The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux

by Satkari Mookerjee | 1935 | 152,014 words | ISBN-10: 8120807375

A systematic and clear presentation of the philosophy of critical Realism as expounded by Dignaga and his school. The work is divided into two parts arranged into 26 chapters. Part I discusses the Nature of Existence, Logical Difficulties, Theory of Causation, Universals, Doctrine of Apoha, Theory of Soul and Problem of After-life. Part II deals wi...

Chapter XX - Self-cognition (Svasaṃvedanam)

Sarvaṃ cittacaittānām ālmasaṃvedanam”—All consciousness, cognitions (citta) and feelings (caitta) irrespectively are known by themselves, that is to say, they are self transparent and self-luminous. Consciousness is diametrically opposed to matter in this that it is of the nature of illumination like the luminary in the firmament, whereas matter is veiled and hidden by a constitutional darkness. The being of consciousness is its illumination, its self-luminosity, and so it cannot be unknown. Consciousness, thus, differs from dead, unfeeling and unthinking matter, which has no light in itself. The immateriality of consciousness carries with it the prerogative of self-revelation and does not connote any subject-object relation in its constitution, which its very immateriality precludes. Matter alone can be divided and consciousness can be consciousness only if it refuses to be split up into compartments, which the subject-object relation involves.[1] So self-luminosity of consciousness does not connote bifurcation of consciousness into a subject and and an object, which would be absurd in a single unit. Consciousness and self-consciousness, therefore, are interchangeableterms.[2] Now, in the text of Dharmakīrti quoted above the word ‘citta’ stands for consciousness in general, inclusive of all cognitions, thoughts and ideas. The word ‘caitta’ stands for feelings, which are classed apart from cognitions on the ground that feelings do not contain an external, objective reference like the latter, but are conversant with internal mental states and are purely inward in reference.[3] Barring this difference, they are all conscious states, the conscient character being common to cognition and feeling alike. In this respect, the Buddhist philosopher is in complete agreement with modern psychologists. The word, ‘sarvam’ (all) is advisedly put in with a view to including all the states of consciousness, feelings and cngnitions alike and not merely pleasurable and painful feelings, which, on account of their manifestness (sphuṭānubhavatvāt) are alone apt to be mistaken as self-revealing and self-transparent. There is no state of consciousness, which is not cognised of itself which, in other words, is not self-revealed. And this alone constitutes its difference from matter that consciousness shines in its own light and matter, being veiled in its nature, is revealed by the light of consciousness. Matter, thus, can shine only in borrowed light and if this light itself be veiled, we cannot conceive how the object can be revealed at all. An object is revealed only when it is cognised, to be precise, when it becomes part and parcel of tbe cognition and if this cognition remains veiled and unknown, the object cannot possibly be known. The proposition of the realistic philosophers, i.e., the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas, that cognition makes known the object by keeping itself in the background like the sense-organ, has, therefore, no sense in it and contains a contradiction in terms. The analogy of the sense-organ is absolutely out of place, because, it ignores a fundamental difference between cognition and the sense-organ..The sense-organ is the efficient cause, the causa essendi, of cognition, whereas cognition only reveals the object already in existence. It has no generative efficiency, it is what is termed a causa cognoscendi in regard to the object.[4]

An object is known when it enters into an intimate relation with consciousness; and what is the nature of this relation? This relation presupposes that consciousness and the objective reality, though enjoying absolute autonomy of existence in their own right, sometimes depart so far from their sacred aloofness that they come together and form a coalition between themselves. And this coalition eo ipso presupposes that either of these participant factors should sacrifice some amount of their independence. Otherwise if they are insistent on maintaining their status quo of absolute independence, no relation can take place and consequently no cognition will result. The contention of Bhadanta Śubhagupta, that consciousness being cognisant in nature will take stock of tbe reality as it is Without any surrender of independence on the latter’s part, only fights with words.[5] This taking stock of reality means that consciousness is no longer pure consciousness but has become consciousness of something, that is to say, has got a distinctive content in its being; and on the side of the objective reality too a momentous change of character has taken place, it is no longer a brute objective fact but has become an object of some consciousness. It will therefore be of no avail to posit the character of cognisancy on the part of consciousness or the character of cognisability on the part of the object. Consciousness minus its Objective content is at best a pure cognisancy and the objective reality outside the consciousness is only an indeterminate cognisability.[6] And if the status quo is maintained intact, the consequence will be that no knowledge will take place. An intimate relation must take place resulting in the combination of the two factors in a synthetic whole.

