by Satkari Mookerjee | 1935 | 152,014 words | ISBN-10: 8120807375
A systematic and clear presentation of the philosophy of critical Realism as expounded by Dignaga and his school. The work is divided into two parts arranged into 26 chapters. Part I discusses the Nature of Existence, Logical Difficulties, Theory of Causation, Universals, Doctrine of Apoha, Theory of Soul and Problem of After-life. Part II deals wi...
The problem of Logic is pre-eminently the discovery of universal concomitance of the probans (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya), because this is the pivot and ground on which inference is based. We can infer the existence of fire from the existence of smoke in all places and times, only if we can persuade ourselves by unflinching logic that smoke cannot exist without fire. But what is the guarantee that smoke and fire will be associated together without any break? We cannot certainly arrive at this truth from perceptual observation, because all the individual cases of fire and smoke, present, past and future, near and distant, are not amenable to observation; and even if it had been possible, it would have rendered all inference nugatory. Nor can this invariable concomitance be known with the help of inference, because inference is itself possible only if there is an invariable concomitance at its back and for this, again, another inference would be in request and for that a third and so on ad infinitum. The upshot will be that no inference would be possible. So the problem of problems that logic has to face and solve is to enquire into and discover the grounds of this universal concomitance.
The Materialists of the Cārvāka school and later on Bhartṛhari and Śrīharṣa emphatically denied the possibility of ascertaining this universal connexion and consequently the validity of inference as a medium of authentic knowledge. The Buddhists affirm that inference of the probandum is possible if the probans is ascertained to be endowed with triple characteristics set forth above. And these triple characteristics can be easily established if the probans can be shown to stand in the relation of causality or essential identity to the probandum in question. But this fundamental position of the Buddhists has been questioned by these sceptics. There is no knowing that fire will produce smoke for all eternity or the oak will have the essential attributes of a tree for all time to come. The powers and attributes of things are not unfrequently observed to undergo essential change of nature in different seasons and places and circumstances. Dates grown on a particular soil have a distinct taste and nutritive properties from dates grown in other countries; water is generally cool, but the water of the well has a tepid temperature and the ice-glaciers of the Himalayas have a freezing touch. Fire has an excessively hot touch in summer, but has got a bearable heat in the cold season. Moreover, even things observed to have definite causal efficiency are seen to be inoperative in regard to other substances. Thus, fire observed to have burning capacity is seen to be inoperative on asbestos and mica. So appeal to the Uniformity of Nature, too, is unavailing, because it is not given to man to divine the secrets of Nature. The sun rises in the east every morning, but there is no guarantee that it will not rise in another direction or not rise at all. Causality, too, is of no avail, because it is quite supposable that the secret nature of the objects and consequently their effects and influence may change without any change in their sensible qualities. “This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: why may it not happen always and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition?” And the relation of cause and effect is not understood by any process of reasoning or argument (larka), but from experience. Certainly there is nothing in what we call the cause which can make us infer an event, the effect. Were this the case one could infer from the first appearance of an object the event that would follow.; But only a number of instances can make us understand the relation. And there is nothing different in a number of instances from every single instance except this: that when in a number of instances the same thing is followed by a particular event, the mind is, by a customary habit, taken, on the appearance of one, to the thought of another, its attendant. The connexion takes place in the mind and cannot be supposed to subsist between the objects and so cannot be known a priori. The relation of causality or of essential identity (tādātmya), on which the Buddhist logician bases the universal concomitance, has, by itself, no special virtue to commend itself in preference to repeated observation of co-presence (sahacāra), which the Naiyāyika claims to be guarantee of the validity of inferential knowledge. Even causation in the last resort is nothing but a belief in the Uniformity of Nature and this Uniformity of Nature is but an unproved postulate.
No guarantee can be offered that the course of Nature, though seen to be perfectly regular in the past, will not change in the future.
“Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future in all our inferences, where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect the event with the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any contrary supposition.”
Purandara, evidently a philosopher of the Cārvāka school, observes that ordinary inference, which we make in our practical life and experience, is not denied by the Cārvākas. The Cārvāka questions the ultimate validity of inference as an instrument of. metaphysical thought. Śāntarakṣita rejoins that if ordinary inference is admitted, you admit the validity of inference as such. Inference, whether ordinary or super-ordinary, is based on causal relation and identity of essence and if this basic relation is taken to be a fact, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of inference even in metaphysical speculations. Gaṅgeśa in the Tattvacintāmaṇi maintains that universal concomitance is known from observation of co-presence of two facts, provided this knowledge is not vitiated by a doubt or uncertainty as to its invariability. If there is a definite knowledge that the co-presence is variable, the universal concomitance is out of the question. But if there is no definite certainty of an exception the universal concomitance can be presumed and this presumption amounts to certitude when all doubts are resolved by a reductio ad absurdum of the contrary supposition. It may be contended that the reductio ad absurdum too is a sort of inference, being based upon a knowledge of universal concomitance between the contradictories and so there will arise a vicious infinite series. Thus, when one argues, that smoke must be concomitant with fire, because smoke is the product of fire, and a product cannot exist without its cause, the arguer assumes a wider universal proposition that cause and effect are inseparably related and for this second universal proposition a third will have to be assumed and so on to infinity. The sceptic will doubt that though a product, smoke can exist independently of fire. But Gaṅgeśa says that no such doubt is possible. You can doubt so long as you do not contradict yourself. It is not possible that you doubt the invariability of causal relation, when you invariably adopt fire to produce smoke. Your own practice and behaviour are proof positive that you do not and cannot doubt the invariable character of causal relation. If out of cussedness you insist on doubting, your practice contradicts your doubt and self-contradiction is the limit of doubt. But this argument of Gaṅgeśa would not satisfy a sceptic. The sceptic would observe in return that the logician here confounds a metaphysical doubt with a logical doubt. The doubt of a philosopher may be deeper than our ordinary empirical doubts.
We can quote with profit Hume in this connexion,
“My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent I am satisfied on the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference.”
European logicians have relegated the task of solution of these doubts to metaphysics.
“Now these doubts and surmises are metaphysical spectres which it remains for Metaphysics to lay. Logic has no direct concern with them, but keeps the plain path of plain beliefs, level with the comprehension of plain men.”
From the metaphysical standpoint, therefore, all our inferences are of a hypothetical character, being based in the ultimate analysis on the belief in the Uniformity of Nature, which belief again is inspired by our uncontradicted experience in the past.
“Nevertheless, it seems undesirable to call our confidence in Nature’s Uniformity an hypothesis, it is incongruous to use the same term for our tentative conjectures and for our most indispensable beliefs. ‘The universal Postulate’ is a better term for the principle which, in some form or other, every generalisation takes for granted.”
Apart from these metaphysical doubts, which lay axe at the very root of all inference, the empirical validity of inference is not doubted even by the greatest sceptic. The importance of universal concomitance both in subjective inference (svārthānumāna) and syllogistic argument (parārthānumāna) was emphasised by Dignāga perhaps for the first time and ever since it has been recognised as an indispensable part of syllogistic argument. Though the Nyāyasūtra does not contain any reference to this all-important factor of inference and there is room for supposition that the argument in Nyāya is based on analogy, there are indications that Vātsyāyana was conscious of the necessity of universal concomitance. Uddyotakara, however, interpreted the Sūtras (1.1.35-36) in such a way that he brought it into line with the triple condition emphasised in Buddhist logic.
Dignāga was perhaps the first logician to insist on the universal concomitance being stated in a syllogism and the violation of this rule was stated to give rise to two fallacies of the example, viz.,
- non-statement of concomitance in agreement (apradarśitānvaya)
- and non-statement of concomitance in difference (apradarśitavyatireka).
