Verse 3627

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एकज्ञानक्षणव्याप्तनिःशेषज्ञेयमण्डलः ।
प्रसाधितो हि सर्वज्ञः क्रमो नाश्रीयते ततः ॥ ३६२७ ॥

ekajñānakṣaṇavyāptaniḥśeṣajñeyamaṇḍalaḥ |
prasādhito hi sarvajñaḥ kramo nāśrīyate tataḥ || 3627 ||

The omniscient person whose existence we have established is one who comprehends within a single cognitive moment the entire round of all that is to be known; it is for this reason that no succession is admitted in this case.—(3627)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued under Text 3250,—“Who can apprehend each one of the endless things, past, present and future,—even in hundreds of years?”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 3627 above]

In this connection some people belonging to our own party, while supporting the opinion of the Idealist, argue as follows:—If the entire round of cognisable things is embraced within a single cognitive moment, then that would imply a limit on the number and extent of things; and this would militate against the accepted idea that the number and extent of things are endless. Because when all things would be embraced within the orbit of a single cognition,—how could they be saved from the contingency of not being endless?—This has been asserted thus—‘Being embraced within a single cognition, there is nothing outside that limit; and thus the idea being that things are only so many, they cannot be endless, they become limited’,—Under the circumstances, the idea of the simultaneous cognition of all things would be open to the same objection that has been urged against the idea of their successive cognition.

There is no force, however, in this argument. If this argument is put up on the basis of the opinion that Cognitions are formless,—then it is all irrelevant. Because, whenever a thing, on becoming cognised, thereby acquires existence,—all that is comprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person is that it is existent, and is, therefore, said to be embraced by it; and it is not meant by this that it covers the place occupied by the thing, in the way that the cloth covers a number of jars. The mere fact that certain things are apprehended by a single cognition does not deprive the things of their own nature or character; whereby, by reason of being apprehended by a single cognition, they would renounce their endless character. When various things, like the Blue, the Yellow and so forth, appearing in a single picture, become apprehended by a single cognition,—they do not cease to be many; nor do they become merged into one another; in fact, they are apprehended by the cognition exactly as they are,—not in any other form. In the same manner, the World which has existence is apprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person exactly as it exists.—As a matter of fact, there is no end to the extent of the worldly region in any direction; hence it is apprehended as limitless,—not as limited. How then could it be regarded as having an end?

It might be urged that—“If the apprehension of the entire world is admitted, then, how could there be no apprehension of the limits?”

It is not so, we reply. Where is there any such universal Proposition that ‘wherever there is apprehension of the entirety of things, there must be apprehension of the limits also’? As a matter of fact, of all the things that exist, there is not one which has existence and has its form unapprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person; in fact all things appear and disappear only as having their forms apprehended by the consciousness of the Omniscient Person; not a single thing is left out. This is what is meant by His apprehending ‘all things in their entirety’. This also is what is meant by all things being ‘embraced in a single cognition’, otherwise, the fact of all things being spoken of as ‘all’ may also be not admitted,—in order to avoid their having limits. So there is nothing in this.

It has been argued that—“on account of the things being all included under a single cognition, there would follow the corollary that there is nothing apart from all these; how then would it be denied that the said things have their limit?”

This also is not right. Under the view of people who regard Cognition as formless, there can be no actual ‘inclusion’ of things within the Cognition; all that happens is that they become indicated by the Cognition merely as

existing,—Nor has the ‘endlessness’ of things been accepted on the ground of their not being comprehended under Cognition; by virtue of which, if they became apprehended, they would come to have limits. All that has been held is that the extension of space being limitless, the Region ‘containing’ the things is ‘limitless’, ‘endless’; as the Region of pure ‘Existence’ is ‘endless’, also because there can be no limits to the enumeration (of things). Nor is there any incompatibility between‘being apprehended’ and the ‘absence of limits’ for the filling up of space;—on account of which ‘incompatibility’, things would have to be regarded as ‘not apprehended’,—If it is asked—“If He does not comprehend all things within His Cognition, how can He be omniscient?”,—the answer is that, it would be so, for that very reason; that is, it is just because He does not apprehend things as limited that He becomes omniscient; otherwise, if He had apprehended the limitless things as limited, He would be clearly mistaken. Because one is called “omniscient’ only when He apprehends existing things as existent, and non-existing things as non-existent;—and to the Region of existence, there is no limit at all. Hence if one apprehends as non-existent, the limit, which does not exist in the form of movement,—and if he apprehends as existent, the Limit, which does exist in the form of being cognised by the Omniscient Person,—why should He be regarded as ‘Not-Omniscient’?

The following might be urged—“Under the view that Cognition is formless, there can be no apprehension of objects; because such Cognition would be indistinguishable. Consequently, no differentiation of particular things and functions being possible,—this view of Cognition being formless should not be put forward at all; as it would be always open to objection”.

