Verse 3271-3272

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

कारणव्यापकाभावे निवृत्तिश्चेह युज्यते ।
हेतुमद्व्याप्तयोस्तस्मादुत्पत्तेरेकभावतः ॥ ३२७१ ॥
कृशानुपादपाभावे धूमाम्रादिनिवृत्तिवत् ।
अन्यथाऽहेतुतैव स्यान्नानात्वं च प्रसज्यते ॥ ३२७२ ॥

kāraṇavyāpakābhāve nivṛttiśceha yujyate |
hetumadvyāptayostasmādutpatterekabhāvataḥ || 3271 ||
kṛśānupādapābhāve dhūmāmrādinivṛttivat |
anyathā'hetutaiva syānnānātvaṃ ca prasajyate || 3272 ||

When there is absence of (a) the ‘cause’ and (b) the ‘pervader’, it is only right and proper that there should be absence of (a) the ‘caused’ and (b) the ‘pervaded’; (a) because the birth of the one proceeds from the other, and (b) because one is of the same nature as the other;—for example, when there is absence of (a) the fire and (b) the tree, there is absence of (a) the smoke and (b) the ‘mango-tree, etc.’—If it were not so, (a) the one could not be the cause of the other, and (b) there would be diversity.—(3271-3272)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question:—“Even when there is absence of the ‘Cause’ and the ‘Pervader’, why should that imply the absence of something else?”

Answer:—[see verses 3271-3272 above]

‘Caused’—that which has a cause; i.e. the effect;—the Dvandva compound is between ‘caused’ and ‘pervaded’;—these two are construed with the foregoing ‘nivṛttiryujyate’,—the meaning being that ‘it is only right and proper that there should be absence of the Caused and the Pervaded.

The reason for this is supplied—‘Because the birth of the one, etc. etc.’—(a) When there is absence of, Cause, there is absence of Effect, because the Effect derives its existence from the Cause; e.g. when there is absence of Fire, there is absence of Smoke. (b) Similarly when there is absence of the Pervader, there is absence of the Pervaded; because the Pervaded is of the same essence as the Pervader,—both being of the same nature; e.g. when there is absence of the Tree, there is absence of the Mango, Khadira and other particular Trees; because it is only a particular Tree that is known as the ‘mango’.

If it were not so,—i.e. if on the absence of the Cause, the Effect were not absent,—then the Cause would not be a true cause at all. Because when one thing can be present even when the other is absent, the latter cannot be the cause of the former; otherwise, there would be absurdities. Similarly when one thing is not absent when the other is absent, they cannot be of the same nature, e.g. the Cow and the Gavaya. Hence it follows that when the Pervader is absent, the Pervaded must be absent,—and where the Cause is absent, the Effect must be absent; it would not imply the absence of anything else; as that would lead to incongruities.

This has been thus declared—‘Thus when a certain nature is related to a thing, its absence would imply the absence of that thing; and the absence of the cause would imply the absence of the effect; because of the infallibility of their relationship. If it were not so, why should the absence of the one mean the absence of the other? Because a man has no horse, does it mean that he should have no Cow either?’—(3271-3272)