Jayantabhaṭṭa fully endorses the Buddhist position in this respect and observes that mere statement of the example is due to laziness; on the other hand, it should be stated only with a view to point out the universal concomitance.
Now, what is the means of apprehending this universal concomitance? The Buddhist answers that the concomitance is known to be universal and invariable if the relation between the probans and the probandum can be shown to be either one of causality or essential identity and not from mere observation of co-accompaniment of two factors. If the concomitance be based upon causality or essential identity, the relation cannot but be conceived to be invariable, as an effect cannot be conceived to be independent of a cause and hence the effect is the proof of the cause; and as regards two things, whose nature is fundamentally identical, there can be no separation between the two, as that would be tantamount to forfeiture of their own essential character, which is inconceivable. So long as the supposition of the contrary possibility is not ruled out of court by a reductio ad absurdum, the doubt as to their concomitance being a case of accidental coincidence will not be removed. And the reductio ad absurdum can come into operation only if the facts in question are known to be related as set forth above. Jayantabhaṭṭa, however, charges the Buddhist with partial observation and narrowness of outlook. If nothing outside causality be supposed to be the ground of universal concomitance, then numerous cases of invariable concomitance and consequential inference would be left unaccounted for. Thus, for instance, the forthcoming appearance of stars is inferred from sunset, the rise of tidal waves from the rise of the moon, impending rainfall is inferred from the movement of ants carrying off their larvæ, the existence of shade on the other side of light on the surface and suchlike cases of inference are approved by all and sundry. But the concomitance in these cases cannot be traced to causality. If the Buddhist raises doubt about the invariability of such cases of concomitance, we shall answer that there is some invariable relation between the two, no doubt, but there is absolutely no justification to restrict this relation to causality and identity alone. Moreover, such doubts are possible even in the case of causality, why should smoke issue from fire alone and not from water? If uncontradicted experience be the answer, the Naiyāyika also can point to this uncontradicted experience of concomitance in agreement and difference as evidence.
The Buddhist in reply observes that mere concomitance.in presence and absence cannot constitute sufficient evidence of its invariability; unless the contrary possibility is debarred by a reductio ad absurdum doubt will persist. And the reductio ad absurdum can arise only if the relation is understood to be one of causality or identity, because no other relation can be conceived to be invariable and uniform. Mere concomitance is incompetent to prove this invariability. For an instance in point, the case of material bodies and the fact of their being inscribable by an iron stylus can be adduced. It may have been observed in hundreds of cases that material bodies are liable to be inscribed by an iron stylus, but this is no guarantee that it would hold good universally and an exception is found in the case of diamonds, which though material are not liable to be scratched by an iron stylus. As regards the cases adduced by the Naiyāyikas, it should be observed that there must be a causal relation, though indirect, between the two sets of connected phenomena. They must be co-effects of the same set of causes and conditions, otherwise the invariability of their relation cannot be explained. If the relation of causality or identity cannot be discovered offhand, we should conduct researches to find out such relation. It will not do to rest content with observation of mere concomitance. So long as such relation is not discovered, the universal proposition can at best be regarded as an empirical generalisation.
Prof. Carveth Reid has enumerated five cases of Uniformities of Co-existence, which cannot be supposably subsumed under a wider Principle of co-existence corresponding to Causation, the principle of succession.
These are as follows: —
(1) “The Geometrical; as that, in a four-sided figure, if the opposite angles are equal, the opposite sides are equal and parallel......... The co-existent facts do not cause one another, nor are they jointly caused by something else; they are mutually involved: such is the nature of space.” The Buddhist logician, however, has postulated for the explanation of such cases of coexistence the relation of essential identity.
(2) “Universal co-existence among the properties of concrete things. The chief example is the co-existence of gravity with inertia in all material bodies.” The Buddhist would include this case under essential identity of nature.
(3) “Co-existence due to causation; such as the position of objects in space at any time............ the relative position of rocks in geological strata, and of trees in a forest, are due to causes.” The Buddhist has also noticed such co-existence between the co-effects of a common cause, as between smoke and transformation of fuel, between colour and taste in a fruit.
(4) “The co-existence of properties in Natural Kinds; which we call the constitution, defining characters, or specific nature of such things—oxygen, platinum, sulphur and the other elements;—all these are known to us as different groups of co-existent properties. It may be conjectured, indeed, that these groupings of properties are also due to causation, and sometimes the causes can be traced; but very often the causes are still unknown.”
(5) “There are also a few cases in which properties coexist in an unaccountable way, without being co-extensive with any one species, genus, or order: as most metals are whitish, and scarlet flowers are wanting in fragrance.”
But the Buddhists would suppose that the source and determinant of concomitance in these cases also must be either causation or identity of essence, though such may not be patent to our limited understanding. Because if one thing could be a condition of another thing without a definitive relation, there would be no restriction in inference and anything could be inferred from any other thing.
In support of the Buddhist position we again quote Prof. Carveth Reid,
“All these cases of co-existence (except the Geometrical) present the problem of deriving them from Causation;......... and, indeed, if we conceive of the external world as a perpetual redistribution of matter and energy, it follows that the whole state of Nature at any instant, and, therefore, every co-existence included in it, is due to causation issuing from some earlier distribution of matter and energy.”
“Geometrical Co-existence......... is deduced from the Definitions and Axioms.”
“When Co-existence cannot be derived from Causation, they can only be proved by collecting examples and trusting vaguely to the Uniformity of Nature. If no exceptions are found, we have an empirical law of considerable probability............If exceptions occur, we have at most an approximate generalisation, as ‘Most metals are whitish,’ or ‘Most domestic cats are tabbies.”
The objections of the Naiyāyikas are refuted by this argument, because without causal connexion or essential identity we cannot convince ourselves of the impossibility of the contrary and this alone is determinant of universal concomitance.
Now, the question arises, what is the guarantee that smoke will not abide in a place devoid of fire? And unless all doubts of exception, of the possibility of the particular concomitance being regarded as a case of accidental coincidence, are not totally removed, the knowledge of universal concomitance cannot take place. We have already quoted Gaṅgeśa who says that doubt of universality is removed by a reductio ad absurdum of the contradictory supposition in cases where the contradictory is possible. But in the case of an Exclusively Affirmative Inference (kevalānvayyammāna) there is no contradictory and so doubt regarding the subsistence of the probans in the contradictory is impossible. Here the reductio ad absurdum is not resorted to, because no occasion arises. And in cases where doubt is removed on pain of self-contradiction, there is absolutely no necessity of having recourse to this negative reasoning, as there is no other doubt to remove, bo knowledge of concomitance of probans and probandum unqualified by a doubt or certitude of its variable character is the guarantee of the certitude of invariable unconditional concomitance. Gaṅgeśa, perhaps, casts a fling at the Jaina Logicians who hold that knowledge of the unconditionality of the probans is always made possible by an appeal to negative reasoning (reductio ad absurdum, vipakṣabādhakatarka) and tbis is the determinant of invariable concomitance; because negative reasoning is possible only where there are negative instances and is necessary only where there is doubt. In an Exclusively Affirmative Inference it is out of the question, as there is no negative instance. For example, in an inference of the type, ‘This is nameable, because it is knowable,’there is nothing, which is not knowable, which can be known inasmuch as if it is known, it becomes knowable. So reduction to absurdity of the contrary instances being impossible, the universal concomitance should be held to be cognised by other means than the reductio ad absurdum. But the Jainas contend that there is no such case as an exclusively affirmative inference, because though an actual contradictory may not be in existence, any imaginary contradictory will serve the purpose of showing the absence of the probans as concomitant with the absence of the probandum. It is curious that Jayanta does not admit an exclusively affirmative reason (probans) and thinks that negative concomitance is the most satisfying and decisive factor, though it may not be actually stated in a syllogism. Mere concomitance in agreement is a halting proof. In default of an actual contradictory, the absence of concomitance should be stated in respect of an imaginary concept like the rabbit’s horn. So no probans can be held to be exclusively affirmative and universal, and unconditional concomitance can be proved by means of negative argument only, as concomitance in mere agreement has no probative value.