What again is the nature of this relation? It must be such as can fully account for the inseparability of the two factors in a cognition. It cannot be, for aught we know, a relation of causality, because there is no such restriction that the cause and the effect should be bound together. The potter and the pot, the carpenter and the table, though causally related, do actually exist apart. If the object be the cause of the cognition in any sense, it can at most be an efficient cause, unless the materiality

of consciousness is maintained, which, though a possible metaphysical doctrine, is not evident in the psychological process and so has no bearing upon this psychological issue. The causal relation therefore is no explanation of the inseparability of the two factors in cognition. We can explain this peculiarity however, if we suppose that the two are essentially identical, and for this it is supposed that the object is known because it imprints its likeness or image on the consciousness and as this likeness is but a part and parcel of consciousness, the two are invariably found together. There is no other means of cognising an external object except through its likeness imprinted on the consciousness. All our cognitions therefore are copies or configurations of the objects and external objects can be known only through these copies or representative symbols. You can say, if you choose, that this is only a vicarious sort of knowledge as objects are known only through their representative symbols and not directly. We plead guilty to the charge but we shall only emphasise that this is the only possible way of knowing external reality and you cannot make a grievance that a medium has got to be postulated for that. Even in the theory of direct perception of objective reality, the medium of the sense-organ has got to be postulated and if this should be no obstacle to our knowledge of external reality as it is, the medium of representative symbols should not be condemned on that score.

From the very peculiarity of the cognitive relation we get it that consciousness and its content are so interrelated that to know the one means the knowing of the other. It is impossible that the thing can be known apart from and independent of consciousness, as consciousness is its very essence quite as much as the feeling-tone is of the feeling itself.[7] The subject-object relation does not exist at all and so the objection that the same thing cannot be the subject and the object is futile. The fact of the matter is that consciousness does not require any other consciousness to make it known, but it is not unknown either when an object is cognised and this is described as the self-perception of consciousness. It does not mean that consciousness is dichotomised into a subject and object, which is absurd on the face of it. It only seeks to bring home the fact that consciousness and its content being inseparable, the one cannot be known without the other.[8]

The knowledge of external reality in perception therefore is made possible only on the hypothesis of consciousness being impressed with a likeness of the external object and it is for this reason that consciousness and its content are felt together, because the two have coalesced in one consciousness-unit. This synchronism of the two factors in perceptual knowledge can be explained by no other theory. There is a school of Buddhist philosophers who maintain that the object and the cognition both are the co-ordinate effects of a common, collocation of causal factors (sāmagrī) like light and colour-form and so their synchronism does not connote that the object is taken into the body of cognition by a representative symbol. They exist independently of one another, being co-effects of a common causal complex. That one thing (sic. cognition) is the subject and another is the object is to be explained by the constitutional peculiarity of the two factors themselves. Jayantabhaṭṭa also quotes this view at length. But as śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla point out, this theory assumes the very fact which is to be explained. The crux of the problem is how can consciousness function as the subject (viṣayī) with regard to the objective factor? This can be explained if the two coalesce together and this can be possible if knowledge is believed to be a configuration of the external reality which is our theory.[9]

It therefore follows from the very peculiarity of the cognitive relation that knowledge and its content are known in one sweep. And this is a matter of logical demonstration. Knowledge by its very immateriality is distinguished from the material objects and these objects are expressed and revealed when consciousness operates on them. The light of consciousness makes the dead matter shine and if this consciousness is supposed to be hidden and veiled in and by itself, we cannot explain how knowledge can arise at all.

