Verse 2945

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

येनैकैः स्वत एवेति प्रो(प्रा ?)च्यैर्नियम उच्यते ।
किञ्चित्स्वतोऽन्यतः किञ्चित्परैश्चानियमो मतः ॥ २९४५ ॥

yenaikaiḥ svata eveti pro(prā ?)cyairniyama ucyate |
kiñcitsvato'nyataḥ kiñcitparaiścāniyamo mataḥ || 2945 ||

[That there is diversity of opinion is shown by the fact that] one party consisting of the ‘prācyas’ (easterners or ancients) assert definitely that “the validity of cognitions is always inherent, self-sufficient, in themselves”; while others assert that in some cases, the validity is self-sufficient, while in others it is due to extraneous causes;—and there is no hard and fast rule one way or the other.—(2945)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘One party’—i.e. the Mīmāṃsakas;—‘others’—‘the Buddhists.

These others hold that some cognitions are self-sufficient in their validity; e.g. (a) the direct perception of themselves by the cognitions by the Mystics,—(b) the cognition of the fruitful activity of things,—(c) Inferential Cognition,—(d) Repeated Perception; this latter is definitely recognised as valid by itself as the possibility of misconception has been set aside by the repeated experience;—while this is so in the case of some cognitions, in that of some others, the validity is derived from extraneous circumstances; e.g. the cognition in dispute, arising from the Veda,—and also such Perception as has not had all possibility of mistake removed; as repeated experience or the perception of effective action has not been obtained.

[Says the Opponent]—“If that is so, then, according to you, there should be no diversity of opinion in regard to Inference; as its validity is self-sufficient. And yet there is such diversity of opinion; as some people hold that Inference is brought about by the three-featured Probans; some others hold that it is brought about by the two-featured Probans; while there are others who hold that it is brought by a Probans that is one-featured.—Further, under this view, the setting up of the definition of things would be futile.—Similarly, the validity of Inference should not be expounded and justified as against the Materialist; because here also, the validity is self-sufficient”.

Answer:—This does not affect our position; because when we assert the self-validity of Inference, what we mean is as follows:—As a matter of fact, Inference proceeds from the definite cognition of the Probans which is invariably concomitant (with the Probandum) through sameness or causation,—and then even without confirmation by subsequent fruitful action, it has been ascertained that it is indirectly produced by the Probans as invariably concomitant with the said Probandum and hence never non-concomitant with it. When the disputants quarrel in this matter, it is before the Inference has appeared,—and the reason for this quarrel lies in their ignorance of the nature of the Probans which is related (to the Probandum) by the causal relation; the quarrel does not arise after the Inference has duly come about; as at that time the exact nature of the said Probans has been duly recognised. It is for this reason that what the Teachers do, when putting forward the definition of things, is to explain the nature of the Probans related by the causal relation. How could any Inference come about from the cognition of a Probans other than the one mentioned?

As regards the argument of the Opponent that—“there should be no arguments addressed to the Materialist, for proving the validity of Inference”;—it is not right; because what we are seeking to prove is not the validity of Inference, but its me. This we do because, even when the validity of Inference has been proved, the Materialist, deluded by listening to the false teachings of Economic Science (Philosophy of Property), does not make use of it,—as the Sāṃkhyas do; hence by showing to him the subject-matter of Inference, we seek to demonstrate to him the me of it;—by pointing out to him that—when one thing is produced by another, the latter is endowed with the capacity to bring about the former;—as is found in the case of Perception and its object;—and the cognition of the ‘Subject’ as containing the Probandum has been brought about by the perception of the Probans as invariably concomitant with the Probandum;—and by explaining to the Materialist all these conventions, we induce him to make use of Inference. Because in regard to Perception, he has used it as valid only on account of finding that it is not incompatible with the real state of things; and what ‘non-incompatibility’ could be there except that one should be produced by the other (as in the case of the Probans based upon causal relation)? This has been thus declared—

‘The validity of Sense-perception is proved by the fact that it does not appear when its object is not there; and as regards the causal character of that which is invariably concomitant, both the conditions are equally present in it’.—Consequently, as the Sāṃkhya, while recognising the fact that the elephant cannot stand on the tip of a grass-blade, has his mind confounded by listening to the scriptures, and consequently, while not making use of the said negative fact (of the elephant standing on the tip of the grass-blade) has recourse to activities;—similarly the Materialist also.

Then again, the validity of the cognition produced by the Veda has not been established; consequently, its validity could not be proved like that of Inference; because no Invariable Concomitance is established in this case; as it is this same validity that has got to be proved. Hence the two cases (that of the validity of cognitions produced by the Veda, and that of the validity of Inference as upheld by the Buddhist) do not stand on the same footing.—(2945)