Verse 3247-3263

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एवं सर्वज्ञता पुंसां स्वातन्त्र्येण निरास्पदा ।
इदं च चिन्त्यते भूयः सर्वदर्शी कथं मतः ॥ ३२४७ ॥
युगपत्परिपाट्या वा सर्वं चैकस्वभावतः ।
जानन्यथाप्रधानं वा शक्त्या वेष्येत सर्ववित् ॥ ३२४८ ॥
युगपच्छुच्यशुच्यादिस्वभावानां विरोधिनाम् ।
ज्ञानं नैकधिया दृष्टं भिन्ना वा गतयः क्वचित् ॥ ३२४९ ॥
भूतं भवद्भविष्यच्च वस्त्वनन्तं क्रमेण कः ।
प्रत्येकं शक्नुयाद्बोद्धुं वत्सराणां शतैरपि ॥ ३२५० ॥
स्वभावेनाविभक्तेन यः सर्वमवबुध्यते ।
स्वलक्षणानि भावानां सर्वेषां न स बुध्यते ॥ ३२५१ ॥
बोद्धा सामान्यरूपस्य सर्वज्ञेनापि तेन किम् ।
अन्याकारेण बोधेन नैव वस्त्ववगम्यते ॥ ३२५२ ॥
तदेकाकारविज्ञानं सम्यङ्मिथ्याऽपि वा भवेत् ।
सम्यक्त्वे दृष्टबाधैवं प्रसक्तं सर्वमद्वयम् ॥ ३२५३ ॥
ततश्च शिष्यसर्वज्ञधर्माधर्मतदुक्तयः ।
न स्युर्वो भिन्नरूपत्वे स्वभावानवधारणात् ॥ ३२५४ ॥
मृषात्वे त्वेकबोधस्य भ्रान्तः प्राप्नोति सर्ववित् ।
न श्रद्धेयं वचस्तस्य तदोन्मत्तादिवाक्यवत् ॥ ३२५५ ॥
सहेतु सकलं कर्म ज्ञानेनालौकिकेन यः ।
समाधिजेन जानाति स सर्वज्ञो यदीष्यते ॥ ३२५६ ॥
प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा शाब्दं वा तदतत्कृतम् ।
प्रमाणमस्य सद्भावे नास्तीति नास्ति तादृशः ॥ ३२५७ ॥
युगपत्परिपाट्या वा कथं कार्याद्विनाऽनुमा ।
सामर्थ्यमपि नैवास्ति समर्थे सर्वमेव वा ॥ ३२५८ ॥
सर्वे सर्वावबोधे च क्षेत्रज्ञाः प्रभविष्णवः ।
उपायविफलत्वात्तु बुध्यन्ते निखिलं न ते ॥ ३२५९ ॥
लब्धासाधारणोपायोऽशेषपुंसां विलक्षणः ।
तत्रैकः सर्ववित्कश्चिदित्येवं निष्प्रमाणकम् ॥ ३२६० ॥
इत्थं यदा न सर्वज्ञः कश्चिदप्युपपद्यते ।
न धर्माधिगमे हेतुः पौरुषेयं तदा वचः ॥ ३२६१ ॥
इति मीमांसकाः प्राहुः स्वतन्त्रश्रुतिलालसाः ।
विस्तरेण च वेदानां साधिता पौरुषेयता ॥ ३२६२ ॥
तस्मादतीन्द्रियार्थनां साक्षाद्द्रष्टैव विद्यते ।
नतु नित्येन वचसा कश्चित्पश्यत्यसम्भवात् ॥ ३२६३ ॥

evaṃ sarvajñatā puṃsāṃ svātantryeṇa nirāspadā |
idaṃ ca cintyate bhūyaḥ sarvadarśī kathaṃ mataḥ || 3247 ||
yugapatparipāṭyā vā sarvaṃ caikasvabhāvataḥ |
jānanyathāpradhānaṃ vā śaktyā veṣyeta sarvavit || 3248 ||
yugapacchucyaśucyādisvabhāvānāṃ virodhinām |
jñānaṃ naikadhiyā dṛṣṭaṃ bhinnā vā gatayaḥ kvacit || 3249 ||
bhūtaṃ bhavadbhaviṣyacca vastvanantaṃ krameṇa kaḥ |
pratyekaṃ śaknuyādboddhuṃ vatsarāṇāṃ śatairapi || 3250 ||
svabhāvenāvibhaktena yaḥ sarvamavabudhyate |
svalakṣaṇāni bhāvānāṃ sarveṣāṃ na sa budhyate || 3251 ||
boddhā sāmānyarūpasya sarvajñenāpi tena kim |
anyākāreṇa bodhena naiva vastvavagamyate || 3252 ||
tadekākāravijñānaṃ samyaṅmithyā'pi vā bhavet |
samyaktve dṛṣṭabādhaivaṃ prasaktaṃ sarvamadvayam || 3253 ||
tataśca śiṣyasarvajñadharmādharmataduktayaḥ |
na syurvo bhinnarūpatve svabhāvānavadhāraṇāt || 3254 ||
mṛṣātve tvekabodhasya bhrāntaḥ prāpnoti sarvavit |
na śraddheyaṃ vacastasya tadonmattādivākyavat || 3255 ||
sahetu sakalaṃ karma jñānenālaukikena yaḥ |
samādhijena jānāti sa sarvajño yadīṣyate || 3256 ||
pratyakṣamanumānaṃ vā śābdaṃ vā tadatatkṛtam |
pramāṇamasya sadbhāve nāstīti nāsti tādṛśaḥ || 3257 ||
yugapatparipāṭyā vā kathaṃ kāryādvinā'numā |
sāmarthyamapi naivāsti samarthe sarvameva vā || 3258 ||
sarve sarvāvabodhe ca kṣetrajñāḥ prabhaviṣṇavaḥ |
upāyaviphalatvāttu budhyante nikhilaṃ na te || 3259 ||
labdhāsādhāraṇopāyo'śeṣapuṃsāṃ vilakṣaṇaḥ |
tatraikaḥ sarvavitkaścidityevaṃ niṣpramāṇakam || 3260 ||
itthaṃ yadā na sarvajñaḥ kaścidapyupapadyate |
na dharmādhigame hetuḥ pauruṣeyaṃ tadā vacaḥ || 3261 ||
iti mīmāṃsakāḥ prāhuḥ svatantraśrutilālasāḥ |
vistareṇa ca vedānāṃ sādhitā pauruṣeyatā || 3262 ||
tasmādatīndriyārthanāṃ sākṣāddraṣṭaiva vidyate |
natu nityena vacasā kaścitpaśyatyasambhavāt || 3263 ||