The Jaina logicians further contend that the triple characteristic and the fivefold characteristic of the probans, respectively maintained by the Buddhist and the Naiyāyikas as the conditio sine qua non of valid inference, are absolutely inane and ineffectual, because the triple or the fivefold condition, if unbacked by knowledge of the impossibility of the contradictory supposition, cannot be a sufficient guarantee of universal concomitance. This can be brought home by a concrete example, ‘X is certainly of a swarthy complexion, because he is a son of Mitrā like the-other sons of Mitrā (who are known to be swarthy).’ In this syllogism, the probans ‘being the son of Mitrā’ is present in the subject X; and so the first condition is satisfied (pakṣasattva). It is also a known fact that other sons of Mitrā are swarthy, and so the second condition ‘existence of the probans in the homologues’ is fulfilled; it is also known- that those who have not a swarthy complexion are not sons of Mitrā, and so the third condition, ‘absence of the probans in the heterologous cases’ is satisfied. But though the triple condition is satisfied in full, the inference is not valid, as there is no logical incompatibility in the fact of Mitrā’s son possessing a fair complexion.
It is, therefore, perfectly reasonable to hold this ‘logical incompatibility of the contradictory supposition’ to be the only legitimate character of a valid probans, when the triple character is absolutely abortive in the absence of this condition and this condition alone is found to prove the thesis, though the triple character may be absent. The triple character of the Buddhist and the fivefold attribute of the Naiyāyika are only logical offshoots of this condition alone, viz., the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory and all their cogency and validity are derived from this factor alone. So it is only a roundabout procedure to regard them as the essential condition of a legitimate probans and sometimes this is misleading and erroneous. It is not infrequently seen that inference’is made without any reference to the subsistence of the probans in the subject (minor term), as for instance the Brāhmanhood of the son is inferred from the Brāhmanhood of the parents. And even the Buddhist has to admit that in negative inference, e.g., in the heterologue, reference to the subject is absolutely unnecessary. The mere knowledge of negative concomitance, of the absence of the probans consequent on the absence of probandum, is alone necessary in such cases. The Buddhist, therefore, cannot insist that the triple character is either fundamental or universal.
The Buddhist however has contended in protest that the triple condition is the only legitimate ground of universal concomitance and, consequently, of inference. The second condition ‘subsistence in homologues’ (sapakṣasattva) does not mean ‘mere subsistence,’ but ‘subsistence in homologues, solely and exclusively,’ which is tantamount to its absolute non-existence in the heterologues or contradictory instances. And in the syllogism in question, the non-existence of the probans,
‘being the son of Mitrā,’ in the contradictory instances is doubtful, as there is no logical incompatibility in Mitrā’s son being not swarthy. The question of complexion, swarthy or otherwise, depends upon other factors, viz., food, merit and the like and not upon Mitrā’s motherhood. Hemacandrasūri, one of the foremost Jaina philosophers, observes in reply to this defence of the Buddhist that the Buddhist here completely gives up his position when he seeks to put such restriction upon the second condition. ‘Subsistence in homologues alone, solely and exclusively’ is tantamount to negation of the contradictory and this is our position. We, Jainas, maintain that the probans must be shown to be incompatible with the contradictory of the probandum in question and this is the only legitimate and self-sufficient condition. And when the Buddhist has to fall back upon this negative interpretation, it is legitimate and fair that he should take up our position and waive all false allegiance to the triple character, simply because it is propounded by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Moreover, the triple character as the definition of a valid probans is rather too narrow, because it fails to meet the exigencies of such arguments as, ‘whatever is existent is momentary.’ In this syllogism there is no homologue, as the attribute of momentariness is predicated of all existent things without exception. The subject or the minor term is a comprehensive class including all existents in its denotation and the universal concomitance is understood in the subject itself. If existence in a homologe was a necessary precondition of the knowledge of concomitance, there could not possibly be any such knowledge of concomitance between momentariness and existents. But the truth of this concomitance and the resultant inference form the very foundation of the Buddhist theory of flux. The Buddhist logician therefore has got to admit that the triple character is not a universal condition.
We have fully refuted the objections of the Naiyāyikas and proved that an imaginary datum has as much logical value as a real object; and where an actual contradictory (vipakṣa) may be impossible, the imaginary concept will do duty for it. So universal concomitance can be understood only by ruling out the contradictory supposition, though the contradictory may be a fiction. The contention of the Naiyāyikas that there is no contradictory of such concepts as ‘knowable,’ ‘cognisable,’ etc., is absolutely devoid of sense and substance. Because, words are used to remove a doubt or misconception in the mind of the hearer, and not without a purpose. And the use of language finds its justification in the removal of such doubt and the like.. Such propositions as ‘colour and form is cognisable by visual perception,’ though tautologous, have still got to be used if there is a doubt or misconception regarding this truth. One may argue, ‘there is no reason that colour should be cognisable by visual perception only, consciousness is one indivisible entity and as such can cognise colour through the auditory sense also.’ And only to rebut such doubt the former propositon is employed. So such words as ‘cognisable,’ ‘knowable’ and the like have got a definite meaning and this definiteness means the exclusion of what it is not, viz., ‘unknowable.’ The excluded thing may be a fact or a fiction. So there is no such thing as a purely affirmative concept and consequently exclusion of negative instances necessary to bring home the truth of a universal proposition is not impossible, as the Naiyāyika contends.
It follows therefore that incompatibility with the contradictory should be regarded as the only logical attribute of a valid probans and the triple or quantuple character without this is powerless to prove the necessary connexion. The Jaina Logicians and later on Ratnākaraśānti, a Buddhist, call this fact ‘internal concomitance’ (antarvyāpti) as opposed, to the Naiyāyikas who hold that universal concomitance is apprehended outside the subject of inference, e.g., in a kitchen and not in the hill. This conception of universal concomitance is characterised as ‘external concomitance’ (bahirvyāpti). The Jainas emphasise that the relation of probans and probandum must be a natural constitutional relation, appertaining to the inherent nature of things and so wherever may concomitance be apprehended, the concomitance must be understood in respect of the probans and the probandum per se without reference to the place of occurrence, which is an accidental coincidence.
Though this doctrine of. internal concomitance has been established by Ratnākaraśānti with ardour and emphasis, and he has left no stone unturned to reconcile this theory with the logical position of Dignāga, it is absolutely certain that the orthodox Buddhist logicians did not accept this theory for a long time to come. On the other hand, the Buddhist logicians attacked this doctrine with all the emphasis at their command. And this is quite natural, because the doctrine of internal concomitance is antagonistic to the doctrine of the triple condition of the probans advocated by Dignāga and also the fallacy of the inconclusive-reason-peculiar-to-the-subject. That this was the case can be inferred from the fact that Śāntarakṣita has attacked this theory as propounded by the Jaina logician Pātrasvāmin and tried to uphold the position of Dignāga.
‘The valid probans is that which is incompatible with the contradictory and it is immaterial whether the two examples, positive and negative, are present or not. Incompatibility with the contradictory is the foundation of inference and if it is present, the triple characteristics are unnecessary and if it is absent, these are absolutely futile.’