Dharmakīrti has very pertinently observed elsewhere,

“Perception of an object is impossible if perception itself is unperceived.”[10]

Māṇikyanandi too observes,

“Certainly admirable is the person who thinks an object is perceived but not the perceptual knowledge which sheds light on it like a; burning lamp.”[11]

If cognition cannot shine in its own light but only in the borrowed light of another cognition, how can the second cognition, which equally lacks original light like the first, make it shine? Certainly there must be light somewhere and in its own right and if it is supposed to belong to some remote cognition, what is the harm if it is conceded to the first? If you deny original light to any cognition whatsoever, perception of objective reality will become impossible, as darkness cannot be removed by darkness. And the alternative of shining in borrowed light is exposed to the charge of regressus ad infinitum. Thus, if a cognition is unrevealed in and by itself and is only revealed by another cognition before it can reveal the object, that other cognition being equally unrevealed will again require a third and the third again a fourth and so on to infinity. The upshot will be that the object will not be known—a position extremely absurd.[12] The contention that a cognition reveals its object though lying unknown by itself like the sense-organ has been proved to be a colossal hoax. A cognition reveals other objects, which are foreign to it, only because it is self-revealing like light. The subject-object relation does not exist and so there is no dichotomy in consciousness. It is immediate in all. knowledge and is not known like an external object. Its nature is to be revealed and revealing. It shines, it sheds lustre and all things coming in its contact are revealed. To say that I do not perceive consciousness in perceiving an object is tantamount to saying that I do not know if I have a tongue jor not.[13] Argument will be lost upon him—a human statue in stone, who perceives an object but is not conscious that he perceives it. ‘To be perceived’ means ‘to be revealed by perception.’ It is a complex of two factors, perception and tbe objective reality, which by mutual association have acquired a new status and are no longer simple entities as before. To say therefore that the object is known and not the fact of knowledge is to talk nonsense.[14] The contention, that awareness is only implicit in objective perception and so knowledge is not always of the form ‘I know the object,’ but is simply of the object, does not prove that knowledge is unknown. Implicit or explicit, awareness is always self-awareness. The reference to the subject and the object in a judgment is a question of emphasis and is possible only if there is a recognition of the fact of knowledge. The self-transparency of knowledge is the presupposition of all knowledge and cannot be denied without denying the very possibility of knowledge.[15]

The problem of self-knowledge has been debated in European philosophy with such an avidity and keenness as remind us of similar discussions in India. There are some psychologists who hold that knowledge of self is an impossibility, because

“knowledge is a subject-object relation; the subject knows the object; but when we speak of the subject knowing itself, are we not using language which is meaningless? a relation, and a relation needs two terms, while here we have one term only. Ex vi terminorum what the subject knows must be an object, and therefore it cannot be the subject itself. The subject of knowledge is like the eye which sees all things but itself is invisible.”

As a result of this dialectic it follows that “All introspection is retrospection.”

“The object which the knower has before him in introspection is truly an other, something that has been shed from his own life and is now a caput mortuum, a fragment of the past, and no part of the present living subject of knowing and doing.”[16]

This view is apparently tased on abstract logical grounds and fails to account for the fact of unity of conscious life. If the subject is eo ipso unknown and unknowable, what is there to cement the discrete experiences and thoughts into one subjective whole? After all, there has been no doubt felt about the emergence of a feeling or thought by a subject, nor has there been any confusion in their subjective reference. A thought or experience is immediately felt as one’s own experience. Knowledge of the self by the self does not mean any duality—the self is immediately felt in all knowledge, objective or subjective. It is not felt as an object, as an other. We shall make nonsense of all our knowledge if we suppose that consciousness is unconscious of itself.