This is not right. In regard to the Cognition of the Omniscient Person, no differentiation of things and their functions is admitted; because the said Cognition envisages all things: because the idea is that the said Cognition (of the Omniscient Person) envisages, not the Blue only, nor the yellow only, but all things. In the case of men with limited powers of vision, their Cognition envisages only particular things; hence as in his case,—under the view that ‘Cognitions are formless’,—all things would stand on the same footing, the impossibility of well-known distinctions is declared to be open to objection, Because, as there could he no such distinction as ‘this is the Cognition of Blue’, ‘that is the Cognition of Yellow’—even common people would be equally omniscient; this is what is urged against this view; as regards the Omniscient Person himself, such non-distinction would be only right; hence how could the said contingency be urged as an undesirable one?—Thus in the state of Omniscience, it is only right and proper that the Cognition should be formless and brought about by the powers of mysticism.

It might be argued that—“In that case things could not be distinguished as (1) those to be acquired, and (2) those to be abandoned”.

Not so, we reply. If in the event of the limitless number of things appearing in consciousness at one and the same time,—there were incompatibility with the things being cognised as (1) to be acquired and (2) to be abandoned,—and if there were no such incompatibility with other things, and there were some loss of character on the part of the things to be acquired and things to be abandoned as they appear in consciousness,—or even thi lost character were not distinguished,—, or even when they appeared in consciousness, if there came about no ordinary Cognition envisaging them,—then, under these contingencies, there might be room for asserting what has been asserted. As a matter of fact, however, when the entire world appears in consciousness, even the thing to be acquired and to be abandoned appear in consciousness without any incongruity, and without losing any of their essential character; and subsequently, it all becomes apprehended by the pure ordinary Cognition brought about by the force of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person. Why then, can there be no Cognition of things as distinguished from one another?

Thus it has been proved that there is no room for the objection as against the view that Cognitions are formless.

If then, the objection is meant to be urged against the view that Cognitions have forms,—then, also there is no such incompatibility as has been urged. Because as the limit-less things, manifesting themselves in endless forms, come into existence,—so also does the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person, which appears as envisaging the forms of all those limitless things; and there is no incongruity in this; as there is nothing incompatible in a single Cognition envisaging the forms of several things.

“Certainly, if what is one envisages many forms,—there is incongruity”.

Not so; because the forms are unreal. If the one thing had several real forms, then there would be incompatibility between the one and the many. As a matter of fact, however, the view that is held is that the many forms do not really belong to the one thing.

“If that is so, then the Cognition of the Omniscient Person would be associated with a wrong Cognition; and thereby the Omniscient Person would be mistaken”.

Not so; as He would cognise things as they are, there would be nothing wrong in it. He would be ‘mistaken’ if He had cognised as real what is really unreal. When, however, He cognises the unreal forms as unreal,—then, how can He be said to be ‘mistaken’?

“When all things are embraced within a single Cognition,—and yet He treats them differently, as ‘seen’ and the rest; how then can He be regarded as not-mistaken?”

There is no force in this; because, He is cognisant of the right means, He could be mistaken, if he neglected the right means of apprehending the thing, and apprehended it by some other secondary means. In fact however, according to the view that Cognitions have forms, there is no means of apprehending a thing except the apprehension of the form of its Cognition; how then could the Person be mistaken if He apprehended the thing by the right and proper means?

Thus then, just as in the case of the knowable things, so in the case of the Cognition also, there is apprehension of the forms of limitless things,—and on that account it is said that ‘limitless things’ are embraced by it.

When things enter into the Cognition in certain forms,—in -those same forms they become recognised by the representative consciousness that appeals later on. And so far as the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person is concerned, things do not enter into it as appearing in a limited number of diverse forms, but everything that happens to be existent enters into it. Because the capacity of the Person is such that in becoming the substratum of the Cognition of all things, it is not trammelled in any way; specially as mental Cognition, envisages all things. Thus then, there being no incongruity in the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person apprehending the forms of limitless things,—and any ordinary cognition that comes later on cannot apprehend things to the farthest limit,—how could there be any Cognition such as ‘so many are the things’? And it would be only if such a Cognition were there, that there could be a limit or end to the number of things.

If, again, the representative Cognition appears in the form that ‘there is nothing beyond what has actually appeared in consciousness’,—even so, it would not be possible for the things to be so limited. Because if all that appeared in the non-conceptual Consciousness of the Omniscient Person appeared as limited in extent,—then the representative Cognition following upon that might apprehend the things as so limited [Read ‘antavattvam' for ‘anantatvam’], and this Cognition would deprive the things of their limitlessness. As a matter of fact, however, what appears in the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person appears actually as without limit,—because the capacity of the Omniscient Person has no limitations; consequently anything else that appears in consciousness must be limited; and it is only this that is apprehended by the representative Cognition; so that you have more clearly than ever established the limitlessness of things. Hence there is no force in what has been urged.

There are some people who hold the view that the whole Consciousness of the Mystic is devoid of objective basis, and resembles the true dream, whence, being in conformity with the real state of things, it is reliable.—As against these people, there is much less room for the objection regarding things becoming limited.—We have had enough of this!—(3627)