Verse 3558-3561

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

उपमानेन सर्वज्ञसत्तासिद्धिर्न चेष्यते ।
तस्याप्रमाणताप्रोक्तेः सत्तासिद्धिस्ततो न च ॥ ३५५८ ॥
प्रसिद्धायां हि सत्तायां सादृश्यं गम्यते ततः ।
साधनं प्रकृतं चेदं सत्तायाः सर्ववेदिनः ॥ ३५५९ ॥
तन्नोपमानतः सिद्धिः प्रतिषेधोऽफलः कृ(त?)तः ।
नरा दृष्टास्त्वसर्वज्ञाः सर्वे चेद्भवता ततः ॥ ३५६० ॥
तवैव सर्ववित्ता स्याद्दूरव्यवहितेक्षणात् ।
अन्यसन्तानसम्बद्धज्ञानशक्तेश्च दृष्टितः ॥ ३५६१ ॥

upamānena sarvajñasattāsiddhirna ceṣyate |
tasyāpramāṇatāprokteḥ sattāsiddhistato na ca || 3558 ||
prasiddhāyāṃ hi sattāyāṃ sādṛśyaṃ gamyate tataḥ |
sādhanaṃ prakṛtaṃ cedaṃ sattāyāḥ sarvavedinaḥ || 3559 ||
tannopamānataḥ siddhiḥ pratiṣedho'phalaḥ kṛ(ta?)taḥ |
narā dṛṣṭāstvasarvajñāḥ sarve cedbhavatā tataḥ || 3560 ||
tavaiva sarvavittā syāddūravyavahitekṣaṇāt |
anyasantānasambaddhajñānaśakteśca dṛṣṭitaḥ || 3561 ||

We do not hold that the existence of the omniscient person is proved by analogy; because it has been shown that analogy is not a reliable means of cognition. Hence the said existence could not be proved by it. It is only when the existence of a thing has been cognised, that its similarity can be perceived; and what is desired to be proved in the present context is the existence of the all-knowing person;—and this cannot be proved by means of analogy. Hence your denial of this (in reference to the said person) is entirely futile.—If all men have been perceived by you to be not-omniscient,—then omniscience belongs to you yourself, since you perceive all men, those near you as well as those remote;—and since you perceive the capacity of cognitions appearing in the ‘chain’ of all other men.—(3558-3561)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued under Text 3215, that—“If any person were seen at the present time to be similar to the Omniscient Person, then the existence of that Person could be cognised through Analogy”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3558-3561 above]

As a matter of fact, no reliability attaches to Analogy, as a means of cognition,—by virtue of which the Buddhist could seek to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person by its means.—Even if Analogy were reliable, it would be of no use in the proving of the said existence. Because all that Analogy proves, for instance, is merely the similarity of the Gavaya in the well-known object, Cow; in the case in question, however, the Omniscient Person is not a well-known object,—as, according to you, He is still to be proved; consequently when, under your view, the Existence of the Omniscient Person is put up as what is to be proved,—there can be no room for Analogy; so that, there being no possibility of its applying to the case in question, your denial of it is entirely futile; as it is only what is regarded as possible that is denied.

It has been argued under Text 3216, that—“Having found that all men of the present day are not-omniscient, it is definitely concluded, through Analogy, that all men are not-omniscient”.—The answer to this is that—‘If all men, etc. etc.’—If all men have been seen by you, then your denial of the Omniscient Person involves self-contradiction. Because, when you admit that you yourself see all men, far and near,—and also that you have definite knowledge of the cognitive capacity of the ‘chain’ of other men,—you clearly attribute Omniscience to yourself; because your said admission would imply your perception of all things far removed in time, place and nature; as such perception can never belong to one who is not omniscient. And yet in denying such Omniscience, you are putting forward arguments, and are actually denying it; so that there is self-contradiction on your part; just like the assertion ‘your mother is barren’,—(3558-3561)

The following Text points out that the Person also that is adduced by the other party is ‘Inadmissible’, ‘Unproven’:—[see verses 3562-3564 next]