‘let this incompatibility be the determinant of unconditional, invariable concomitance. But where is this unconditional concomitance apprehended? Is this relation apprehended between the probans and probandum in their widest and most general character without reference to the particulars? Or is it understood in the subject under dispute ? Or in the homologue?
Now, in the first alternative, the existence of tbe probandum in the subject (minor term) cannot be proved, because the probans is not said to be present in the subject. For instance we can point out the concomitance of visibility with impermanence, which, though unconditional and invariable as far as it goes, cannot prove the quality of impermanence in a word. If the subsistence of the probans in the subject is to be expressly stated, we get the triple character in full. Because by the incompatibility-with-the contradictory we have got universal concomitance both in agreement and difference and from the subsistence of the probans in the subject we have the first condition. So the Jainas do not gain anything by formulating this unitary character, which is nothing but an abbreviated formula of the triple characteristics. If however it is supposed that the universal concomitance is understood in and through the subject itself, the employment of the probans in an inference becomes redundant, as the existence of the probandum in the subject will be proved by the knowledge of the concomitance.
“The Buddhists think that a valid probans is what is not found to be dissociated from the probandum in an example. But we Jainas think that the probans is what is not capable of coming into existence without the probandum in the subject of inference. So our inference has a double aspect like the man-lion deity, as there is in it the room for exclusion of the contradictory (vipakṣavyāvṛtti), the condition of arthāpatti (Presumption) of the Mīmāṃakas and the pakṣasattva (the subsistence of the probans in the subject) of the Buddhists. It is an entirely different thing from the inference of the Buddhists and the presumption of the Mīmāṃsakas.”
But this conception of inference will make the value of the probans absolutely nugatory. If the probans cannot come into existence without being conjoined to the probandum, then the very apprehension of the probans in the subject will entail the apprehension of the probandum also, as the probans is invariably associated with the probandum. And if the probandum is not knōwn, the probans also cannot be known, because the probans is supposed to be constitutionally associated with the probandum and this inseparable relation with the probandum is the very life and soul of the probans. If however the probandum is known by any other means, the probans will have no function and value, as the probans is requisitioned only to prove the probandum and if the probandum is proved otherwise, what shall we do with the probans?
If the universal concomitance is supposed to be apprehended in an external example without reference to the subject, then, the existence of the probandum in the subject will not be proved, because the concomitance, which is the foundation of inference, is not apprehended in its universal reference. So it is proved that no inference is possible unless the probans is possessed of the triple character, enunciated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. And as in subjective inference the probans is reduced to nullity in the theory of internal concomitance, so will be in syllogistic argument the statement of the subsistence of the probansin the subject; in one word, the minor premise will be redundant. In a syllogism, the universal proposition expressing the universal concomitance is first stated and then the minor premise, showing the subsistence of the probans in the subject, is employed. But this would be unnecessary and unjustifiable -in the theory of internal concomitance, because this theory takes for granted that the concomitance is apprehended in the subject and so the subsistence of the probans in the subject would be cognised along with, or previous to, the concomitance. The statement of the universal concomitance will therefore itself involve a knowledge of the minor premise and as such the express statement of the minor premise will become redundant. But in the theory of external concomitance (bahirvyāpti), the statement of the minor premise is necessary, because the concomitance is apprehended outside the subject in outside examples, e.g., kitchen and the like, and if the minor premise is not stated, the knowledge of the probandum in the subject will become impossible.
In reply to this. elaborate charge of the orthodox Buddhist logicians, the upholder of internal concomitance maintains that all this attack proceeds upon a misconception of the nature and process of the knowledge of universal concomitance on the part of the opponents. It must be admitted by all that universal concomitance is understood without any reference either to the subject or to the homologue whatsoever. The advocate of external concomitance holds that inference is rendered possible if it is preceded by a knowledge of the subsistence of the probans in the subject (minor premise, pakṣadharmatājñāna) and the remembrance of the universal concomitance (vyāptijñāna), and this position is fully endorsed by the exponent of internal, concomitance also. The. knowledge of the minor premise (pakṣadharmatā) alone unbacked by a knowledge of universal concomitance (as in a case of lapse of memory) does not lead to any inference. In the circumstances it may be contended that whereas the concomitance with the probandum of the probans is remembered in respect of the subject, and as such the knowledge of the probandum in its relation to the subject is derived from the act of remembrance, the possibility of inference as an independent instrument of knowledge is excluded, as its function, namely, the deduction of the probandum, has been exercised by memory. If to avoid this contingency it is.contended that the universal concomitance is remembered without any reference to the subject, we ask why should the subject be ignored or passed over when the universal concomitance is remembered in respect of the probans factually existing in the subject? You will have to concede that this concomitance is cognised in respect of the universals, say, for instance, the universal-smoke and the universal-fire, and that the subject or the homologue does not enter as determinant factors into this knowledge. On the contrary, reference to the subject or the homologue would render the probans too particularistic to make inference permissible. The subject or the homologue is only a medium of this universal knowledge and cannot be supposed to delimit the concomitance to their own individual extent. The minor premise, in which the probans is found to exist, has a value in determining the incidence of the probandum, but it has no function so far as the universal concomitance qua its universal character is concerned. Reference to the individual on the other hand would only circumscribe the concomitance and thus render inference either futile or impossible. Moreover, this individualistic reference cannot be pressed as a universal characteristic because universal concomitance is known to be cognised in negative instances without any reference to a particular individual as the substratum of such concomitance. If the knowledge of the subsistence of the probans in the subject (the minor premise) is deemed to be a necessary factor of knowledge of universal concomitance the opponent cannot maintain that such concomitance is ascertained in the homologue, because the knowledge of the minor premise is lacking in this case. And if this reference to the subject is insisted upon as a factor of the concomitance, then inference will be rendered nugatory, as the knowledge of the probandum in the subject will be derived from memory. It follows therefore with irresistible logic that reference to the subject is unnecessary in universal concomitance, whether it is held to be cognised internally between the probans and the probandum or externally in an outside homologue and so inference has a scope and a function assured in the doctrine of internal concomitance much to the discomfiture of the opponents.
The interests of subjective ratiocination (svārthānumāna), we have seen, are not in jeopardy in the theory of internal concomitance. The probans has a utility of its own and so inference is not jettisoned. And the contention of the opponent that the statement of the minor premise, showing the subsistence of the probans in the subject, will be useless in syllogistic argument (parārthānumāna) is equally hollow and unsubstantial. It is urged that the customary form of a syllogistic argument is that the universal proposition is stated first and then comes the minor premise. In the theory of internal concomitance, the universal concomitance is known in the subject and so the knowledge of the subsistence of the probans in the subject being an antecedent condition of knowledge of universal concomitance, the statement of the universal proposition will carry with it a reference to the subject and so the statement of the minor premise will be redundant and useless. Nay, the statement of the probans will alone be sufficient, as the probans, by virtue of its concomitance with the probandum, will induce a knowledge of the probandum.
In reply to this contention of the advocate of external concomitance, the adherent of internal concomitance observes that the order of syllogistic premises has nothing to do with our subjective experience. Whatever be the customary arrangement of propositions in a syllogism, we have nothing to quarrel with. Because, after all, it is a question of arrangement of words, and words have no bearing on objective facts and much less on concomitance and the like, which are relations of facts. Words are employed only to indicate these factual relations and so verbal order has no essential relation with factual order and the order of our ratiocinative process. Whatever be the arrangement of premises, the knowledge of the probans subsisting in the subject is the first step in the ratiocinative process and thp the universal concomitance is ascertained by a reductio ad absurdum of the contradictory proposition. And this is exactly the psychological process involved in all cases of inference irrespective of the order of propositions in a syllogism. Moreover, the syllogistic order is not the same in all schools of thought, and if the order of ratiocination is made contingent upon the verbal order, there will be no uniformity in inferential knowledge as a psychological fact. The statement of the minor premise is therefore not redundant in the theory of internal concomitance.