J. F. Ferrier is nearer the truth when he formulates the dictum,

“Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself.[17]

But it will be misleading and also perversion of truth if self-cognisance is understood to be cognisance of self as an object. This would imply that there are two objects in all knowledge, viz., the self and the matter in hand. We have no warrant to suppose it to be so.

As has been pertinently observed by Prof. Sorley,

“I may be entirely occupied in the examination of ah object of perception, or in thinking about it, without the reflexion entering my mental state that I am so perceiving or so thinking. That reflexion is always there at call—so to speak a potential element of any cognitive state; but it is not in all cases an actual element in it.”[18]

The truth seems to lie in the golden mean. Consciousness is neither unconscious of itself nor always explicitly and emphatically self-conscious. The former position would fail to explain the unity of psychic life and the latter would put all our knowledge on the level of judgments.

Prof. Sorley concludes,

“Surely the true condition of all our knowledge is not a superadded consciousness of self, but the fact of its being a consciousness by self.”[19]

Of course the Buddhist and the Vedāntist who advocate the self-shining nature of consciousness do not maintain that self-consciousness as a judgment is the condition of all knowledge. They only emphasise that implicitly or explicitly the -ground of all empirical knowledge is.consciousness, which is never known or hidden in its nature. Self-consciousness as the connotation of all consciousness is an immediate felt fact and is rather the form than the content of knowledge. In self-judgments the self appears as the object, but this objectivity is only a heightened form of self-consciousness and need not imply any alienation of the.self. It only means that attention is turned •back internally upon itself, upon the thought as.thought.

As has been aptly observed by M. Bergson,

“There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time—our self which endures. We may sympathise intellectually with nothing else, but we certainly sympathise with our own selves.”[20]

Prof. Sorley observes,

“It is an apprehension which is immediate—which is lived in the moment that it is known, although it is preserved in memory and clarified by reflexion.”


“This is more difficult to name: for in naming it we are apt to speak of it as if it were one element amongst the others. But it may be described as the sense of life or the sense of self. It is not one factor amongst others —such as sensation or impulse or feeling. For it is something through which all these are—through which they have being. And it is through it that each person has his own individual being and no other, so that my perception of this sound, say, is entirely distinct from yours, even although no perfect analysis can find no dissimilarity between their respective contents.”[21]


“The idea of self is founded upon immediate experience of self as a unity or whole of conscious life. We do not approach it from the outside: We have inside acquaintance, because we are it.”[22]

Although the Buddhist does not believe in the existence of an enduring self running through all the diverse experiences, still these opinions of the immediacy of consciousness are fully in accord with his views. The problem of the self as a permanent unity is a different problem and is irrelevant to our present enquiry. We have however dealt with this problem in our critique of the Buddhist non-soul theory and we have expressed pur differences. Be that as it may, we cannot help thinking that the besetting sin of philosophers has been to lay stress on the objective content and so to ignore the self-revealing character of consciousness.

Prof. Sorley evidently contradicts himself when he denies consciousness of self as the ground of all consciousness.

“We should need clear evidence to convince us,” observes Prof. Sorley,

“that the consciousness of one object always requires to be accompanied by the consciousness of another object, even although the other object is self.”[23]

The point is that consciousness as such is never known as an object, as if it were one factor among other factors. It is hasty analysis to speak of the self or consciousness as a part of the objective judgment. Judgment is itself possible because consciousness supplies ‘the spiritual bond’ to quote Goethe,[24] And this is admitted by Prof. Sorley himself in other places as quoted by us.

Citsukhācārya is certainly on the right track when he says that the judgment, ‘The pot is known by me’ is no evidence of the self being known as an object. The ‘me,’ is the subject of the knowledge and not its object. The language too is unmistakable. In the proposition tbe predicate is “knownness” and it is predicated of the object, the pot. Knownness does not qualify the subject, but the object. So the self is never known objectively. And all cases of self-knowledge will be found, to be knowledge of something as an object by the self and never of the self by the self, though the prima facie view of self-judgment would point the other way. The objection cf the Naiyāyika that consciousness, if it is self-consciousness, must necessitate the judgment, ‘I know this or that’—is based on a faulty reading and analysis of knowledge. We have seen that the judgement ‘I know this’ does not connote that.the self is objectively cognised as ‘this’ is cognised.

