Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3125-3127 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3125-3127.

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Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

वेदस्यापि प्रमाणत्वं यस्मात्पुरुषतः स्थितम् ।
तस्य चातीन्द्रियज्ञत्वे ततस्तस्मिन्प्रमाणता ॥ ३१२५ ॥
अन्यथाज्ञानसंदेहविपर्यासानुषङ्गिणि ।
पुंसि कर्त्तरि नैवास्य प्रामाण्यं स्यात्तदन्यवत् ॥ ३१२६ ॥
स्वर्गयागादिसम्बन्धो ज्ञात्वा तद्येन भाषितः ।
विस्पष्टातीन्द्रियज्ञानः सोऽभ्युपेयः परैरपि ॥ ३१२७ ॥

vedasyāpi pramāṇatvaṃ yasmātpuruṣataḥ sthitam |
tasya cātīndriyajñatve tatastasminpramāṇatā || 3125 ||
anyathājñānasaṃdehaviparyāsānuṣaṅgiṇi |
puṃsi karttari naivāsya prāmāṇyaṃ syāttadanyavat || 3126 ||
svargayāgādisambandho jñātvā tadyena bhāṣitaḥ |
vispaṣṭātīndriyajñānaḥ so'bhyupeyaḥ parairapi || 3127 ||

Inasmuch as the validity and reliability of the Veda also is due to a person,—it follows from that itself that the said validity is possible only if that person is cognisant of super-sensuous things. If it were not so, then the person would be liable to ignorance, doubt and wrong cognition; and when such a person would be the author of the Veda, this latter could not have any validity,—like other assertions. Inasmuch as the connection between heaven and sacrificial performance has been asserted by him after full knowledge, it is clear that he is cognisant of supersensuous things. This must be admitted by others also.—(3125-3127) commentary.

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Tasya’—of the Person.

Tataḥ’—the Person, its composer.

Tasmin’—in the Veda;—the Locative ending is in relation to the word ‘Pramāṇatā’, ‘Validity’.

Validity’—capacity to make known supersensuous things in accordance with their true nature.—This has been said in reference to the view of the other party.

What is meant is as follows:—If you must insist upon the validity and reliability of the Veda,—then that validity must be due to the Person who composed it, and not to the Veda itself. This has been explained already. If this Author of the Veda is capable of perceiving supersensuous things,—then alone can reliability belong to him; otherwise if the author were liable to wrong and doubtful cognitions, the Veda would be just like the utterances of mad and demented people, and hence entirely unreliable. Hence it follows that the Author of the Veda, whose existence has been proved in the chapter on ‘The Revealed Word’, must be regarded, at least by implication, to be one who is capable of perceiving supersensuous things. Hence there should be no denial of such an Author.

As a rule, men have their powers of perception beset with defects like Love and Hate, and hence they are unable to perceive supersensuous things; having realised this truth, people lose all hope of establishing the validity of scriptures composed by such men; so when one seeks to obtain the knowledge of what is Dharma and what is Adharma, ha will rely upon the reliability of the Veda,—just like the bird which is unable to perceive the shore.

With this idea, the Mīmāṃsakas, being devoid of all excellent qualities (?), deny the existence of the Person cognisant of supersensuous things; their argument being as follows “All men being beset with Love and Hatred, etc. as also by Ignorance, and not knowing how to get rid of these, they become confused; hence there can be no Person who is capable of perceiving supersensuous things; consequently, Dharma can be known only through the Veda, not through the senses; ‘as it is the Veda only which can make known things past, present and future, subtle and remote and near,—not so the Sense-organ or any other Means of Cognition’ (Śabara-Bhāṣya). In support of this view, they put forward the following reasoning: A thing that falls within the scope of the Means of Cognition known as ‘Non-apprehension’, which consists in the absence of the five means of Cognition (Sense-perception and the rest), can be regarded by the wise only as non-existent; e.g. the ‘sky-lotus’,—the omniscient Person falls within the scope of the said ‘Non-apprehension’;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things; the Probandum consisting of capability of being used and regarded, As for the negation of this, it can be cognised by ‘Non-apprehension’ only”, (3125-3127)

Other Tibetan Buddhism Concepts:

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Discover the significance of concepts within the article: ‘Verse 3125-3127’. Further sources in the context of Tibetan Buddhism might help you critically compare this page with similair documents:

Excellent qualities, Nature of things, Sense-organ.

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