“thus then, there is no room for the omniscience of men. We now proceed to consider why the omniscient person has been postulated?—Your omniscient person—does he apprehend all things by a single cognition? Or by several cognitions? And then, does he apprehend them all at once? Or in succession—noticing only the more important things? In no case has it been seen that a single cognition apprehends such contradictory things as pure and impure and so forth; nor have several divergent cognitions been found to appear at one and the same time.—Who too is there who could apprehend, even in hundreds of years, each of the endless number of things, past, present and future?—Even if the person, by his own undiversified nature, apprehends all things,—he cannot apprehend the specific individualities of all things. Under the circumstances, what would be the use of the omniscient person who knows the things only in their general form? Specially as in no other form is the thing apprehended.—Then again, this uniform cognition could be either true or false.—If it be held to be true, then this would be contrary to perceived facts; as it would mean that all is one, without a second; and the result of this would be that there would be no such diverse entities as the disciple, the omniscient person, dharma, adharma, and the teachings of the said person; as the distinctive features of these would not be cognised.—If the one uniform cognition be held to be false, the omniscient person turns out to be a deluded person; so that no confidence should be reposed in his words, which are like the words of demented and intoxicated men.—If then the omniscient person is held to be that person who apprehends all things and their causes, through a single abnormal cognition brought about by communion,—then there can be no means of cognition to vouch for his existence,—in the shape of perception or inference or word, that is not produced by that person himself. Hence the conclusion would be that such a person does not exist.—Whether simultaneously or successively, how could there be any inference without an effect?—As a matter of fact, a certain person can either have no potency at all, or if he has, then he would have all potencies; so that all beings would be able to have the cognition of all things. And yet as a matter of fact, wanting in the necessary means, people do not cognise all things.—The idea that ‘there is one person who has acquired special powers not common among men, and he knows all things’—is entirely baseless.—Thus then, no omniscient person of any kind is conceivable. Consequently no human assertion could be the means of providing the knowledge of dharma.”—(3247-3261)

Thus have the Mīmāṃsakas argued, being firm believers in the self-sufficiency of the Veda.—But we have already proved in detail that the Veda is the work of a person.—Hence the conclusion is irresistible that there is a person who has the direct knowledge of all things; and no one can know things by means of the eternal word, which is an impossibility.—(3262-3263)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verses 3247-3261]:

So far the Author has set forth arguments, from Kumārila’s point of view, against the Buddhist view that there are Omniscient Persons.—He now sets forth arguments adduced by the two writers, Sāmaṭa and, Yajñaṭa, against the idea of the Omniscient Person:—[see verses 3247-3261 above]

Does the man regarded as ‘omniscient’ know all things at one and the same time? Or in succession, one after the other?—Or, does He apprehend the whole world as one, in one form, such as eternal and the like? Or only the more important things—those for instance that are useful to men, such as the effects following from Acts and so forth?—Or is He called ‘omniscient’ because He possesses the capacity to know all things,—like Fire, which, though not actually devouring all things, either simultaneously or in succession, is yet called ‘all-devourer’?

Under the first alternative, two alternative views are possible, Does He know all things simultaneously through a single Cognition? Or through several Cognitions?—He could not know them through a single Cognition; because never has it been seen that several mutually contradictory things,—such as the pure and the impure—are apprehended by a single Cognition.

It might be argued that—what happens is that at one and the same time there exist in Him several Cognitions envisaging the various mutually contradictory things.

The answer to this is—‘Nor have several divergent, etc. etc.’—This has to be construed with ‘na dṛṣṭaḥ’, changed from the ‘dṛṣṭam’, of the previous clause. As a matter of fact, several Cognitions in the same ‘Chain’ of a Cognition have never been found to appear.

[Several lines of the text are missing here.]

[The Buddhist’s answer to the Mīmāṃsaka’s arguments against the Omniscient Person,—embodied in Texts 3128-3261.]

[verses 3262-3263]:

Thus the conclusion is that there is a Person who perceives things directly by Himself, not through the ‘Eternal Word’; because the ‘Eternal Word’ is an impossibility.

The ‘eva’ after ‘draṣṭā’ should be construed after ‘sākṣāt—(3262-3263)