The judgment ‘I know this’ presupposes a series of psychical activities. In the first flush of experience, the contents are given in a lump—as a whole.

“Analysis brings out into relief elements which are in the whole and are important for understanding the whole.”

The judgment is thus the result of analysis of the immediate experience and it must be noted that analysis can never reach the inner life;

“in the centre it is always at a loss; for when the centre or subject is reached there is nothing further to analyse, and the mere analyst is tempted to say that there is nothing there at all.”[25]

The contention of Rāmānuja that all knowledge is judgmental in character and self-knowledge is possible only in association with an other is based on superficial psychology and slipshod logic. We have seen that knowledge of sense-data is possible only because consciousness owns them up and consciousness or self is never in need of a foreign light for its manifestation. And even in sense-perception the data are not apprehended as isolated or distinct units; their distinctness is due to our own processes of abstraction and analysis, which take place after the experience has taken place. Judgment is thus only a clarified form of the immediate experience, made possible by a series of psychological processes, such as analysis, reflection, selection and synthetic reintegration. So the plea of the Nāiyayika that self-consciousness must emerge in the form of a judgment is based on a short-sighted view of experience. In the first flush of experience, remarkably in sense-perception, the contents are known in a lump. In the second place, the contents are distinguished and analysed and objective judgments in the form of ‘this is blue,’ etc., are made possible. In the third place, when attention is turned back upon the subjective pole, the judgment emerges in the form of self-consciousness, such as ‘I know the blue object,’ etc. But it would be a faulty analysis if we suppose that either in the first or in the second stage the element of consciousness is not conscious of itself. As in the third stage where we get the explicit knowledge of the self as the subject, the objective elements are not unknown, though the subjective side is prominently felt, as attention is focussed upon it, so in the first two stages the subjective side is neither slurred over nor unfelt, though attention is focussed upon the objective contents and the subjective side is not emphasised. The question of immediate indeterminate knowledge and of judgments, both objective and subjective, is a question of analysis and attention; but the logical postulate of all knowledge in all stages is the presence of consciousness as the form and the form is never unknown, though attention may be diverted to the contents and the presence of consciousness as the form or the spiritual bond may not be emphasised. It is the presence of consciousness as the form and as the spiritual bond in all processes of knowledge that is emphasised by the Buddhists and the Vedāntists and they insist with unerring logic that this form is the life and soul of all knowledge and its existence is never unknown. On the contrary they assert that this self-shining nature of consciousness is its special prerogative and it is this which distinguishes it from matter, which for its revelation is dependent upon consciousness. But consciousness is not dependent upon matter for its self-relelation; and association of contents in our wakeful experience is only an accident. The Nāiyāyika or all realists for the matter of that have made a grave blunder in supposing consciousness to be the product of objective elements operating upon the self, which is regarded as but an unconscious receiving apparatus. But this would make the explanation of the unity of conscious life impossible and so the postulation of a permanent self as the cementing bond of psychic life will have no meaning.

