Verse 3349-3350

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

को हि निःशेषशास्त्रार्थतत्त्वज्ञं मन्यते जडः ।
समानभोजनज्ञानान्मातृकामात्रवेदनात् ॥ ३३४९ ॥
तद्येन हेतुनैकस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रसाध्यते ।
तद्धेतुवस्तुनोऽसत्त्वान्न सोऽन्यस्योपतिष्ठते ॥ ३३५० ॥

ko hi niḥśeṣaśāstrārthatattvajñaṃ manyate jaḍaḥ |
samānabhojanajñānānmātṛkāmātravedanāt || 3349 ||
tadyena hetunaikasya sarvajñatvaṃ prasādhyate |
taddhetuvastuno'sattvānna so'nyasyopatiṣṭhate || 3350 ||

What fool is there who will regard a person who knows the letters of the alphabet only, as conversant with the essence of all the sciences,—merely on the ground of his possessing equal knowledge of food?—(3349)

Thus then, that reason by which the omniscience of one person is established is not available in the case of another person;—because the essence of that reason is absent in this latter case.—(3350)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 3349]:

It has been argued by the other party, under Text 3150, that—“In regard to one matter, of Arithmetic for instance, all beings are found to be truthful and no distinction is found among them, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 3349 above]

It has been argued by the other party, under Texts 3151 et seq., that—“The Reason that the Buddhist adduces in support of the Omniscience of one Person will be available in the case of other Persons also, etc. etc.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 3350 above]

[verse 3350]:

‘Tat’—Therefore; thus.

‘The essence of that Reason’;—though the mere verbal expression of the Reason may be applicable,—in the form ‘Because they are Teachers of the Syādvāda and other doctrines which are true and all-pervading [therefore Jina and others should be regarded as Omniscient]’;—yet the essential factor of that Reason which is concomitant with the reality of things, is absent in such reasonings,—which therefore cannot be available for the case of Kapila and others. It is only when one real thing is concomitant with another real thing,—and not merely a verbal expression—that brings about the right apprehension of things.—(3350)