Verse 3102-3103

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

उत्पत्त्यवस्थमेवेदं प्रमाणमिति मीयते ।
न तावदविकल्पत्वादनिष्टेश्चात्मसंविदः ॥ ३१०२ ॥
नापि ज्ञानान्तरेणैव तत्कालेऽसन्निधानतः ।
तस्याप्यव्यक्तभावत्वादनिष्टापत्तितोऽपि वा ॥ ३१०३ ॥

utpattyavasthamevedaṃ pramāṇamiti mīyate |
na tāvadavikalpatvādaniṣṭeścātmasaṃvidaḥ || 3102 ||
nāpi jñānāntareṇaiva tatkāle'sannidhānataḥ |
tasyāpyavyaktabhāvatvādaniṣṭāpattito'pi vā || 3103 ||

It cannot be recognised that it is valid at the time that it appears;—because it is non-conceptual and because self-cognition is not admitted.—Nor can it be recognised by another cognition; because it is not there at the time; also because its presence is not manifested; or because of an undesirable contingency.—(3102-3103)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued under Text 2915, that—“Invalidity does not become recognised on any other grounds; at the time that it appears, it is always recognised as valid, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3102-3103 above]

At the time that the Cognition appears (comes about)—(a) is it recognised by itself that it is valid? Or (b) is it so recognised by another Cognition, appearing at the same time? Or (c) by another Cognition, appearing at another time?—These are the three alternatives possible.

(a) The Cognition cannot be recognised by itself, as valid; because, as regards themselves, all Cognitions are non-conceptual (indeterminate), and hence any such notion as that ‘this is valid’ is impossible.

(b) Nor is the apprehension of a Cognition by another Cognition admitted (by the other party); because it has been held that Cognition is always uncognisable.

Nor can the Cognition he cognised by.another Cognition, appearing at the same time; because two Cognitions can never appear at the same time.

Nor can it be cognised by another Cognition, appearing at another time; because if there be no Cognition of this other Cognition,—what is cognised by that third Cognition cannot be known; so that the Cognition cognised by that third Cognition would be one whose manifestation has not been manifested; and if it be held that this also is cognised by yet another Cognition, there would be an Infinite Regress.—(3102-3103)