Verse 3010-3017

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स्वतःप्रामाण्यपक्षेऽपि स्वरसेनैव निश्चयात् ।
कस्माद्बाधकसद्भावसिद्धौ यत्नो विधीयते ॥ ३०१० ॥
तथाहि स्वरसेनैव न यस्मिन्माननिश्चयः ।
निश्चीयतेऽत्र(प्य?)यत्नेन सामर्थ्यात्तत्र बाधकः ॥ ३०११ ॥
अतः परीक्षकज्ञानत्रयमत्र किमुच्यते ।
नैकस्याप्यवकाशोऽस्ति तस्मिन्निश्चयतः स्वतः ॥ ३०१२ ॥
यदि चोत्पद्यते शङ्काऽनुपलम्भेऽपि संशयात् ।
बाधाभावाविनाभूतं य्मान्नानुपलम्भनम् ॥ ३०१३ ॥
एवं सति त्रये कस्मात्परितोषस्त्वया कृतः ।
अदृष्टावपि शङ्क्येत बाधा पूर्ववदत्र हि ॥ ३०१४ ॥
यावन्न कार्यसंवादस्तावन्न विनिवर्त्तते ।
बाधाशङ्का यतस्तस्मिन्नियमस्त्रितयेऽफलः ॥ ३०१५ ॥
ततश्चाजातबाधेनाप्याशङ्क्यं बाधकं पुनः ।
छलेन वस्तुनस्तत्त्वं नहि जात्ववतिष्ठते ॥ ३०१६ ॥
आजीवितात्समुत्पन्नं बाधप्रत्ययवर्जितम् ।
शङ्खे पीतनिभं ज्ञानं प्रमाणं नहि जायते ॥ ३०१७ ॥

svataḥprāmāṇyapakṣe'pi svarasenaiva niścayāt |
kasmādbādhakasadbhāvasiddhau yatno vidhīyate || 3010 ||
tathāhi svarasenaiva na yasminmānaniścayaḥ |
niścīyate'tra(pya?)yatnena sāmarthyāttatra bādhakaḥ || 3011 ||
ataḥ parīkṣakajñānatrayamatra kimucyate |
naikasyāpyavakāśo'sti tasminniścayataḥ svataḥ || 3012 ||
yadi cotpadyate śaṅkā'nupalambhe'pi saṃśayāt |
bādhābhāvāvinābhūtaṃ ymānnānupalambhanam || 3013 ||
evaṃ sati traye kasmātparitoṣastvayā kṛtaḥ |
adṛṣṭāvapi śaṅkyeta bādhā pūrvavadatra hi || 3014 ||
yāvanna kāryasaṃvādastāvanna vinivarttate |
bādhāśaṅkā yatastasminniyamastritaye'phalaḥ || 3015 ||
tataścājātabādhenāpyāśaṅkyaṃ bādhakaṃ punaḥ |
chalena vastunastattvaṃ nahi jātvavatiṣṭhate || 3016 ||
ājīvitātsamutpannaṃ bādhapratyayavarjitam |
śaṅkhe pītanibhaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ nahi jāyate || 3017 ||

Under the theory of the self-validity of cognitions, the validity being ascertained by itself, why should an effort be made to prove the existence of a sublating cognition?—Because, when the validity of a cognition is not definitely cognised by itself, its sublating cognition is got at without effort. Thus, why should there be said to be ‘three cognitions’ for the investigator? In fact there is not room for a single one; the conviction regarding it having come about by itself.—If it be held that—“even when no sublating cognition is actually found, there arises suspicion due to doubt; because the non-apprehension of sublating cognition is not always concomitant with its absence”;—then, under the circumstances, why have you become satisfied with only three (cognitions)? Because, as before, even when the sublating cognition is not there, its presence could always be suspected; and this suspicion of sublation could not cease until one met with conformity to effective action; hence the restriction to three only is entirely futile.—Thus then, even in a case where no sublation has actually appeared, its presence can always be suspected; specially as casuistry can never lead to the ascertainment of truth.—Even though a man may have had the unsublated cognition of the conch-shell as yellow, throughout his life,—such cognition can never become valid.—(3010-3017)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under Text 2869, that—“If, even after due effort at seeking for it, no other sublating Cognition is found,—on account of there being no basis for it,—then no Cognition sublative of the first Cognition would be found, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3010-3017 above]

If Validity is ascertained by itself, then Validity being invariably concomitant with conviction,—where there is no conviction, there, by implication, would be Invalidity; so that the presence of its sublating Cognition becomes secured without any effort; hence any effort to prove the existence of the said sublating Cognition would be futile. So that there is no room for even a single Cognition on the part of the investigator; what to say of three? Hence when it is said that ‘the Cognition of the investigator does not proceed beyond three’, it is something entirely irrelevant. This is what is pointed out in the Text beginning with the word ‘Ataḥ’ (Text 3012).

The following might be urged—“The absence of the sublating Cognition cannot be ascertained by mere non-apprehension of it; because even when a thing is existent, it is not apprehended if it happens to be remote, or very small, or hidden; so that non-existence is not invariably concomitant with non-apprehension; hence it is that effort is made for proving that there is no sublating Cognition”.

If that is so, then please give up the idea of any such restriction as that ‘the investigator should have only three Cognitions’; because, as in the case of the first Cognition, so in all other Cognitions, the presence of sublation would be suspected; until the Cognition of the fruit (result) of the Cognition has appeared,—how can the suspicion of sublation be prevented, in view of which, there could be the restriction of the number of Cognitions to three only? Unless there is proof for it, mere proclamation cannot bring about the cessation of suspicion in the minds of intelligent men. Because the whole investigation regarding Cognitions proceeds on the basis of real things; and what has been started is not mere Casuistry, whereby only a few Cognitions are examined.

If the validity of Cognitions rested upon the limitation of the investigation to three Cognitions only,—then in the case of men who have suffered from the jaundiced eye throughout their life, as the conch-shell is always cognised as yellow,—that Cognition would be quite valid.—(3010-3017)