Verse 3264

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नित्यस्य वचसः शक्तिर्न स्वतो वापि नान्यतः ।
स्वार्थज्ञाने समुत्पाद्ये क्रमाक्रमविरोधतः ॥ ३२६४ ॥

nityasya vacasaḥ śaktirna svato vāpi nānyataḥ |
svārthajñāne samutpādye kramākramavirodhataḥ || 3264 ||

The ‘eternal word’ can never have the capacity to bring about the cognition of its own meaning;—because there is incompatibility between ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’.—(3264)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It may be possible to have the ‘Eternal Word’; even so, however, it cannot be right to accept it as a means of knowing supersensuous things.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—[see verse 3264 above]

‘Its own meaning’—what is expressed by the word.—Or, ‘sva’ (in ‘svārtha’) may stand for the ‘self’, the nature, of the Word;—and ‘artha’ for what is expressed by it; so the compound ‘svārthajñāna’ would mean ‘the Cognition of the Word itself and its meaning’.

For the bringing about of such Cognition, the capacity of the ‘Eternal Word’ could be either inherent in itself, or due to other contributory causes. It cannot be inherent in it; because in the matter of an Eternal Thing bringing about its effect, there is incompatibility between succession and simultaneity; and apart from these, there is no other method possible whereby there could be effective action; as the two (succession and simultaneity) are mutually exclusive. Hence all effective action must be invariably concomitant with succession and simultaneity.

Now, in the case of the ‘Eternal World’, it cannot bring about the Cognition of its ‘meaning’ in succession; because at the time that the first effect is being brought about, the cause would not have lost its capacity to bring about the subsequent effects (Cognitions); so that all these should appear, all at the same time. Nor is it possible for these effects to be brought about in succession; because even at the later moment,—just as at the moment of the bringing about of the first effect—the efficiency of the cause would be there intact, and hence there would be an incongruity if it did not bring about the first effect over again.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a thing is devoid of a wider character, it must be devoid of the less wide character;—e.g. the Jar, which is devoid of the character of ‘tree’, is devoid of the character of ‘śiṃśapā' (a particular tree); the ‘Eternal Word’ called Veda is devoid of the character of ‘succession and simultaneity’ which includes under itself the character of ‘effective action’;—hence, by implication, there is non-apprehension of the wider character.—Thus it is not possible for the ‘Eternal Word’ to have the said capacity inherent in itself.

Nor can the said capacity be due to any other contributory cause. Because the capacity being nothing apart from its very nature, cannot, like this nature, be brought about by any such cause. Even if there were some such cause, any relationship to it would be impossible. This has been discussed several times.

Thus then, the idea of the Cognition of supersensuous things being due to the ‘Eternal Word’, being rejected by Inference, cannot be accepted.—(3264)