Verse 3354-3355

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सर्वाकारज्ञतायास्तु न कश्चिदपि विद्यते ।
साक्षादितरथा वाऽपि विरोधो ज्ञेयतादिभिः ॥ ३३५४ ॥
अज्ञेयत्वादिविश्लेषात् ज्ञेयत्वादि व्यवस्थितम् ।
न सर्वज्ञत्वविश्लेषात्तत्पुनः स्थितलक्षणम् ॥ ३३५५ ॥

sarvākārajñatāyāstu na kaścidapi vidyate |
sākṣāditarathā vā'pi virodho jñeyatādibhiḥ || 3354 ||
ajñeyatvādiviśleṣāt jñeyatvādi vyavasthitam |
na sarvajñatvaviśleṣāttatpunaḥ sthitalakṣaṇam || 3355 ||

As a matter of fact, there is no incompatibility, direct or indirect, between the character of ‘knowing all things’ and that of ‘being cognisable, etc.’—in fact ‘cognisability’ is proved by the ‘absence of incognisability’, not by the ‘absence of omniscience’; this latter therefore retains its character.—(3354-3355)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued, under Text 3157,—“Who can reasonably accept the existence of a Person who can be regarded by such reasons as ‘being cognisable’, etc. etc.?”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3354-3355 above]

When one desires to establish the denial of one thing by the affirmation of another, he should affirm that which may be incompatible either directly or indirectly, with what is to be denied,—and not that which is not so incompatible. If it were not so, then the affirmation of anything at random might lead to the denial of all things. In the case in question, there is no incompatibility, direct or indirect, between ‘Omniscience’ and ‘cognisability’. For instance, incompatibility between any two things can be of only two kinds—(1) in the form of mutual exclusion, the presence and absence of one implying the absence and presence, respectively, of the other,—e.g. between Existence and Non-existence, or between Succession and Non-succession; and (2) in the form of impossibility of co-existence; e.g. between Fire and Coolness.—That the former kind of ‘incompatibility’ is not there between ‘Omniscience’ and ‘cognisability’ is shown by the words—‘Cognisability is proved, etc. etc.’—It has been pointed out on a previous occasion that there is ‘incompatibility’ of the kind of mutual exclusiveness between those two things only of which the cognition of one means the non-cognition of the other; and ‘cognisability’ is there, as excluding, not ‘Omniscience’, but ‘incognisability’.—(3354-3355)

The following Text shows that the second kind of incompatibility also is not there in the case in question:—[see verse 3356 next]