Verse 3381-3389

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

समस्तवस्तुसम्बद्धतत्त्वाभ्यासबलोद्गतम् ।
सार्वज्ञं मानसं ज्ञानं मानमेकं प्रकल्प्यते ॥ ३३८१ ॥
नतु नेत्रादिविज्ञानं ततः किमिदमुच्यते ।
नूनं स चक्षुषा सर्वान्रसासर्वात्रसादीन्प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ३३८२ ॥
सिद्धं च मानसं ज्ञानं रूपाद्यनुभवात्मकम् ।
अविवादः परस्यापि वस्तुन्येतावति स्फुटः ॥ ३३८३ ॥
वर्ण्यते हि स्मृतिस्तेन रूपशब्दादिगोचरा ।
स्वप्ने च मानसं ज्ञानं सर्वार्थानुभवात्मकम् ॥ ३३८४ ॥
ततश्चानियतार्थेन मानसेन प्रकल्पिते ।
सर्वज्ञे चक्षुषा कस्माद्रसादीन्प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ३३८५ ॥
चाक्षुषेणैव तत्क्लृप्तावयं दोषो भवेदपि ।
समासेन तु चित्तेन वेत्त्येव च रसादिकम् ॥ ३३८६ ॥
यत्राप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स्वस्वार्थानतिलङ्घनात् ।
दूरसूक्ष्मादिदृष्टौ स्यान्न रूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तितः ॥ ३३८७ ॥
इत्यादिकमतोऽनिष्टं परैरुक्तं न नो यतः ।
स्वार्थाविलङ्घनेनैव मानसेऽतिशयो मतः ॥ ३३८८ ॥
यज्जातीयैः प्रमाणैश्च यज्जातीयार्थदर्शनम् ।
दृष्टं सम्प्रति लोकस्य तथा कालान्तरेऽपि नः ॥ ३३८९ ॥

samastavastusambaddhatattvābhyāsabalodgatam |
sārvajñaṃ mānasaṃ jñānaṃ mānamekaṃ prakalpyate || 3381 ||
natu netrādivijñānaṃ tataḥ kimidamucyate |
nūnaṃ sa cakṣuṣā sarvānrasāsarvātrasādīnpratipadyate || 3382 ||
siddhaṃ ca mānasaṃ jñānaṃ rūpādyanubhavātmakam |
avivādaḥ parasyāpi vastunyetāvati sphuṭaḥ || 3383 ||
varṇyate hi smṛtistena rūpaśabdādigocarā |
svapne ca mānasaṃ jñānaṃ sarvārthānubhavātmakam || 3384 ||
tataścāniyatārthena mānasena prakalpite |
sarvajñe cakṣuṣā kasmādrasādīnpratipadyate || 3385 ||
cākṣuṣeṇaiva tatklṛptāvayaṃ doṣo bhavedapi |
samāsena tu cittena vettyeva ca rasādikam || 3386 ||
yatrāpyatiśayo dṛṣṭaḥ svasvārthānatilaṅghanāt |
dūrasūkṣmādidṛṣṭau syānna rūpe śrotravṛttitaḥ || 3387 ||
ityādikamato'niṣṭaṃ parairuktaṃ na no yataḥ |
svārthāvilaṅghanenaiva mānase'tiśayo mataḥ || 3388 ||
yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇaiśca yajjātīyārthadarśanam |
dṛṣṭaṃ samprati lokasya tathā kālāntare'pi naḥ || 3389 ||

The only evidence that is suggested is that of the mental cognition of omniscience as brought about by the repeated practice of the ‘truth’ relating to all things;—and not the ordinary visual and other cognitions. Under the circumstances, how can it be asserted that the said person should cognise taste, etc. through the eye?—As regards mental cognition of things like colour and the rest, it has been accepted, without dispute, even by the other party; in fact, it is on the basis of this mental cognition that the remembrance of colour and other things has been said to be produced.—During dreams also, there is mental cognition in the shape of the apprehension of all things.—Thus then, the omniscient person being postulated on the basis of mental cognition, the scope of which is not restricted,—how could he cognise taste, etc, through the eye? This objection might apply, if he were held to know all things through the eye itself. As a matter of fact however, he does cognise taste and other things collectively, through the mind.—Even in cases where some superior peculiarity is found (in the cognitions of the omniscient person), in regard to the perception of subtle and remote things,—it is all within the scope of the said mind and mental concepts; and it is not due to the functioning of the auditory organ on colour; all these undesirable contingencies that other people have urged against us are not applicable to us at all; because all the superiority and peculiarity lies in the mental cognition itself, and it does not lie beyond the scope of this cognition. Thus then for us, the things that were cognised in the past by certain means of cognition are precisely the same that are cognised now by the same means of cognition.—(3381-3389)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If it had been held (by us) that the Visual and other Sense -perceptions apprehend all things, then there might have been room for the objection that has been urged. As a matter of fact, however, when we postulate the Omniscient Person we do so on the basis of the fact that at one and the same time He knows all things through Mental Cognition,—which apprehends all entities, and which is as good as Perception, on account of its distinctness and its being in agreement with the real state of things,—real Mental Cognition having been brought about by the Practice of Meditation upon the Truth relating to the impermanent and other characters of all things; and we do not hold that He apprehends all things through the Visual or other Sense-perceptions.

It cannot be right to assert that—“Mental Cognition is not known to apprehend all things”. Because you have yourself explained that there is Remembrance of Colour, Sound and other things; and Remembrance is certainly a Mental Cognition—Then again, it is a well-known fact that in dreams, there is cognition of Colour and other things; so that the denial of Mental Cognition is impossible. Consequently, the peculiarities in the cognition of the Omniscient Person falling well within the scope of Mental Cognition, what you have urged does not affect our position at all.—(3381-3389)