In the opponent’s view, too, the probans is first cognised and then its concomitance with the probandum is apprehended in the externally found homologue. Such also is the case in the theory of internal concomitance. The probans is first cognised in the subject and then the concomitance is arrived at by its own proof, viz., the reductio ad absurdum of the opposite thesis. We therefore hold that invariable concomitance is a factual relation inherent in the probans and the probandum and is arrived at internally, that is to say, without reference to an external homologue or the subject. It may be contended that in an external example the probans and the probandum are seen to be associated together and so their concomitance is easily apprehended. But these two are not found in association in the subject and so their concomitance cannot be comprehended. But this contention blinks the fact that though found in association, the two facts are not correlated as probans and probandum in an external example and this correlation is understood after the comprehension of their concomitance. Moreover, this coassociation may be pressed only in cases like that of fire and smoke, but the case of the concomitance of existence and momentariness is not a matter of perception. In this case at least the reductio ad absurdum has to be appealed to as proof of the concomitance of the two qualities. There can be no difficulty, therefore, for the concomitance being comprehended in the subject. Again, observation of co-association can be of little avail. If such observation had any efficacy, we need not have waited for a number of instances, as each observation is absolutely alike and non-distinct from the other and there being no special virtue in a mere repetition of the instances, the first instance should have been sufficient for the purpose. Mere observation of co-association cannot be regarded as an adequate security of invariable concomitance and its failure in the case of diamonds and the fact of inscribability can be adduced as an instance in point. It must be admitted that unless and until the contrary supposition is barred by a reductio ad absurdum, there can be no assurance of invariable concomitance and this fact alone is sufficient and necessary.
Śāntarakṣita contended that if the universal concomitance is not apprehended with reference to the subject, the probans will fail in its probative value. Because tbis would only mean that the subsistence of the probans in the subject would not be a necessary condition and the consequence would be that word could be inferred to be perishable on the ground of visibility. But the objection is neither sound nor fair. There is no invariable concomitance between visibility and impermanence of word and so no inference is allowed, and reference to the subject has nothing to do with it. Furthermore, the statement of the probans endowed with invariable concomitance can only prove the probandum in any and every possible subject, but the particular subject has got to be mentioned for determinate reference. The objection that the statement of the subject will make the probans useless has already been refuted. Neither can it be urged that in the absence of pakṣadharmatā, an inference would be legitimate on the basis of a probans existing outside the subject, because the occasion for debate cannot arise unless the probans is apprehended in relation to a particular subject. The subsistence of the probans in this subject is an implied fact. It follows therefore that reference to an external example is absolutely redundant and unprofitable, because invariable concomitance is comprehended only when the contrary supposition is absolutely barred out and so long as this does not occur, a thousand instances of co-association will not help us in the least.
Nor is there any logical necessity for the statement of the example in a syllogistic argument, and the omission of the example on the other hand will make the syllogism scientific and less cumbrous. The example is usually tagged on to the universal proposition, the major premise, but there is no logical or psychological warrant for this addition of a superfluous and otiose adjunct. It may be contended that if universal concomitance is comprehended in the subject of inference and not in an outside example, say kitchen, then the probandum will be proved in the subject along with the concomitance by the proof of the latter and an appeal to the probans will be superfluous. The result will be that ‘inference’ as an independent proof will have no scope, as the predication of the probandum, for which it would be in request, would be accomplished by the knowledge of universal concomitance and its proof. But if the said concomitance is held to be cognised in an outside example without any reference to the subject, the adduction of the probans will have a meaning and a purpose for bringing home the predication of the probandum in respect of the subject and inference will have its own sphere of action. Our reply is that if the probandum is proved by means of the instrument of universal concomitance and resort to inference is, thus, rendered unnecessary, we have nothing to complain about. On the contrary we have every reason to congratulate ourselves on the positive gain and the economy of logical procedure that we are relieved of the necessity of having recourse to the probans. It is not an obsession with us that we shall have to resort to the probans at all events. We must have courage to throw away this convention, if there is no sanction of logical necessity behind it. And if the probandum is not so proved of the subject by the instrument of universal concomitance, the probans will not be superfluous and inference will have its vested rights preserved intact. That such is the case has been proved beyond cavil or doubt in the foregoing paragraphs. So there is absolutely no cause for this consternation about our theory of internal concomitance.
Neither can reference to an example be needful for the comprehension of concomitance, because the reductio ad absurdum of the contrary supposition is alone sufficient for the purpose. Nor can it be in request for the attestation or verification of the same, because concomitance has reference to universals and examples being individual instances can have no relevancy in that respect. Nor again can it be supposed to be necessary for recalling the fact of concomitance to memory, because the mention of the concomitant probans is the sufficient stimulus for that. An example, on the other hand, would raise the spectre of doubt, because an example can but serve as evidence of concomitance in its own particular case and it does not afford any guarantee for its universal truth. If to lay this spectre you think it necessary to state the universal proposition as proof of universal concomitance, we submit, let this alone be stated and why should the example, an otiose appendage as it is, be tagged on to it? It may be urged that mention of a concrete example is necessary for bringing home the universal truth to a dull understanding. It may be so, we submit. But in that case, the statement of example should be confined within a manual of logic and should not be stated in a logical disputation, because only an expert is eligible for debate. Besides, a debate or a logical disputation is not the occasion for the instruction of pupils, as its objective is only to score a victory by an effective refutation of the opponent’s thesis. It has been contended that this admission of the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory and the implied necessity of its reference to the subject on the part of the exponent of internal concomitance virtually amounts to the postulation of the triple-charactered probans advocated by the orthodox Buddhist logicians; and so the unitary probans transpires to be but an abbreviated formula and the gain is only verbal and apparent. We admit the plausibility of the objection. The triple character is but a corollary of incompatibility-with-the-contradictory and the latter alone is the validating condition of the so-called triple character, which, without this saving grace, becomes but an effete and inane adjunct. We therefore regard this factor alone as the adequate qualification of the probans and not the triple character, which draws all its validity from the former.
It may be urged that if incompatibility with the contradictory, that is to say, total absence from heterologous instances, is deemed the sufficient qualification of a valid probans and subsistence in homologous cases, the second characteristic according (to?) Buddhist logic, is not an indispensable condition, then there would be no case for the fallacy of 'the uncommon inconclusive probans’ (asādhāraṇānaikāntika-hetu). The fallacy is upposed to arise when the probans belongs exclusively to the subject (pakṣa or dharmin) and so does not. exist in a homologous instance, as for instance, the probans ‘audibility.’ According to Dignāga, such inference as word is impermanent, because it is audible’ is not valid, as the quality of audibility is the exclusive property of word and its concomitance with impermanence is not: attested in a homologous instance. If the testimony of a homologous instance is deemed unnecessary, as is done by the advocate of internal concomitance, this argument would be legitimate and valid. But this is in express contravention of the position of Dignāga. The Jaina logicians, who professed no allegiance to Dignāga, did not regard this discrepancy as a case: of. disloyalty; on the contrary, they, gloated over this triumph over Dignāga for obvious reasons. The Jaina logicians regarded the above inference as perfectly legitimate and valid, because they think that audibility is incompatible with permanence, the contradictory of impermanence, and this incompatibility is the only satisfying condition of validity. But Ratnākaraśānti, who appropriated this theory of internal concomitance from the Jainas, had to face this charge of treason against Dignāga, whose authority he could not disown being a Buddhist by profession. Accordingly he has endeavoured to bring it into line with Dignāga’s conception of valid probans; and he has succeeded in doing so only by explaining away Dignāga’s theory of triple character. He observes that the doctrine of triple character only emphasises the fact of invariable concomitance in agreement and difference and that this concomitance in its dual aspect has got to be ascertained to ensure the validity of the probans. It is silent and indifferent with regard to cases where this twofold, concomitance has to be ascertained. The obvious implication is that it should be ascertained wherever it is possible. If the aspect of agreement is ascertained in the subject on the strength of the impossibility of the contradictory proposition, there is no ground for complaint. The opponent has got to admit it in such cases of inference as ‘All that exists is momentary.’ In this inference, ‘momentariness’ is predicated of all existents without exception and as such there is no homologue external to and apart from the subject, where the agreemental aspect could be verified. The agreement therefore must be admitted to be comprehended in the subject on the strength of the absurdity of the contrary possibility. Subsistence in a homologue in and by itself has no cogency, unless it is ratified by the absurdity of the counterissue. So the fallacy of the uncommon inconclusive probans is no fallacy in reality. It has been formulated by the Master only as a concession to persons of dull intellect, who labour under the delusion that concomitance can be ascertained only in an external example outside the scope of the subject. But this is not really so, as concomitance is apprehended in a universal reference.
