Verse 3363-3365

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

असर्वज्ञप्रणीतत्वं नचैवं तस्य युज्यते ।
सर्वज्ञतासमाक्षेपादतः संवादनं भवेत् ॥ ३३६३ ॥
अनुभूय यथा कश्चिदौष्णयं पश्चात्प्रभाषते ।
तस्माद्वस्त्वविसंवादस्तदर्थानुभवोद्भवात् ॥ ३३६४ ॥
तेन सर्वज्ञताकाले हेतोरस्याप्रसिद्धता ।
व्याहारवृत्तिकाले तु भवेत्सिद्धप्रसाधनम् ॥ ३३६५ ॥

asarvajñapraṇītatvaṃ nacaivaṃ tasya yujyate |
sarvajñatāsamākṣepādataḥ saṃvādanaṃ bhavet || 3363 ||
anubhūya yathā kaścidauṣṇayaṃ paścātprabhāṣate |
tasmādvastvavisaṃvādastadarthānubhavodbhavāt || 3364 ||
tena sarvajñatākāle hetorasyāprasiddhatā |
vyāhāravṛttikāle tu bhavetsiddhaprasādhanam || 3365 ||

Even so, it cannot be right to regard his words as those uttered by one who is not-omniscient; because his non-omniscience has been discarded by his omniscience; hence there should be agreement. for instance, having experienced heat, one speaks of it [and this speech is reconciled, in agreement, with the previous experience or cognition]; from this there is no disagreement with the real state of things, because the speech is the outcome of the direct cognition of those things. thus then, at the time when the lord is omniscient, the reason adduced by the other party is not present; and as regards the time of ordinary usage, his argument would be superfluous.—(3363-3365)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Bays the Opponent:—“If it is held that in the conceptual state, the Lord is not omniscient,—then His words would be words uttered by one who is not omniscient, and as such, not reliable.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3363-3365 above]

Though at that time the Lord is not omniscient,—yet that does not mean that His words are such as have been uttered by one who is not-omniscient;—why?—because this non-omniscience has been set aside by Omniscience. It is on this account that the Words in question become reliable also,—having been prompted by the Conceptual Content brought about by the force of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person, and therefore connected, indirectly, with the real state of things; this reliability is just like the reliability of the Inferential Conception.

An example is cited in support of the said idea—‘For instance, etc. etc.’

‘Tasmāt’—from the speech coming after the experiencing of heat.

‘The speech is the outcome, etc. etc.’—i.e. because the Conceptual Content has been brought about, indirectly, by the direct cognition of the Heat.

The following might be urged—“If the Omniscient Person has Conceptual Cognitions, then there is likelihood of His being mistaken; because, by its very nature, Conception is mistaken, wrong, because it appears as the Cognition of a thing as what is not that thing”.

This is not so. The Lord could be mistaken, only if He did not know the distinction between the Real and the Imposed (Unreal). As a matter of fact, however, He recognises the object of the Conceptual Cognition as only imposed (unreal), while He looks upon the real external object,—which is envisaged by the Non-conceptual Cognition,—as something quite different, and real; how then can He be said to be ‘mistaken’?

“If He is not mistaken, why does He impose (fancy) things during the conceptual state?”

Not so; because He is cognisant all the time of the means whereby speech is prompted. As a matter of fact, He does not perceive anything else,—apart from the imposing conception—as prompting the speech;—nor does He apprehend any other connotation of the Words, apart from what is imposed; hence, knowing the means whereby speech is prompted, He takes pity on the world, and, without expounding to others the things as He has actually perceived them, He cannot sit idle; and being urged by the desire to expound them, He creates the imposing conception,—as the means prompting speech,—as also the imposed, in the shape of the connotation of Words.

All this objection the Author will bring up later on and answer it. We have introduced it in the present context, because it had some bearing upon it.

For the same reasons, it cannot be right to regard the Omniscient Person as affected by Love, on the ground of His speakership. Because speech can proceed from other causes also. Speaking, Movement and such actions are not always due to Love, etc.; they are due to the mere desire to speak; and this Desire to speak is possible also in the Person devoid of Love, being due to His mercy. Hence the Reason adduced is not true.

“Mercy itself is only a form of Love.”

Not so; because Mercy does not bring about any undesirable effects; while Love has been described as that attachment of the mind which appertains to things beset with impurities, and which is indicated by the notion of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ and of one’s ‘lasting happiness’; while Hate is the desire to harm, against anything that injures the ‘me’ and ‘mine’;—and the notion of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ is sheer delusion; not so Mercy; because Mercy appears, even without any notion of ‘I’, through the repeated perception of particular forms of Pain and Suffering. It is on this ground that the Scriptures have asserted that Persons free from Love and Attachment are moved by Friendliness and other feelings that are based entirely upon Dharma, etc.—(3363-3365)