Verse 2973

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

भ्रान्तिहेतोरसद्भावात्स्वतस्तस्य प्रमाणता ।
प्रथमस्य तदाभावे प्रद्वेषो भ्रान्तिसंभवात् ॥ २९७३ ॥

bhrāntihetorasadbhāvātsvatastasya pramāṇatā |
prathamasya tadābhāve pradveṣo bhrāntisaṃbhavāt || 2973 ||

Of the second cognition, the validity is self-sufficient, because there are no causes for misapprehension; in the case of the first cognition, however, there is hostility towards its self-validity, on account of the possibility of misapprehension.—(2973)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2855, that—“if the Validity of some cognition be held to be self-sufficient, why should there be hostility to the same being the case with the initial cognition?”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2973 above]

Says the Opponent:—“That cognition,—which is concomitant with the suspicion of invalidity, and hence in regard to which there is no certainty regarding its capacity to get at its objective,—would be like Inference and hence not valid. Because, in the case of Inference, when there is doubt regarding the invariable concomitance of the objective, ṇo validity attaches to it; in the same manner Perceptions also would be not valid”.

This does not affect our position. Because when Perception is regarded as valid, it is not because it represents itself as invariably concomitant with its objective, like Inference;—but only as tending to the envisaging (or ideating) of the objective. Because it is called ‘valid’, when it presents the desired object to the man seeking for effective action; and this presentation of the object is not done either by carrying the man to the place where the object lies, or by carrying the object to the place where the man is; it is done by prompting the man to activity. Nor does it prompt the man to activity by taking hold of his hand; it does it by showing the objective of that activity;—and this showing of the objective is no thing but the cognition of the object figuring in the Perception.—In a case where there is doubt, there also there certainly is cognition of the object figuring in the Perception; if there were no cognition of it, it could not figure in the doubt at all. As the functioning of the Perception would be complete by this much,—if there is a doubt later on, regarding the invariable concomitance of the object (with the Perception),—this doubt could not prevent the functioning of the Perception; so that even when there is this doubt, the validity of the Perception remains intact.—That Perception, however, which appears as beset by the idea of a form contrary to the object figuring in the Perception, is not valid; e.g. the Perception of the Mirage beset, by the idea of Water; and the reason

for this lies in the fact that the aforesaid functioning of the Perception does not take place. Similarly when there is cognition of the yellow colour in the Conch-shell, or that of the gem in the light radiating from it,—all this cognition is clearly invalid; as in both these cases, the cognition is not in accordance with the real state of the things concerned.

The apprehension or non-apprehension of the Perception is due to what actually figures in it,—it is not due to mere conformity with the real state of things. In the cases just cited, the thing that actually figures in the cognition is not as it really exists at the particular time and place; in fact the time and place are not the same at all; as time and place also make a difference in the nature of things; if it were not so, there would be an end to all notions of difference.

As for Inference, on the other hand, as it is by its very nature, conceptual, it envisages generalities,—and hence the idea of what forms its object cannot be determined by what actually figures in the cognition; because the object (in the form of generalities) cannot figure in the cognition; its object therefore can be determined only by the conviction (certainty) that it produces; as has been thus declared—‘The form that is not determined by convictions,—how can that form the objective of those cognitions?’—Thus it is that though Inference is devoid of the actual appearance of the object, yet it is brought about by the inference of the perception of things that are invariably concomitant, and hence becomes indirectly tied down to the object; and it is on this that its validity is based. Hence in this case, certainty regarding the invariable concomitance is essential; as otherwise, Inference could not come about at all.

For these reasons, Perception cannot be regarded as standing on the same footing as Inference.—(2973)