The uncommon probans has been characterised as inconclusive only with reference to these deluded persons. As a matter of fact, concomitance is comprehended without reference to the homologue and so the absence of the homologue cannot render a probans inconclusive, though it might be uncommon. If we probe deeper into the question, we shall see that the probans, ‘audibility,’ is not only not inconclusive, but also is not uncommon either. It has been characterised as uncommon only in deference to the logical superstition of dull-beaded persons. A probans is called uncommon when, it is found to belong solely and wholly to the subject of dispute. But in the case of audibility, the subject of dispute is the perceived sound and the probans ‘audibility’ belongs to perceived and unperceived sounds alike, just like the smoke-in-the universal, which is not the property of the hill alone, but also of the kitchen and the like. So concomitance in a universal reference. being cognisable between audibility and impermanence, there is absolutely no reason to characterise it as uncommon. An uncommon probans cannot have a universal reference, and if its concomitance is supposed to be comprehended in the subject, which is its only locale, the probandum will be proved of the subject along with the concomitance and so the probans will be futile as an instrument of inference. In such cases, there can possibly be no concomitance and in the absence of concomitance, the probans will have a doubtful cogency either this way or that and so will be inconclusive. But when universal concomitance is possible, audibility should be regarded as a conclusive probans. When the subject of dispute is an individual sound, another sound will serve as the example and if all the sounds are made the subject, the reductio ad absurdum will make an example of one among them, though it may not be accepted as a full-fledged example. In other words, the absence of an undisputed example will not operate as a bar. It is seen that audibility and the like are neither uncommon nor inconclusive. The objection based upon this fallacy has no force against the theory of internal concomitance and it should not be regarded as conflicting with the position of the venerable Master Dignāga.
We have seen that concomitance is comprehended by means of reductio ad absurdum of the contradictory thesis and examples have no bearing upon it. Reductio ad absurdum is a species of tarka (hypothetical reasoning) and tarka is not regarded as an independent means of proof. We shall bring this chapter to a close after discussing whether tarka is a proof or not. Vātsyāyana has called it not-proof (apramāṇa). It is not a vehicle of certitude.
It is not a knowledge of the type ‘this is so and not otherwise.’ When two conflicting alternatives present themselves, tarka only shows the incompatibility of one and approves of the other. It only reinforces the independent means of truth and as such is only an assistant in the matter of ascertaining the truth. It approves the matter of proof and does not prove it.  Uddyotakara regarded it as a kind of cognition different from doubt and certitude alike and has gone the length of declaring them fools-who subsume it under inference. There is a vital difference between the two, as tarka has no reference to the probans or its subsistence in the subject (paksadharmatā). Inference is invariably pivoted upon this knowledge of the probans in relation to the subjects. But tarka is not fettered like this. It may prove something -regarding a particular subject on the basis of an attribute found in the other, as for example in a reasoning like this, ‘certainly there are human beings here, because we see that horses are used as beasts of burden.’ Now, a horse as bearer of burden is no attribute of human beings, but nevertheless it signifies ‘their existence. The difference between inference and tarka is, therefore, very manifest and so they should not be confounded. Gaṅgeśa, too, has characterised tarka as not-proof (apramāṇa). Thus, the tradition among the Naiyāyikas is uniformly consistent with regard to the neutral character of tarka and about its lack of probative value. We have not come across any speculation on tarka in any Buddhist work. But Ratnākaraśānti always characterised it as vipakṣabādhakapramāṇa (the proof refuting the contradictory.) and Ratnakīrti treated this proof of contradiction as a full-fledged syllogistic argument in his Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi. The obvious implication is that it is regarded as a proof and as a species of inference; In fact, if tarka is to be treated as a pramāṇa, it must be included under inference as there is no third proof according to the Buddhist logicians. Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra possibly had these Buddhists in view when they characterised this identification of tarka with inference as a delusion. The Jainas however regard it as a separate pramāṇa.
Hemacandra Sūri has fully refuted the views of the Naiyāyikas on tarka. The Naiyāyikas cannot regard tarka as a separate pramāṇa, because that would contradict their doctrine of four pramāṇas. Nor can they subsume it under inference, as inference is contingent on the knowledge of universal concomitance and for this the accepted pramāṇas have no competency. They have to requisition tarka, but to make it Consistent with their central epistemological doctrine of four pramāṇas, the give it a half-hearted recognition. Older Naiyāyikas hold that perception, reinforced and supplemented by tarka, is competent to visualise the universal concomitance. But this doctrine is the result either of confusion or of wilful perversion. Mere perception is incompetent to envisage the concomitance and it is presumed to acquire the competency only when tarka aids and informs it. Is it not fair and legitimate therefore to give tarka the credit and the glory for this generalisation, which perception by its very constitution and nature is incapable of arriving at? Perception is generated by the impetus of sense-data upon our sensitivity and is absolutely delimited to the same, being destitute of ratiocinative faculty. The Naiyāyika is guilty of a dual injustice and this only to maintain a pet superstition. He gives credit to perception which it does not deserve and denies it to tarka though it is its rightful due. The Naiyāyika would plead that he does so because tarka has no validity of its own. But this is a mere dogmatic assertion and has no logic in ife. Why should it be invalid? It has all the incidents of validity in it, to wit, (1) absence of discrepancy with fact and (2) a legitimate object in the shape of universal concomitance. To dub it invalid despite these two characteristics of truth and validity betrays a wilful perversity that will not bow to reason. So tarka must be given an honourable niche in the palace of pramāṇas. It is the instrument of knowledge of universal concomitance and perception and the like do but give the. occasion for it. The Naiyāyika only puts the cart before the horse when he seeks to throw tarka into the background, supposing it to subserve as a vassal the interests of the false master, perception. But the truth is in the contrary version.
We have seen that the doctrine of antarvyāpti (internal concomitance) is originally the creation of Jaina logic and the doctrine has been supported and accepted by Jaina logicians from beginning to end, from Siddhasena Divākara of the 6 th century down to Hemacandra Sūri of the 12th century, to name only two masters. Śāntarakṣita has made frantic attempts to refute this doctrine and this was natural and inevitable, because the doctrine is, we have seen, antagonistic to the doctrine of triple probans and the fallacy of the uncommon inconclusive reason, propounded by Dignāga. Jayantabhaṭṭa refered to this doctrine of antarvyāpti, but his presentation of it is not in consonance with the orthodox view. Moreover, he is silent as to the exponents of this doctrine, as to whether they are Buddhists or Jainas. Later on Ratnakīrti and his worthy disciple, Ratnākaraśānti, more fully than the former, adopted this doctrine and incorporated it into the corpus of Buddhist logic. We have seen that Ratnākaraśānti has made bold and almost frantic efforts to reconcile this doctrine with the fundamental logical position of Dignāga and his followers. It is a truism to say that the world is much indebted to the Buddhists and Jainas, whose logical and philosophical contributions have distinctly extended the frontiers of human knowledge. It will be nothing short of folly and perhaps madness to form an estimate of the development and worth of Indian logic without a close and serious study of the Jaina and Buddhist works still available to us.
