The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3098-3099 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3098-3099.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एतावत्तु भवेदत्र ग्रहणेऽपि स्वसंविदः ।
भ्रान्तिकारणसद्भावात्तथात्वे न विनिश्चयः ॥ ३०९८ ॥
तदा चार्थतया भावोऽप्यस्मान्नैवावसीयते ।
सादृश्यादुपलम्भेन तदन्यारोपसम्भवात् ॥ ३०९९ ॥

etāvattu bhavedatra grahaṇe'pi svasaṃvidaḥ |
bhrāntikāraṇasadbhāvāttathātve na viniścayaḥ || 3098 ||
tadā cārthatayā bhāvo'pyasmānnaivāvasīyate |
sādṛśyādupalambhena tadanyāropasambhavāt || 3099 ||

Even in the cognition of itself by itself, there is this fact that there can be no certainty regarding its validity, on account of the possibility of causes of misconception being present, consequently it is not ascertained that what is cognised is a real entity; because mere apprehension can also be due to similarity, and there is always the possibility of the imposition (misconception) of something else.—(3098-3099)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Says the Opponent—“If the Cognition is cognised by its own Cognition, then its validity is self-sufficient, inherent in itself”.

This is what is anticipated and answered in the following:—[see verses 3098-3099 above]

Merely because the thing has been cognised is not enough to bring about perfect certainty relating to it; because certainty is dependent upon other causes; as has been explained in several places. Hence even when the Cognition is cognised by itself, its capacity to get at its object remains uncertain, because causes of misconception may be present, in the shape of simil-larity, absence of repeated experience and so forth, which bar the way to certainty. Specially because certainty of conviction is something different from, mere apprehension. Thus it is for the excluding of misconception that extraneous conditions are needed, in view of which the validity of Cognition is held to be extraneous, not inherent; which view is not open to objection.—This is what has been thus declared—‘The Cognition itself is cognised by itself, but its validity is ascertained by usage’.

Tathātve’—regarding its validity.—(3098-3099)

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