Verse 3151-3153

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

येनैव हेतुनैकस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रसाध्यते ।
स्वपक्षप्रीतिमात्रेण सोऽन्यस्याप्युपतिष्ठते ॥ ३१५१ ॥
दूषणानि ससंरम्भाः सर्वज्ञजिनसाधने ।
शाक्या यान्येव जल्पन्ति जैनास्तान्येव युञ्जते ॥ ३१५२ ॥
तत्रानवस्थितैस्तेषां भिन्नैः साधनदूषणैः ।
प्रतिबिम्बोदयग्रस्तैर्निर्णयः क्रियते कथम् ॥ ३१५३ ॥

yenaiva hetunaikasya sarvajñatvaṃ prasādhyate |
svapakṣaprītimātreṇa so'nyasyāpyupatiṣṭhate || 3151 ||
dūṣaṇāni sasaṃrambhāḥ sarvajñajinasādhane |
śākyā yānyeva jalpanti jaināstānyeva yuñjate || 3152 ||
tatrānavasthitaisteṣāṃ bhinnaiḥ sādhanadūṣaṇaiḥ |
pratibimbodayagrastairnirṇayaḥ kriyate katham || 3153 ||

“That same reason, by which the omniscience of one person is proved, merely on account of your love for your own view of things,—is found to be present in other persons also;—the objections also that the Buddhists, with great zeal, urge against the arguments in proof of the omniscience of Jina, are also urged by the Jainas (against the other party).—Under the circumstances, how can any definite conclusion be arrived at through such reasonings and counter-reasonings, which are uncertain and swallowed by their own reflections?”—(3151-3153)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It might be argued that—When, in regard to a person it is found that, on being scrutinised by all Means of Cognition, what he has said cannot be gainsaid,—then that person alone can be regarded as omniscient,

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3151-3153 above]

There is a certain reasoning adduced by the Buddhists in support of the omniscience of Buddha;—in this form—‘Buddha must be regarded as a person who directly knew the true nature of all things,—because he has taught things unheard of, uninferred and in conformity with the real state of things,—just like the ordinary man who has seen water and talks about it’, This same reasoning is put forward by the Digambara Jainas for proving the omniscience of Jina.—So that the matter remains as doubtful as before.—Again, when the Jaina has put forward his reasoning in support of the omniscience of Jina,—the Buddhists put forward objections against it,—in the form—‘The teachings of Jina, in regard to Syādvāda and other doctrines being impossible, he cannot be regarded as omniscient’; these same are urged by the Jainas when the Buddhist adduces his reasoning in support of the omniscience of Buddha,—the Jaina’s counter-reasoning being—

‘Buddha cannot be regarded as omniscient because his teachings regarding the Perpetual Flux, etc. are impossible’.

In this way this becomes a case like that of Reflection and Counterreflection: When the reflected object is there, its reflection appears; in the same way when the Reasonings and Counter-reasonings have been put forth, reasonings and counter-reasonings to the contrary come forward. These reasonings and counter-reasonings thus being always uncertain,—they are swallowed by their own reflections; how then can there be any definite conclusion regarding the omniscience of any Person?—(3151-3153)