The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2957-2962 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2957-2962.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नचानवस्थितिप्राप्तिरन्यतो मानसंश्रितौ ।
तस्मादर्थक्रियाज्ञाने स्वतःप्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ॥ २९५७ ॥
ननु कोऽतिशयस्तस्य प्राक्तनादस्ति येन तत् ।
परतः पूर्वविज्ञानमिव नाभ्युपगम्यते ॥ २९५८ ॥
उच्यते वस्तुसंवादः प्रामाण्यमभिधीयते ।
तस्य चार्थक्रियाभ्यासज्ञानादन्यन्न लक्षणम् ॥ २९५९ ॥
अर्थक्रियावभासं च ज्ञानं संवेद्यते स्फुटम् ।
निश्चीयते च तन्मात्रभाव्यामर्शनचेतसा ॥ २९६० ॥
अतस्तस्य स्वतः सम्यक्प्रामाण्यस्य विनिश्चयात् ।
नोत्तरार्थक्रियाप्राप्तिप्रत्ययः समपेक्ष्यते ॥ २९६१ ॥
ज्ञानप्रमाणभावे च तस्मिन् कार्यावभासिनि ।
प्रत्यये प्रथमेऽप्यस्माद्धेतोः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ॥ २९६२ ॥

nacānavasthitiprāptiranyato mānasaṃśritau |
tasmādarthakriyājñāne svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ || 2957 ||
nanu ko'tiśayastasya prāktanādasti yena tat |
parataḥ pūrvavijñānamiva nābhyupagamyate || 2958 ||
ucyate vastusaṃvādaḥ prāmāṇyamabhidhīyate |
tasya cārthakriyābhyāsajñānādanyanna lakṣaṇam || 2959 ||
arthakriyāvabhāsaṃ ca jñānaṃ saṃvedyate sphuṭam |
niścīyate ca tanmātrabhāvyāmarśanacetasā || 2960 ||
atastasya svataḥ samyakprāmāṇyasya viniścayāt |
nottarārthakriyāprāptipratyayaḥ samapekṣyate || 2961 ||
jñānapramāṇabhāve ca tasmin kāryāvabhāsini |
pratyaye prathame'pyasmāddhetoḥ prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ || 2962 ||

If validity is dependent (upon something else), there can be no infinite regress. Hence there can be certainty regarding self-validity only when there is cognition of effective action.—(2957)

“What peculiar feature is there in the second cognition, different from those of the previous cognition, on account of which it is not regarded to be entirely like the previous cognition?”—(2958)

The answer to the above is as follows:—it is conformity with the real state of things that is called ‘validity’; and there is no feature of it except the repeated cognition of effective action.—The cognition envisaging effective action is clearly apprehended; and the apprehension becomes confirmed by the after-thought envisaging the same. Thus its own real validity haying been duly ascertained, it does not stand in need of any subsequent cognition of the same effective action. Thus the validity of the cognition becomes manifested in the very first cognition envisaging the said effective action; and thereby its validity becomes confirmed.—(2959-2962)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 2957]:

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2854, that—“Just as the ñrst Cognition needs corroboration of the second Cognition, so would the latter need another, and so on and on there would be an Infinite Regress.” The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2957 above]

The other party argues as follows:—[see verse 2958 next]

[verse 2958]:

The answer to this (from the Buddhist) is as follows:—[see verses 2959-2962 next]

[verses 2959-2962]:

The purport of the above, in brief, is as follows:—The name ‘Pramāṇa’, ‘valid cognition,’ is given to that cognition which is in conformity with the real state of things;—as has been asserted in the declaration that—

Pramāṇa is that cognition which is in conformity with things’;—this ‘conformity’ appears in the shape of effective action;—as it is only for purposes of effective action that there is a desire to investigate the ‘validity’ of Cognitions;—because the sane man investigates the validity or invalidity of cognitions only for the purpose of undertaking activity in accordance with it,—and not because he likes to do so;—this effective action is one that figures in the notion of such acts as burning, cooking and the like; as it is only when this cognition has appeared that the want of the man seeking to undertake the activity becomes supplied;—this cognition of effective action, on account of the perceptibility of its own cognition, appears by itself;—and as this apprehension is quite clear, it is followed by an afterthought, in accordance with the same apprehension,—which serves to confirm the cognition;—all this is self-evident.—Nor does the man desire any other fruit resulting from the said cognition; for the sake of which he would seek for the appearance of another cognition envisaging another effective action; which would lead to an Infinite Regress. For instance, in ordinary life, the fruits of activity that are desired are in the form of prosperity and adversity (happiness and unhappiness); and this is accomplished by the appearance of joy and sorrow; and men, being satisfied with this result, desist from further activity; and this is what is meant when it is said that the result has been accomplished by itself.

As for the first cognition which has brought about the second cognition, the validity of that is said to consist only in the capacity to bring about the second cognition; and the presence of this capacity cannot be ascertained by people who, on account of the absence of repetition, do not know of the effective action resulting from it; hence it is ascertained only by the appearance of its effect in the shape of the second cognition.

It is for these reasons that the validity of the first cognition is said to be due to something extraneous to itself.—(2959-2962)

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