- Nyāyasūtra, 1-1-5; 1. 1. 33-40.
- Do. Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana,
- Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara.
- Do. Tātparynṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra.
- Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita.
- Do. Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla.
- Parīkṣāmukhasūtra of Māṇikyanandi.
- Do. Laghusūtravṛtti of Anantavīrya.
- Pramāṇamīmāṃsā of Hemacandra Sūri.
- Ślokavārtika—anumānapariccheda of Kumārila.
- Vākyapadīya, Ch. I, of Bhartṛhari.
- Mahāvidyāviḍambana of Vādīndra (G. O. S.).
- Antarvyāptisamarthana of Ratnākaraśānti.
- Kṣanabhaṅgasiddbi of Ratnakīrti.
- Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṇgeśa.
N.B.—The term antarvyāpti which we have rendered in English as internal concomitance, may be -more happily expressed as ‘Intrinsic Determination’ following Dr. McTaggart.
Cf. “If it is true that. whenever something bas the quality X, something has the quality Y, this involves that, besides the relation between the two propositions “something has the quality X” and “something has the quality Y,” there is a relation between the qualities X and Y. I propose to call this relation Intrinsic Determination The quality X will be said to determine intrinsically the quality Y whenever the proposition that something has the quality X implies the proposition that something has the quality Y.”
The Nature of Existence, Ch. XII; p. 111.
Footnotes and references:
avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu |
bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā ||
nirjñātaśakter dravyasya tāṃ tām arthakriyāṃ prati |
viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śakhiḥ pratibadhyate ||
Vāk Pa., Ch. I, śls. 32-33.
na ca kukatālīyatvādiśaṅkāvyudāsārthaṃ dvitīyādidarśanāpekṣe’ti vācyam, dvitīyādidarśane’pi śaṅkātādavasthyāt......... evaṃ bhūyodarśanam api saṃśāyakam, tarkas tv anavasthāgrasta eve’ti kathaṃ vyāptigrahaḥ.
bhūyodarśanatas tāvad udeti matir īdṛśī |
niyato’yam anene’ti sakalaprāṇisākṣikā ||
Quoted in N. M., p. 122.
T. S., śls. 1482-83.
vyabhicārajñānavirahasahakṛtam sahacāradarśaṇaṃ vyāptigrāhakaṃ, jñānaṃ niścayaḥ śaṅkā ca...... tadvirahaś ca kvacid vipakṣabādhakatarkāt... tarkasya vyāptigrahamūlakatvenā’navasthe’ti cet, na, yāvadāśaṅkaṃ tarkānusaraṇāt. yatra ca vyāgbātena śaṅkai’va nā’vatarati tatra tarkaṃ vinai’va vyāptigrahaḥ... tad idam uktam, tad eva hy āśaṅkyate yaṣminn āśaṅkyamāne svakriyāvyāghāto na bhavatī’ti. na hi sambhavati svayaṃ vahnyādikaṃ dhūmādikāryārthaṃ niyamata upādatte, tatkāraṇaṃ tan ne’ey āśaṅkyate.
We, however, do not undertake to conduct an enquiry into the merits of the sceptical position adopted by Hume and Śrīharṣa, which enquiry will be entirely irrelevant to our purpose, viz., the discussion of logical problems. It will, however, suffice to observe that the doubts and problems raised by these thinkers were not understood at their true value both in India and Europe for a long time. We can profitably quote Kant’s opinion about Hume, which, I doubt not, applies with equal force in the case of Srīharṣa and his critics.
“But the perpetual hard fate of metaphysics would not allow Hume, to be understood. We cannot, without a certain sense of pain, coṅsider how utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie and even Priestley, missed the point of the problem. For while they were ever assuming as conceded what he doubted, and demonstrated with eagerness and often with arrogance what he never thought of disputing, they so overlooked his inclination towards a better state of things, that everything remained undisturbed in its old condition.”
Prolegomena, p. 6.
Carveth Reid, Logic: Deductive and Inductive, p. 10.
Op cit., pp. 264-65.
udāharaṇavacanam ahi paṭavad ity evam ālasyād eva prayuñjate, tad dhi vyāptipradarśanāyai’va vaktavyaṃ yat kṛtakaṃ tad aniṭyaṃ dṛṣṭam yathā ghaṭa iti.
N.M., p. 569.
tasmin saty eva bhavanam na vinā bhavanaṃ tataḥ |
ayam evā’vinābhāvo niyamaḥ sahacāritā ||
kiṃkṛto niyamo’syā’sminn iti ced evam uttaram |
tadātamatādipakṣe’pi nai’ṣa praśno nivarṭate ||
jvalanāj jāyate dhūmo na jalād iti kā gatiḥ |
evam evai’tad iti cet sāhacarye’pi tat saṃam ||
N. M., p. 121.
ekasāmagryadhīnatvād rūpāde rasāto gatiḥ |
hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat |
Quoted in T.S.P., ad. śl. 1425, p. 417.
Op. cit., pp. 165 66.
sambandhānupapattau ca sarvasyā’pi gatir bhavet.
T. S., śl. 1423,
Op. cit., pp. 275-76.
Vādīndra Paṇḍita has elaborately proved that Exclusively Affirmative Inference is an impossible fiction and he has taken the same line of argument as set forth above. He has raised an interesting dilemma, which reduces the opponent to an absurdity. ‘Well,’ the opponent may argue,; ‘when the probans has no counter-instance (vipakṣa), and so exists only in the homologous cases, it is a case of Exclusively affirmative inference.’ But this is only a pretence. Is the counter-instance known or unknown? If known, you cannot deny it. If unknown, you cannot assert that it is non existent !
Vide Mahāvidyāviḍambana, p. 07.
kevalānvayihetuś ca na kaścid upalabhyate.
N. M., p. 676,
(Also,) na kevalānvayī nāma hetuḥ sambhavati.
(Again,) sādhanadharmasya vipakṣād vyāvṛttim abhidhitsatā sādhyābhāve sādhanābhāvo darśayitavyaḥ... yo hy avidyamānavipakṣo hetuḥ so’pi sutarāṃ tato vyāvṛtto bhavati, tadabhāvāt tatrā’vrtter iti...... yatrā’nityatvaṃ nāsti tatra kāryatvam api nāsti yathā śaśaviṣāṇādāv iti.
(Also,) vyatirekaniścayam antareṇa pratibandhagrahaṇānupapatteḥ.
Op. cit., p. 122.
pitroś ca brāhmaṇatvena putre brāhmaṇatānumā |
sarvalokaprasiddhā na pakṣadharmam apekṣate ||
of Kumārila, quoted in Pra. mi., II. 1. 17.
tasmād vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte no’ṣṭo’vaśyara ihā’śrayanḥ |
tadabhāve tu tan ne’ti vacanād api saṅgateḥ ||
quoted inT. S. P., p. 145.
T. S., śls. 1416-18.
atha sapakṣa eva sattvam anvayo na sapakṣe sattvam eve’ti cet, astu, sa tu vyatireka eve’ty asmanmatam aṅgīkṛtaṃ syāt. vayam api hi pratyapīpadāma, anyathānupattyekalakṣano hetur iti.
