Verse 3077-3079

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यदि कारणशुद्धत्वादिज्ञानं निश्चयस्ततः ।
यदि चार्थक्रिया प्राप्ता साक्षाद्वा(द्गा?)हादिलक्षणा ॥ ३०७७ ॥
यद्वाऽभ्यासवती वृत्तिर्निरपेक्षा फलोदये ।
सर्वोपायवियोगे तु न प्रमाणविनिश्चयः ॥ ३०७८ ॥
अतः प्रमाणता तस्मिन्विद्यमानाऽप्यनिश्चिता ।
अविद्यमानकल्पेति नैवास्तीत्यपदिश्यते ॥ ३०७९ ॥

yadi kāraṇaśuddhatvādijñānaṃ niścayastataḥ |
yadi cārthakriyā prāptā sākṣādvā(dgā?)hādilakṣaṇā || 3077 ||
yadvā'bhyāsavatī vṛttirnirapekṣā phalodaye |
sarvopāyaviyoge tu na pramāṇaviniścayaḥ || 3078 ||
ataḥ pramāṇatā tasminvidyamānā'pyaniścitā |
avidyamānakalpeti naivāstītyapadiśyate || 3079 ||

When there is cognition of the excellence of the cause and other conditions, then there follows certainty;—and also when effective action is found directly, in the share of burning, etc.;—or repeated functioning brings about the result independently.—When there is absence of all these means (of certainty), then there is no certainty at all. Thus even if validity were there, it would be uncertain,—as good as non-existent; that is why it is said that it is not present.—(3077-3079)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘If effective action is found’—‘then there is certainty’—this has to be construed, with this.

Says the Opponent:—“As the Cognition of effective action envisages an entirely different thing, the certainty regarding the validity of the preceding Cognition cannot be due to that. For instance, the visual Cognition of water can apprehend colour only, as there is no composite substance; as for the Cognition of effective action in the shape of Bathing and the like, it can be secured only by means of Touch; how can the Cognition of one thing confirm the validity of the Cognition of another thing? If it did, then there would be incongruities”.

Answer:—This does not affect our position. As a matter of fact, when two objects occur in the same ‘chain’, which are invariably concomitant,—the Cognition of one object will certainly establish the validity of the Cognition of the other. In the instance cited, the Colour and the Touch do not exist entirely apart from one another; in fact both are placed under exactly the same circumstances. So that, even if the first Cognition is objectless, it proceeds on the basis of a definite objective; and the subsequent Cognition apprehending the Touch which is invariably concomitant with the object of the previous Cognition is not needed for the bringing about of certainty of conviction.

Says the Opponent:—“Even so, as all things are momentary, the functioning of the later Cognition cannot envisage the Touch which is invariably concomitant with the Colour envisaged by the previous Cognition; how then could the certainty follow from that?”

Answer;—This does not affect our position; because the subsequent colour-moments have the same effective action as the colour-moments envisaged by the previous Cognition; hence all of these colour-moments stand on the same footing and share the same fate; and hence are treated as one and the same. In fact, people with limited vision do not deal with ‘moments’ at all.

Or, the object envisaged by the later Cognition is invariably concomitant with the colour, etc. envisaged by the previous Cognition; hence even though the previous Cognition being the cause of the later one, the two are regarded as distinct,—yet there is no incongruity in the idea of the certainty being brought about by it.—(3077-3079)