Pleasure and pain, which have been grouped under ‘caittas’ (secondary mental phenomena) are equally conscious states and as such self-transparent and self-intuited. Dharmottara observes that the feelings of. pleasure or pain are experienced immediately on the perception of external objects. The perceptual knowledge emerges with a distinctive feeling-tone, be it pleasurable or painful, and this is felt internally and has no external objective reference. The experience of pleasure or pain, therefore, is purely subjective like the perceptual knowledge itself and so there is no excuse to identify it with the external object, though the external object may be rightly regarded as the occasioning condition of such experience. The fact of the matter is that consciousness and its feeling-tone are one and the same thing. Pleasure and pain are the characteristic features of consciousness itself. It is quite possible that there may be a neutral state of consciousness, which is neither pleasurable nor painful, Yaśomitra and Guparatna have admitted this possibility and have accordingly divided caittas into three categories, (1) pleasurable, (2) painful, (3) neutral.[26] The contention of the Naiyāyikas, that pleasure and pain are not essentially conscious states but are felt objectively as much as external objects, is psychologically untenable. Of course, Jayantabhaṭṭa admits that pleasure and pain are internally perceived, but he would have us believe that they are objective perceptions none the less. The pleasure and pain are objective realities existing inside the soul-substance in the form of universal archetypes and so are felt as much objectively as external objects are perceived. An experience is distinguished as pleasant because pleasure is the object of this experience quite as much as a jug becomes an object. The feeling-tone cannot be regarded as the essential character of consciousness, as the feeling-tone is variable. So it must be conceded that pleasure and pain enter into the constitution of knowledge as objects and are not integral parts of consciousness, as pure consciousness without a feeling-tone is also experienced.[27]

Śāntarakṣita observes in reply to this contention of the Naiyāyikas that unless pleasure, etc., are regarded as the integral parts of perceptual knowledge and as such essentially conscious states, the immediate perception of pleasure or pain simultaneously with the perceptual knowledge cannot be accounted for. Even if it is held that pleasure and pain are felt by a distinct mental perception this mental perception can arise in the second moment and so the simultaneous perception of pleasure and perceptual experience cannot be accounted for. The pleasure or pain is felt immediately the external object is perceived and this immediacy can be explained if the feeling-tone is regarded as the part and parcel of the perceptual cognition. Nor can the feeling of immediacy be accounted as an illusion due to the rapidity of the successive cognitions, as we have proved before that rapidity of succession cannot be a bar to perception of succession. Moreover, if pleasure and pain are objectively perceived, we can expect that the Yogins should feel happy or miserable when they supersensuously intuit the pleasure and pain in other persons. Not only that, one should feel happy or miserable when one infers the pleasure or pain of another person. The existence of the pleasure and pain in the subject is not essential.


Jayantabhaṭṭa’s explanation of the Naiyāyika position.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, we are inclined to believe, anticipated this difficulty and so posited the existence of pleasure and paiii in their' universal archetypal forms in the subjective centres. These archetypal universals are ubiquitous and so can exist in the being of the self. And these archetypal universals become evident when they come into relation with particular causes of pleasure and pain and this relation is brought about under the influence of the law of harmony or mutual affinity (yogyatā).[28] But this attempt on the part of Jayantabhaṭṭa to deny the character of consciousness to feelings does not seem to be convincing. On the other hand it makes some unwarrantable assumptions. The existence of archetypes or universals is not above doubt and in the second place the assumption of these universals of pleasure and pain in the soul-substance does not seem to be justified by any logical necessity. Not only is there no logical justification, but it does not make these psychical states any more intelligible. And to give it a semblance of justification Jayanta has to postulate a relation of harmony or affinity with particular objective realities known to induce pleasurable or painful sensations. This is not all; Jayanta is compelled to commit one absurdity after another. Once he lets in a particular universal, he finds himself under the painful obligation of postulating as many universals as there are conscious states. Thus, pleasure, pain, knowledge, volition, hatred, desire and many others are to be.assumed to exist in their universal forms. And what does this existence of universals avail? They cannot make themselves felt unless and until particular objective facts are perceived, and to justify these two factors he postulates a sort of mysterious relation under the name of ‘affinity’ or ‘harmony,’ which is not intelligible to the plain understanding. The Buddhist theory does not make any one of these assumptions, which have been requisitioned by the Naiyāyika to escape the unmistakable fact of the self-transparency of knowledge, which the Naiyāyika feels called upon to deny. But the self-transparency of consciousness is based upon the irrefutable testimony of experience and an undeniable logical necessity and the denial of this leads to an infinite variety of absurd situations, little suspected by the Naiyāyika. It redounds all the more to the credit of the Buddhists that modern psychological researches fully corroborate the Buddhist theory, as feelings are regarded as conscious states as much as cognitive and volitional facts.

