Verse 3235-3237

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यत्सर्वं नाम लोकेऽस्मिन्प्रत्यक्षं तद्धि कस्यचित् ।
प्रमेयज्ञेयवस्तुत्वैर्दधिरूपरसादिवत् ॥ ३२३५ ॥
ज्ञानमात्रेऽपि निर्दिष्टे पक्षन्यूनत्वमापतेत् ।
सर्वज्ञ इति योऽभीष्टो नेत्थं स प्रतिपादितः ॥ ३२३६ ॥
यदि बुद्धातिरिक्तोऽन्यः कश्चित्सर्वज्ञतां गतः ।
बुद्धवाक्यप्रमाणत्वे तज्ज्ञानं क्वोपयुज्यते ॥ ३२३७ ॥

yatsarvaṃ nāma loke'sminpratyakṣaṃ taddhi kasyacit |
prameyajñeyavastutvairdadhirūparasādivat || 3235 ||
jñānamātre'pi nirdiṣṭe pakṣanyūnatvamāpatet |
sarvajña iti yo'bhīṣṭo netthaṃ sa pratipāditaḥ || 3236 ||
yadi buddhātirikto'nyaḥ kaścitsarvajñatāṃ gataḥ |
buddhavākyapramāṇatve tajjñānaṃ kvopayujyate || 3237 ||

“[The argument put forward is]—‘All the things that there are in this world must be perceptible to some person,—because they are entities, cognisable and knowable,—like the curd, colour, taste and other things’.—Inasmuch as mere knowledge is mentioned, it falls short of the original proposition (of the Buddhist); so that the ‘omniscient person’ whose existence is desired to be proved does not become established in this manner.—If some person other than Buddha had become omniscient, of what use could this knowledge be in the proving of the reliability of the words of Buddha?”—(3235-3237)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts show that these same arguments serve to reject the argument that other people have put forward in support of the existence of the Omniscient Person:—[see verses 3235-3237 above]

‘Whatever is endowed with cognisability, knowability and the character of being an entity, must be perceptible to some person,—e.g. the Curd, Colour, Taste and so forth,—all things have the said characters of knowability, etc.;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.’

Here also, as before, it has to be pointed out that the conclusion falls far short of the desired Proposition, and the Reason is Inconclusive,

Thus then, it is not possible to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person, either in general or in particular. Hence it becomes established that there can be no Omniscient Person. And when there is no Omniscient Person, there can be no words of such a Person; consequently no man can undertake an activity through such words.—(3235-3237)

Or, there may be an Omniscient Person; even so, there can be no ‘words’ (‘assertion’, uttered by Him,—on which your activities could be based.—This is shown in the following:—[see verses 3238-3239 next]