Verse 2963-2965

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

आद्ये ह्यआद्ये हि वस्तुविषये वस्तुसंवादलक्षणम् ।
द्वितीयं न प्रवर्त्तेत तस्य हेतोरसम्भवात् ॥ २९६३ ॥
अशोकस्तबकादौ हि पावकाध्यवसायिनः ।
न दाहपाकनिर्भासि विज्ञानं जातु जायते ॥ २९६४ ॥
जातौ वा न विजातीयं ज्वलनात्तत्प्रसज्यते ।
तत्कार्ययोग्यतामात्रलक्षणत्वाद्विभावसौः ॥ २९६५ ॥

ādye hyaādye hi vastuviṣaye vastusaṃvādalakṣaṇam |
dvitīyaṃ na pravartteta tasya hetorasambhavāt || 2963 ||
aśokastabakādau hi pāvakādhyavasāyinaḥ |
na dāhapākanirbhāsi vijñānaṃ jātu jāyate || 2964 ||
jātau vā na vijātīyaṃ jvalanāttatprasajyate |
tatkāryayogyatāmātralakṣaṇatvādvibhāvasauḥ || 2965 ||

If the initial cognition did not envisage a real entity, then the second cognition, in the form of confirmation by conformity to the real state of the thing, would not appear at all; as its cause would not be there. For example, when a man has the cognition of fire in reference to the cluster of aśoka-blossoms, there does not appear the cognition envisaging burning and cooking (which are not brought about by what has been cognised as fire). If this latter does appear, then the cognised object turns out to be not anything different from fire; because fire is only an entity that is characterised by the capacity for producing its effect (in the shape of burning, cooking and the rest).—(2963-2965)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In the following Texts, the author sets forth another way of avoiding the Infinite Regress:—[see verses 2963-2965 above]

If the initial—first—cognition had appeared in regard to a nonentity, then the subsequent cognition of its result (in the shape of effective activity) could not come about; because its cause would not be there; because the cognition of effective action is always concomitant with an entity. When the cognition does not envisage real Fire,—when for instance one has the idea of Fire in regard to the bunch of Aśoka-blossoms,—there do not appear the cognitions of such actions as burning and cooking (which are peculiar to Fire).

If such cognitions did appear, then the thing cognised would really be Fire itself;—why?—because Fire is nothing else but what is characterised by the capacity to burn and to cook things.

‘Vibhāvasu’ is Fire.—(2963-2965)