The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3159 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3159.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यज्जातीयैः प्रमाणैस्तु यज्जातीयार्थदर्शनम् ।
दृष्टं सम्प्रति लोकस्य तथा कालान्तरेऽप्यभूत् ॥ ३१५९ ॥

yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇaistu yajjātīyārthadarśanam |
dṛṣṭaṃ samprati lokasya tathā kālāntare'pyabhūt || 3159 ||

“As a matter of fact, the perception of certain things through certain causes in the past was exactly as it is found to appear at the present time.”—(3159)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—Though it is true that at present the perceptions derived from the Eye and other sense-organs do not apprehend diverse and heterogeneous things,—yet it is possible that at some time in the past, such apprehension of divergent heterogeneous things did appear in a certain Person.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 3159 above]

The nature of things is always determined by the exact concomitance of definite causes, not haphazard. If it were not so, then all characters could be attributed to all things; and if such were the case, then how could it ever be possible for the nature determined by causes to be otherwise? That is to say, it is not possible for the Smoke,—which has its existence concomitant with Fire—to be produced from anything else.

Nor can the view be accepted that the apprehension of all things comes about through Mental Perception,—[the second alternative put forward in the commentary on 3157-3158, on p. 1405, line 2].—Because, though Mental Perception may envisage all things,—yet it has no independent operation of its own towards the apprehension of things; if it had, then there would be no deaf or blind persons. It is then dependent upon something else; and as a matter of fact it is found that it envisages only those things that have been apprehended by Perception through the Senses; so that there can be no apprehension by Mental Perception of anything that has not been envisaged by Sense-perception,—such things, for instance, as are remote, small, hidden, and the mind of another person and so forth.—(3159)

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