Verse 3062-3065

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

पर्युदासात्मकं तच्चेत्तद्विविक्तान्यदर्शनात् ।
दोषाभावापरिज्ञानं गुणज्ञानात्मकं भवेत् ॥ ३०६२ ॥
विवक्षितप्रमाज्ञानस्वरूपं च प्रसज्यते ।
अप्रमाणद्वयासत्त्वज्ञानं तद्व्यतिरेकि च ॥ ३०६३ ॥
अप्रमाद्वितयासत्त्वे ज्ञाते स्वातन्त्र्यतोऽथवा ।
परिशिष्टः प्रमात्मेति भवतो निश्चयः कुतः ॥ ३०६४ ॥
अन्यथानुपपत्त्या चेन्नन्वर्थापत्तितो भवेत् ।
अनुमातोऽन्यतो वापि स्यादेवं निश्चयोऽन्यतः ॥ ३०६५ ॥

paryudāsātmakaṃ taccettadviviktānyadarśanāt |
doṣābhāvāparijñānaṃ guṇajñānātmakaṃ bhavet || 3062 ||
vivakṣitapramājñānasvarūpaṃ ca prasajyate |
apramāṇadvayāsattvajñānaṃ tadvyatireki ca || 3063 ||
apramādvitayāsattve jñāte svātantryato'thavā |
pariśiṣṭaḥ pramātmeti bhavato niścayaḥ kutaḥ || 3064 ||
anyathānupapattyā cennanvarthāpattito bhavet |
anumāto'nyato vāpi syādevaṃ niścayo'nyataḥ || 3065 ||

If the absence is of the nature of relative negation,—then its cognition would only be the negation of something other than itself; so that the cognition of the absence of defects would be of the nature of the cognition of excellences; and it would thus come to be of the nature of the cognition of the intended valid cognition. The cognition of the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition also would turn out to be of the contrary nature. Or, in case the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition were cognised independently by itself,—how could you secure the conviction that the rest of it is valid?—If it be urged that “the conviction is due to the pact that well-known pacts could not be explicable otherwise”,—then this

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts point out the objections against the view that the ‘absence of Defects, etc.’ is of the nature of Relative Negation (the second alternative suggested in the Introduction to Text 3059):—[see verses 3062-3065 above]

Through Relative Negation, ‘Absence of Defects’ would be the same as ‘Excellences’; hence the Cognition of the said absence also would be the same as the Cognition of Excellences;—and this cannot be desirable (for you); because of your assertion that—“The Excellences do not operate, as cognised

The ‘absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’ also becomes the same as¹ Valid Cognition’, under the view that it is Relative Negation that is meant by ‘absence’; hence the Cognition of ‘the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’ also would be of the nature of the intended ‘Valid Cognition’; and in that case the assertion—that “there is absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition, hence the general law remains undenied”,—cannot be right; as it involves a confusion of thought; for instance, the same Cognition being known to be valid,—if from that same fact it is deduced that the Cognition is valid,—such a confused assertion of Cause and Effect, becomes difficult to understand; as there is no difference (between the two Cognitions).—Further, if the two were regarded as different, because the cause must be different from the effect, then it comes to this that ‘the Cognition of the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’ is different from ‘the Cognition of the valid Cognition’; while it is not right to regard what is of the nature of ‘Relative Negation’, as different from the valid Cognition.

‘Or, in case the absence of the two kinds, etc. etc.’—This argument admits (for the sake of argument) the Cognition of ‘the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’,—and then, in accordance with the views of the other party, shows that the Validity of Cognitions becomes extraneous.

‘Due to the fact that well-known facts, etc. etc.’—That is, “there is no other alternative possible except the self-validity of all Cognitions except the Doubtful and Wrong Cognitions”.—(3062-3065)