Footnotes and references:


vijñānaṃ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttaṃ upajāyate |
iyam evā’tmasaṃvittir asya yā’jadarūpatā ||
kriyākārakabhāvena na svasaṃvittir asya tu |
ekasyā’naṃśarūpasya trairūpyānupapattitaḥ ||
      T. S., śls. 2000-2001.

na hi grāhakabbāvenā’tmasaṃvedanam abhipretam, kiṃ tarhi? svayamprakṛtyā prakāśātmatayā, nabhastalavartyālokavat.
      T. S. P., ad 2000.



Cf. “We can know nothing until we know intelligence, for the knowledge of all things depends on it, and not it on this knowledge.” 
      Descartes, Reg. VIII (XI, p. 243).

“Or...... all forms of perception, imagination and conception, that is all forms of knowledge are forms of consciousness or thinking, and hence consciousness is known in knowing any. thing.”
      Norman Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, p. 90.


cittam arthamātragrāhi, caittā viśeṣāvasthāgrāhiṇaḥ sukhādayaḥ. sarve ca te cittacaittāś ca... sukhādaya eva sphuṭānubhāvatvāt svasaṃviditāḥ, nā ’nyā cittāvasthā ity etadāśankānivṛttyarthaṃ sarvagrahaṇaṃ kṛtam. nāsti sā cittāvasthā yasyām ātmanaḥ saṃvedanaṃ na pratyakṣaṃ syāt. 
      N. B. T., p. 14 (A. S. B. Edn.)

Cf. tatrā ’rthadṛṣṭir vijñānaṃ tadviśeṣe ca caitasā’ ity abhyupagamāt.
      M. K., P. P. V., ad 1. 1.

also, ‘cittam arthamātragrāhi, caittā viśeṣāvasthāgrāhiṇaḥ sukhādayaḥ vijñānaṃ upalabdhir vastumātragrahaṇaṃ, vedanādayas tu caitasā viśeṣagrahaṇarūpāḥ.’
      A. K. V.


tad idam viṣamaṃ yasmāt te tathotpattibetavaḥ |
santas tathāvidhāḥ siddhā na jñānaṃ janakaṃ tathā ||
      T. S., śl. 2008


Bhadanta Śubhaguptas tv āha, vijñānam anāpannaviṣayākāram api viṣayaṃ pratipadyate tatparicchedarūpatvāt tasmān nā’śaṅkā kartavyā kathaṃ paricchinatti kiṃvat parircchinattī’ti. āha ca, kathaṃ tadgrāhakaṃ tac cet tatparicchedalakṣaṇam. vijñānaṃ tena nā’śaṅkā kathaṃ tat kiṃvad ity api.
      Quoted in T. S. P., p. 562.


tatpariccheddarūpatvaṃ vijñānasyo’papadyate |
jñānarūpaḥ paricchedo yadi grāhyasya saṃbhavet ||
anyathā tu paricchedarūpaṃ jñānam iti sphuṭam |
vaktavyaṃ na ca nirdiṣṭam ittham arthasya vedanam ||
       T. S., śls. 2009-10.


paricchedaḥ sā tasyā’tmā sukhādeḥ sātatādivat |
      T. S., 2001.


svarūpavedanāyā’nyad vedakaṃ na vyapekṣate |
na cā’viditam astī’dam ity artho’yaṃ svasaṃvidaḥ ||
      T. S., śl. 2012.


“nā’nyo’sti grāhako jñanac cākṣuṣair viṣayair vinā |
ataś ca sahasaṃvittir nā’bhedān nīlataddhiyoḥ ||
pūrvikai’va tu sāmagrī prajñānaṃ viṣayakṣaṇam |
ālokarūpavat kuryād yena syāt sahavedanam ||
      Quoted in the T. S. P., p. 569.

na jñānātmā parātme’ti nīladhīvedane katham |
nīlākārasya saṃvittis tayor no ced abhinnatā ||
      T. S., śl. 2032.


