The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3148 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3148.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सर्वज्ञेषु च भूयस्सु विरुद्धार्थोपदेशिषु ।
तुल्यहेतुषु सर्वेषु को नामैकोऽवधार्यताम् ॥ ३१४८ ॥

sarvajñeṣu ca bhūyassu viruddhārthopadeśiṣu |
tulyahetuṣu sarveṣu ko nāmaiko'vadhāryatām || 3148 ||

“When there are many omniscient persons, preaching mutually contradictory doctrines,—the grounds of reliability being the same in all,—which one of these should be accepted as reliable?”—(3148)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—In the case of Buddha, the Teachings are found to be related to supersensuous things; not so the works of poets; hence the knowledge of all such things is inferred only in the case of Buddha, not i n that of others. If it were not so, the -person who does not possess the knowledge of all supersensuous things could not have the knowledge of even some of these things; as there would be no difference between the two cases. Consequently the addition of the qualification—‘being a person knowing supersensuous things’ would prevent the Reason applying to the case of Poets and hence from ‘Falsity’ (Inconclusiveness).

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 3148 above]

There are many Teachers,—Buddha, Kapila, Kaṇāda, Gautama and so forth,—who are regarded by their respective devotees as omniscient; and each one of these is sought to be proved to be omniscient;—which one of them is to be definitely recognised as reliable? The ground of omniscience, in the shape of having taught doctrines relating to supersensuous things, is equally present in all of them.—It cannot be right to regard them all as omniscient; because what is taught by them is mutually contradictory. When several persons propound teachings contrary to each other, they cannot all be regarded as knowing the truth; as the truth regarding any particular thing can be one only; hence it cannot admit of mutually contradictory properties.—(3148)

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