Verse 2981-2982

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नैवं भ्रान्ता हि साऽवस्था सर्वा बाह्यानिबन्धना ।
न बाह्यवस्तुसंवास्तास्ववस्थासु विद्यते ॥ २९८१ ॥
स्वसंविदितरूपाश्च चित्तचैत्ताविलक्षणाः ।
अवस्याद्वयभेदोऽपि स्पष्टं तेन प्रतीयते ॥ २९८२ ॥

naivaṃ bhrāntā hi sā'vasthā sarvā bāhyānibandhanā |
na bāhyavastusaṃvāstāsvavasthāsu vidyate || 2981 ||
svasaṃviditarūpāśca cittacaittāvilakṣaṇāḥ |
avasyādvayabhedo'pi spaṣṭaṃ tena pratīyate || 2982 ||

It cannot be so; because the whole of that state is illusory? having no basis in the external world;—hence in those states, there can be no conformity with external objects;—all these are known in their own forms, not differing, in this, from the mind and the mental states. This is the reason why the difference between the two states is clearly perceived.—(2981-2982)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If what has been urged is against the Buddhist who accepts the reality of the external world, then the Reason adduced, is ‘inadmissible’; this is what is meant by the first two lines.

What is meant is that the said upholder of the external world admits the validity of Cognitions to be based upon conformity to the real state of things,—and not upon conformity to the Cognition of effective action;—in the case of dreams, there can be no conformity to the real state of things; because all parties are agreed on the point that the entire dream-state is illusory; hence in that state all the Cognitions that appear are without objects, hence they are objectless. Thus then, as the conditions of validity can be applicable to Cognitions of the waking state only, it is not right to urge the ‘inconclusiveness’ (or falsity) of our Reason on the basis of Dream-Cognition.—This is what is meant by the Text.

Further, the ‘Cognition of effective action’ that appears during dreams is one that has never appeared before,—it is fleeting,—and confused; while the reverse of it is the case with similar Cognition during the waking state; how then can the validity of this latter be doubtful in view of what happens in the former?

If, on the other hand, what has been urged is against the Yogācāra (Idealist), then it has no bearing upon the case in question. Because it is for the practical man (from the practical point of view) that Valid Cognition has been defined as ‘Cognition in conformity with the real state of things’;—and in this connection, ‘conformity’ can consist only in the Cognition envisaging effective action; as it is only when this latter has appeared that people regard the Cognition in question as ‘valid’; and it is for this purpose that people have recourse to activity towards things. This practical Cognition can be only one appearing during the waking state; because it is only activities during this state that are regarded by people as real; never those occurring during dreams. Thus then, so long as ‘being waking Cognition’ has not been introduced as a necessary qualification, there can be no ‘inconclusiveness’ or ‘falsity’ in view of what happens during dreams.—(2981-2982)