The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3059-3060 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3059-3060.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

दोषाभावे प्रमासत्त्वमितीदं च निषेधनम् ।
केवलं यदि कल्प्येत तत्सिद्धिर्नैव सम्भवेत् ॥ ३०५९ ॥
अभावानु(दु?)पलम्भेन तत्सिद्धिर्नावकल्पते ।
अनवस्थितिदोषाच्च न युक्तानुपलम्भतः ॥ ३०६० ॥

doṣābhāve pramāsattvamitīdaṃ ca niṣedhanam |
kevalaṃ yadi kalpyeta tatsiddhirnaiva sambhavet || 3059 ||
abhāvānu(du?)palambhena tatsiddhirnāvakalpate |
anavasthitidoṣācca na yuktānupalambhataḥ || 3060 ||

The assertion that “there is validity when there is absence of defects” contains a negation; if this negation is meant to be absolute; then it can never be proved.—It cannot be proved by apprehension, because it is of the nature of negation;—nor can it be proved by non-apprehension, as that would involve an infinite regress.—(3059-3060)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Further, Kumārila’s assertion quoted above—“therefore from Excellences follows the Absence of Defects, etc. etc.”—has declared validity, and also the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition and the Absence of Defects,—as part and parcel of the certainty.—Now the ‘absence’ here spoken of can be either (a) of the nature of ‘absolute negation of what is possible’, or of the nature of ‘relative negation’; these are the only two alternatives possible.

The following Text points out the objections against the first alternative (that it is of the nature of absolute negation):—[see verses 3059-3060 above]

If it is Absolute Negation that is meant, then it cannot be proved. Because would such Negation be proved by itself? or by something else? If it is proved by itself, (I) would it be due to its being of the nature of ‘self-illumination’? or (2) to the fact of its bringing about certainty?—If it is proved by something else, is it proved, (3) by Apprehension? or (4) by Non-apprehension?—These are the alternative views possible.

(1) Now, it cannot be right to assert that it is proved by itself, through its being ‘self-luminous’; because it is a non-entity, while ‘luminousness’ is the property of entities; it is Cognition alone that is proved by its own apprehension, on account of its being ‘self-luminous’ by nature;—not so Negation, which is of the nature of the denial of the nature of things.

(2) Nor can the Negation be regarded as proved by itself, through bringing about certainty. Because as a matter of fact, Negation is devoid of all capacity; hence it cannot bring about anything, If it did bring about anything, it would have to be regarded as an Entity; and secondly, as it would not be possible for it to have any new peculiarity produced in it, its effect would be such as comes about from it itself, independently of all contributory causes, and hence the appearance of such an effect would be incessant.

(3) If the Absence be regarded as proved by something else,—through Apprehension,—that also is not possible;—why?—because it is of the nature of Negation, and there can be Apprehension only of what is a positive entity.

(4) Nor lastly can it be right to hold the view that the Absence is proved through Non-apprehension. Because that would involve an Infinite Regress. For instance, this Non-apprehension also being negative in character,—how is it proved? By itself? Or through something else? All these questions arise here. It cannot be by itself, because of the objections urged above; nor can it be through something else, as that would involve an Infinite Regress.—(3059-3060)

The said ‘Infinite Regress’ is pointed out in the following:—[see verse 3061 next]

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