Verse 3192-3193

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सर्वज्ञोऽयमिति ह्येवं तत्कालैरपि बोद्धृभिः ।
तज्ज्ञानज्ञेयविज्ञानशून्यैर्ज्ञातुं न शक्यते ॥ ३१९२ ॥
सर्वज्ञो नावबुद्धश्च येनैव स्यान्न तं प्रति ।
तद्वाक्यानां प्रमाणत्वं मूलाज्ञानेऽन्यवाक्यवत् ॥ ३१९३ ॥

sarvajño'yamiti hyevaṃ tatkālairapi boddhṛbhiḥ |
tajjñānajñeyavijñānaśūnyairjñātuṃ na śakyate || 3192 ||
sarvajño nāvabuddhaśca yenaiva syānna taṃ prati |
tadvākyānāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ mūlājñāne'nyavākyavat || 3193 ||

“As a matter of fact, even the contemporaries of the omniscient person could not know him as ‘omniscient’, as they would be devoid of the knowledge of the cognitions of that person [or, of the knowledge of the things cognised by that person].—[see Ślokavārtika 1.1.2, 134], and if the omniscient person is not recognised by any one,—for that man, the assertion of that omniscient person could not be reliable; as the very basis of that assertion would be unknown,—as in the case of the assertion of other ordinary men.”—[see Ślokavārtika 1.1.2, 136.]—(3192-3193) commentary.

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Then again, we shall lay aside, for the present, the idea that people of the present day are incapable of knowing the Omniscient Person as no such is present before them; as a matter of fact, even people who lived at the same time as that Person could not know him, because they would themselves be not-omniscient.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—[see verses 3192-3193 above]

The compound ‘tajjñānajñeya, etc. etc’. is to be expounded as—‘they are devoid of—without—that Cognition which has for its object—i.e. which envisages—the Cognitions of the Omniscient Person’.—Or as ‘who are devoid of the Cognition of all the things cognised by that Person’,—because he is himself not omniscient.

By merely looking at the body, one does not conclude that ‘he is omniscient’; because such conclusion must be accompanied by the recognition of the presence of exceptional knowledge (in the Person); this ‘exceptional knowledge’, in order to be able to prove omniscience, must envisage all things; and this fact of the Cognition envisaging all things cannot be recognised unless the things comprehended by that Cognition are known; for instance, the Cognition of the ‘man with the stick’ is not possible unless one knows the stick.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When the Cognition of one thing forms the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of another thing, there can be no Cognition of the latter thing without the Cognition of the former thing;—e.g. the Cognition of the stick being the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of the man with the stick, there is no Cognition, of the man with the stick unless there is Cognition of the stick;—the Cognition of things cognised by the Omniscient Person, which is the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person himself, is not possible for men of limited vision; hence there is non-apprehension of the more-extensive character (which implies the absence of the less extensive); because the Cognition of the necessary adjunct is more extensive (wider) than the Cognition of that to which the said adjunct belongs; and the former is absent in the case in question.

Thus then, even in the case of a man contemporaneous with the Omniscient Person, unless such a man is himself omniscient, he cannot know the Omniscient Person; so that for such a man, even the assertions of Omniscient Persons would be of doubtful veracity and hence unreliable; as the basis of it—the grounds of certainty regarding reliability, in the shape of the definite cognition of the Cognitions of the Omniscient Person,—would be absent.

‘As in the case of the assertion of ordinary men’—i.e. of the assertion of common people.—(3192-3193)