‘apratyakṣopalambhasya nā’rthadṛṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati.’


ko vā tatpratibhāsinam artham adhyakṣam icchaṃs tad eva tathā ne’cchet.
      1.11. pradīpavat. 1.12., P. M. S.

also, tathāhi—na tāvad arthasya svānubhavakālo’pi siddhiḥ, tadabhivyaktisvabhāvasyā’nubhāvasya tadānīm asiddhatvāt kadā siddhir bhaviṣyatī’ti vaktavyam. tajjñānajñanājātau (sic) arthajñānajñānotpattikāle siddhir bhaviṣyatī’ti cet, etad atisubhāṣitam. yo hi nāma svānubhavakāle na siddhas sa katham asvānubhavakāle setsyati.
      T, S, P., p. 561.


bodhe’py anubbavo yasya na kathañcana jāyate |
taṃ katham bodhayec chāstraṃ loṣṭaṃ narasamākṛtim ||
jihvā me’sti na ve’ty uktir lajjāyai kevalaṃ yathā |
na budhyate mayā bodho boddhavya iti tādṛśī ||
      — Pañcadaśī Ch. III, 19-20.



viditaviśeṣaṇasya vedanasyai’va bodhasvarūpatvāt tadanubhavā^ bhāve viditasyā’py anubhavābhāvaprasaṇgātbodhānubhavo 'vaśyam aṅgīkar? tavyaḥ.
      Vyakhyā, ibid.


Cf. na ca nilīnam eva vijfiānam artbātmānaujñāpayaticakṣurSdivad iti vācyam. jñāpanaṃ hi jñānajananaṃ janitaṃ ca jiiānaṃ jadam san no 'ktadūṣaṇam ativartete. evam uttorottarāṇy api jfiānāni jadānī’ty anavasthā. tasmād aparādhīnaprakāśā saṃvid upetavyā.
      Bhāmatī, p. 35.
      N. S. A. Sāstry’s edn.


Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, p. 202.


Institutes of Metaphysic, 2nd ed., p. 81. The italics are mine.


Op. cit., p. 205.


Op. cit., p. 207.


Introduction to Metaphysics, Eng. tr., p. 8.


Op.cit., pp. 263-64.


Op.cit., 265.


Op.cit., p. 207.


Cf. “To understand the living whole
They start by driving out the soul;
They count the parts, and when all’s done.
Alas! the spirit-bond is gone.”
      Op. cit., p. 250.


Op.cit., p. 264.


citte bhavāś caittā vastuviśeṣarūpagrāhakāḥ sukhaduḥkhopekṣālakṣaṇāḥ.
      T. R. D., p. 40.

also, yathā hi tisro vedanā bhavanti sukhā, duḥkhā, aduḥkhasukhā ve ’ti.
      Abhi. K. V., p. 14.


tad idānīṃ sukhajñānam apy anubhūyamānaṃ sukhena viṣayabhāvajuṣā ghaṭādine ’vo ’parajyata iti gamyate na svarūpeṇai ’va sukhātmakam, tato bhinnarūpasya bodhamātrasvabhāvasya jñānasyā ’nyadā dṛṣṭatvād iti.
      N. M., p. 75.


nanu sukhotpādāt pūrvam anāśrayaṃ sukhatvasāmānyaṃ kathaṃ tatra syāt, kaś cā’pi sukhahetubhiḥ kārakaiḥ saṃsargaḥ, asaṃsṛṣṭaṃ ca kathaṃ kārakaṃ syāt? ucyate sarvasarvagatāni sāmānyāni sādhayiṣyanta iti santi tatrā’pi sukhatvādīni. yogyatālakṣaṇa eva cai’ṣāṃ sukhahetubhiḥ kārakaiḥ saṃsargaḥ.
      N. M., pp. 75-76.

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