Pr. mi. v., ad 1-2-12.
Antārvyāpti, SBNT., p. 110.
T. S., śls. 1160-80. Cf. ‘ajñeyaṃ kalpitaṃ kṛtvā tadvyavacchedena jñeye’numānam.’
Dignāga, quoted in T. S. P., p. 359, and Nyāyaratnākara, p. 605, ad śl. 145,. S. V.
anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasya tasyai’va hetutā |
dṛṣṭāntau dvāv api stāṃ vā mā vā tau hi na kāraṇam ||
anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasya tasya trayeṇa kim |
nā’nyathānupapannatvaṃ yasya tasya trayeṇa kim ||
T. S,. śls. 1368-69.
T.S., śls. 1380-88.
A.V., p. 107.
tadbhāvahetubhāvau hi dṛṣṭānte tadavedinaḥ |
vyāpyete viduṣāṃ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalaḥ ||
P.L.S.V., ad III. 93.
saktasya sūcakaṃ hetor vaco’saktam api svavam.
A. Vyā. S., p. 108.
asiddhe dharmiṇah (ṇi?) sattve vivādānavatārataḥ |
tatra siddhasya ca vyāptigrahaṇe, sādhyadharmiṇi |
vyāptigrahaḥ kathaṃ na syād dṛṣṭānte’pi na vā bhavet ||
A. Vyā. Sa., p. 111.
(Also,) sādhyadharmādhārasandehāpanodāya gamyamānasyā’pi pakṣasya vacanam.
P. M. S., III. 29,
bādhakāt tadasidhhiś ced vyartho hetvantaragrahaḥ |
A. Vyā. Sa., p. 109.
yadi hi dharmiṇi vyāptiḥ siddhyanty eva sādhyasiddhim antarbbāvayati, nanu lābha evai’ṣaḥ, vyāptiprasādhakād eva pramāṇāt sādhyasiddheḥ sattvahetvapāśrayaṇaprayāsasya nirasanāt. na hi vyasanam evai’tal liṅgāntarānusaraṇaṃ nāma. atha na vyāptisādhakāt sādhyasiddhiḥ, na tarhy antarvyāptau hetuvaiyarthyam iti kim akāṇḍakātaratayā bahutaram āyāsam āviśasi.
A. Vyā. sa., pp. 109-10.
- na hi tat sādhyapratipattyarthaṃ tatra yathoktahetor eva vyāpārāt. (III. 33.)
- tadavinābhāvaniścayārthaṃ vā, vipakṣa-bādhakād eva tatsiddheḥ. (34.)
- vyaktirūpaṃ nidarśanam, sāmānyena tu vyāptiḥ, tatrā ’pi tadvipratipattāv anavasthānaṃ syād dṛṣṭāntāntarāpekṣaṇāt. (35.)
- nā ’pi vyāptismaraṇārthaṃ tathāvidhahetu-prayogād eva tatsmṛteḥ. (36.)
- tat param abhidhīyamānaṃ sādhyasādhane sandehayati. (37;)
- bālavyutpattyarthaṃ ca tattrayopagame śāstra evā ’sau na vāde ’nupayogāt. (40.)
P. M. S., Ch. III.
Cf. na hi vādakāle śiṣyā vyutpādyāḥ, vyutpannānām eva tatrā ’ dhikārāt.’
L. V. ad III, 40, ibid.
Vide Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, 1. 2. 2.
A. Vyā.. pp. 112-13:
asādhāraṇatāṃ hetudoṣaṃ mūḍhavyapekṣayā |
abravīd agrahād vyāpter, nai’vaṃ sarvopasaṃhṛtau ||
sarvopasaṃbāravatī vyāptiḥ (ibid, p. 113). ‘sarvasmin dharmiṇi hetoḥ sādhyena vyāptipradarśanaṃ sarvopasaṃhāraḥ.’
T. S. P., p. 245 ad śl. 746.
Vide infra, the Chapter Prasaṅgānumāna.
Ny. bhā., I.1.40.
tattvajñānaviṣayābhyanujñālakṣaṅānugrahabbāvitāt prasannād anantaraṃ pramāṇasāmarthyāt tattvajñānam utpadyata. iti.
Cf. ‘pravṛttasya prayojyasya taddhitopāyoktir anujñā.’
Vedāntakalpataru, p. 70. Abhyanujñā=approval.
N. V., p. 142, and Tāt. ṭī., p. 301.
Taitvaciniāmaṇi: Vyāptigrahopāyasiddhānta—‘tarkasyā’ pramāṇatvāt.’
Pramāṇamimāṃsāvṛtti 1 2.5.
Vide History of Indian Logic, see Jaina Logicians.
Jayanta says that universal concomitance is a relation of universals and when the same is comprehended in reference to a particular subject, it is designated as internal concomitance. To take a concrete case, when fire is inferred in a hill on the strength of the concomitance comprehended outside the hill in a forest and the like, the concomitance in the forest is called external concomitance. Again, thin very concomitance is regarded as internal concomitance, when fire is inferred at some other time in that very forest. But Jayanta’s representations not in conformity with the conception of antarvyāpti set forth above. It ignores the supreme fact of importance in antarvyāpti that the concomitance is comprehended by means of the reductio ad absurdum of the contradictory supposition, viz., the existence of smoke in a Tireless place. It fails to recognise that antarvyāpti is not a relative concept, but an absolute relation between two universal without any reference to the subject, possible or actual. When, this concomitance is cognised, there is no possibility of a contradicted or counterbalanced reason, for which Jayanta pleads so energetically. So the position of the antagonist, that if the concomitance of coldness and being a product is apprehended to the exclusion of fire, which though a product is not cold, then antarvyāpti will not have been cognised, stands.
yadi tv analam utsṛjya ghaṭādāv anvayagrahaḥ |
nā’ntarvyāptir gṛhīrā syāt sādhyasādhanadharmayoḥ ||
N.M., p. 110.
Cf. sāmānyena ca vyāptir gṛhītā satī siṣādhayiṣitadharmyapekṣāyāṃ sai’vā’ntarvyāptir ucyate. yai’va ca nagalagnānumānasamaye tadvyatiriktakāntārādiprādeśavartinī abhūt sai’va kālāntare kāntāravartini vahnāv anumīyamāne’ntarvyāptir avatiṣṭḥate.
Ibid., p. 111.
Ratnakīrti has not expressly advocated the claims of antarvyāpti, but he has adopted the exact principle on which it is based and also the same line of argument as found in Ratnākaraśānti’s monograph. He expressly declares that the concomitance of ‘existence’ (sattva) with ‘momentarinesa’ (kṣaṇikatva) is not attested by perception in the familiar example, ghaṭa (earthen jar). The concomitance is proved by means of Prasaṅga and Prasaṅgaviparyaya, which two are cases of inference (anumāna). He also admit that the universal concomitance is capable of being comprehnded in the subject of inference provided the arguer has the energy to appeal to the evidence at every step. In this case, reference to an outside example is unnecessary and unprofitable.
Cf. anumānāntaram eva prasaṅga-prasaṅga-viparyayātmakaṃ ghaṭe kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhakaṃ pra māṇāntarm asti.
SBNT., p. 21.
(Also,) nanv ābhyām (prasaṅga-prasaṅgaviparyayābhyām) eva pakṣe’pi kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhir astv iti cet, astu, ko doṣaḥ. yo hi pratipattā prativastu yad yadā yajjananavyavahārayogyaṃ tat tadā taj janayatī’tyādikam upanyasitum analasas tasya tata eva kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ.
Ibid, p. 26.