Verse 3154-3158

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एवं सर्वज्ञकल्पेषु निहतेषु परस्परम् ।
अल्पशेषीकृतान्सर्वान्वेदवादी हनिष्यति ॥ ३१५४ ॥
यथा नकुलदन्ताग्रस्पृष्टा या काचिदौषधिः ।
सर्वं सर्पविषं हन्ति क्रीडद्भिरपि योजिता ॥ ३१५५ ॥
वेदवादिमुखस्थैवं युक्तिर्लौकिकवैदिकी ।
या काचिदपि शाक्यादिसर्पज्ञानविषापहा ॥ ३१५६ ॥
यस्य ज्ञेयप्रमेयत्ववस्तुसत्त्वादिलक्षणाः ।
निहन्तुं हेतवः शक्ताः को नु तं कल्पयिष्यति ॥ ३१५७ ॥
एकेनैव प्रमाणेन सर्वज्ञो येन कल्प्यते ।
नूनं स चक्षुषा सर्वान् रसादीन्प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ३१५८ ॥

evaṃ sarvajñakalpeṣu nihateṣu parasparam |
alpaśeṣīkṛtānsarvānvedavādī haniṣyati || 3154 ||
yathā nakuladantāgraspṛṣṭā yā kācidauṣadhiḥ |
sarvaṃ sarpaviṣaṃ hanti krīḍadbhirapi yojitā || 3155 ||
vedavādimukhasthaivaṃ yuktirlaukikavaidikī |
yā kācidapi śākyādisarpajñānaviṣāpahā || 3156 ||
yasya jñeyaprameyatvavastusattvādilakṣaṇāḥ |
nihantuṃ hetavaḥ śaktāḥ ko nu taṃ kalpayiṣyati || 3157 ||
ekenaiva pramāṇena sarvajño yena kalpyate |
nūnaṃ sa cakṣuṣā sarvān rasādīnpratipadyate || 3158 ||

“In this way pseudo-omniscient persons haying been beaten off by each other, the few that remain shall be beaten off by the upholder of the Veda.”—(3154)

“Any herb that has been touched by the teeth of the mongoose removes the poison of all serpents, even when applied in play (carelessly); in the same way any stray secular and spiritual argument proceeding from the mouth of the Vedic scholar will destroy the poison of all serpent-like Buddhists and others.”—(3155-3156)

“Who can (reasonably) assume (accept) the existence of a person (omniscient) who can be rejected by such reasons as—‘being knowable’, ‘being cognisable’, ‘being an entity’, ‘being existent’ and so forth? The man who assumes the existence of an omniscient person knowing all things through a single means of cognition may certainly apprehend all such things as taste, odour, etc. through the eyes alone.”—(3157-3158)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 3154]:

The following might be urged that—That person alone may be regarded as omniscient in whose case no objection can be urged to the contrary.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 3154 above]

The Mīmāṃsaka asserts his own superiority in the following:—[see verses 3155-3156 above]

[3155-3156]:

Question:—What is this ‘stray argument’?

Answer:—[see verses 3157-3158 above]

[verses 3157-3158]:

When several such Reasons as ‘being knowable’ and the rest,—which are free from such defects as ‘being equally co-existent with the Probandum and the absence of the Probandum’—are available for refuting the idea of the Omniscient Person,—such a person must be an utter impossibility; and cannot be accepted by any sane person.

For instance, the following reasoning may be set forth—‘Buddha cannot be omniscient, because he is knowable, cognisable, an entity, existent, a speaker, a person and so forth,—like any common man on the road’, These Reasons could not be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’. Because a man is called ‘omniscient’ because he knows all things; this knowledge of all things could be either through Sense-perception or through Mental Perception.—It cannot be through Sense-perception; because the scope of such Perception is limited and it cannot envisage all things; this reasoning may be thus formulated—Perceptions through the eye and other Sense-organs are restricted in their scope, because they are produced by the Sense-organs which are always restricted in their scope; that is why in ordinary life, they are never found to go beyond the hounds of those limitations; consequently the apprehension of all things through these is an impossibility. Otherwise there would be no need for more than one sense-organ; and the result of this would be that all such divergent things as Taste, Odour, etc. would become apprehended by means of a single Cognition i The Buddhist who makes such an astounding assumption,—as is clear from his assertion that “By one He knows all, by one He sees everything”,—could apprehend all such divergent things as Taste, Odour, etc.; through the one Perception proceeding from the eye alone!

No such assertion can be made; for if it were so, then there would be the apprehension of several things through a single Cognition at one and the same time. It could be possible only through several Cognitions; because there cannot be several Cognitions at one and the same time. Even if it were possible, there could be no apprehension of all things; because the mind of another person cannot be envisaged by the Sense-perception of any man; nor is it possible for him to apprehend, by its means, things beyond the reach, of the senses,—such as those that are remote or too small or hidden and so forth.—(3157-3158)