Verse 3186

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सर्वज्ञो दृश्यते तावन्नेदानीमस्मदादिभिः ।
दृष्टो न चैकदेशोऽस्ति लिङ्गं वा योऽनुमापयेत् ॥ ३१८६ ॥

sarvajño dṛśyate tāvannedānīmasmadādibhiḥ |
dṛṣṭo na caikadeśo'sti liṅgaṃ vā yo'numāpayet || 3186 ||

“The omniscient person is not seen by us at the present, time nor is there any indicative recognised as part (of the subject), which could lead to his inference.”—(3186)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

“As a matter of fact, the existence of the Omniscient Person has not been vouched for by any one of the five Means of Cognition—Perception, Inference, Word, Analogy, Presumption;—how then can such a Person, who falls within the scope of ‘Negation’ (Non-apprehension only) and is non-existent, stand on the same footing as the Veda which is known to all men down even to the milk-woman?—With this idea, the Vedic Scholar proceeds to refute the idea of the Omniscient Person being cognisable by any one of the five Means of Cognition, Perception and the rest:—[see verse 3186 above]

“By means of Perception we, men of limited vision, do not see the Omniscient Person; because the perception of men of limited vision is of three kinds:—(1) Perception through the Senses, (2) Perception through the Mind, and (3) the Self-Cognition of all minds and mental phenomena.—None of these three kinds of Perception can bring about the Cognition of the Omniscient Person; because He does not form an object of such Cognition; (1) Perception through the senses is restricted to the five objects—Colour, Odour, Taste, Touch and Sound; hence the mental functions subsisting in the ‘chain’ of other persons cannot figure in Perception through the Senses.—(2) Nor can the Omniscient Person be the object of Perception through the Mind; because the Mind, as such, apprehends only such things as have been already apprehended by Perception through the Senses; and hence it is, like this latter, restricted to the same objects, Colour and the rest.—(3) Nor can He be the object of ‘Self-cognition’, because this apprehends only such mind and mental operations as occur in one’s own ‘Chain’; and consequently, it cannot apprehend, the mind, etc. occurring in other ‘Chains’, or even such mental operations occurring in one’s own ‘Chain’ as are yet to come. As regards the Perception by Mystics,—such perception forms the subject-matter of dispute; hence the question regarding the Omniscient Person being perceived or not perceived by Mystics does not arise at all.

(2) “Nor can the Omniscient Person be proved by means of Inference. The Buddhists have regarded Inference as based upon three kinds of Indicative (Probans)—[viz.:—(a) Based on non-apprehension, (b) Based on causal relation, and (c) Based on the nature of things]. (a) In the present instance, what is needed is a positive reason, hence there is no room for non-apprehension.—(b) Nor is there room for causal relation; because the causal relation is always based upon Perception, and no Perception is possible of the far off Omniscient Person; whose causal relation with anything therefore is impossible.—(c) As for the mature of things, any Reason based upon that also cannot prove the existence of the Omniscient Person; because such a Person himself being imperceptible, his nature, which must be inseparable from himself, cannot be apprehended; hence it cannot serve as an Indicative which is ‘perceived’—well-known, recognised,—as ‘being part’—of the ‘Subject’ (Omniscient Person),—leading to the inference of the Omniscient Person.

Then again, any Reason that may be adduced in proof of the existence of the Omniscient Person, cannot escape from the three kinds of flaw (fallacy)—being ‘inadmissible’, ‘contradictory’ and ‘inconclusive For instance, when the Reason is adduced, is it adduced as a property belonging to a positive entity? Or to a negative entity? Or to both?—These are the only three alternatives possible.—As regards the Omniscient Person, there can be no such ‘Property belonging to a positive entity’ as is admitted by both parties; because that positive entity itself (in the shape of the Omniscient Person) is yet to be proved;—if he were admitted, there would be no dispute at all; if a party accepts the idea of such a property belonging to that entity, how could he not accept the entity itself? Because the mere property cannot exist without its substratum in the shape of the entity.—Nor can the Reason proving the Omniscient Person consist of a property belonging to a negative entity; because such a Reason would prove the non-existence of the entity, and hence it would be ‘contradictory—Nor, lastly, can the Reason be one that belongs to both; because such a Reason would be ‘inconclusive’, How could any Reason which belongs to both positive and negative entities serve as proving the existence of an entity,—which it could do only if it were inseparable from the entity, and if it were excluded from existence in the Negative Entity, which is present in cases where the contrary of the Probandum is present?

Thus none of the three kinds of Indicative, as part of the ‘Subject’, can bring about the Inference of the Omniscient Person, whose existence, therefore, cannot be proved.—(3186)