The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2927-2928 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2927-2928.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अतश्च शक्यते वक्तुं स्वत एव न वर्त्तते ।
पश्चात्प्रमा स्वकार्येषु नैरूप्याद्गगनाब्जवत् ॥ २९२७ ॥
अस्तुवाऽक्षणिकं ज्ञानं स्वत एव प्रवर्त्तते ।
स्वप्रामाण्यविनिश्चित्यै चेत्तत्किं संशयादयः ॥ २९२८ ॥

ataśca śakyate vaktuṃ svata eva na varttate |
paścātpramā svakāryeṣu nairūpyādgaganābjavat || 2927 ||
astuvā'kṣaṇikaṃ jñānaṃ svata eva pravarttate |
svaprāmāṇyaviniścityai cettatkiṃ saṃśayādayaḥ || 2928 ||

For these reasons, it can be asserted that by itself the cognition cannot be valid, the validity comes only later in relation to its effects,—because it is featureless,—like the ‘sky-lotus—(2927)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 2927]:

In the following Text the author shows, through a formulated argument, that the idea of the Mīmāṃsaka is annulled by Inference-—[see verse 2927 above]

In the following Text, the Author admits (for the sake of argument) that Cognitions are not-momentary, and then proceeds to show that the view of the other party is annulled by facts of Sense-perception and other forms of Cognition:—[see verse 2928 above]:

[verse 2928]:

If the Cognition itself produces the conviction regarding its own validity, then there should be no Doubt, etc. regarding the Cognition. The ‘etc.’ includes wrong cognition, as also contradictions due to it, ideas to the contrary, setting forth of self-contradictory definitions, and non-conformity.

Thus, inasmuch as we do meet, after the Cognition, with Doubts, etc. which are contrary to the conviction of validity of the Cognition,—it is clearly established by Perception itself that there is no conviction in the case; and this absence of Conviction becomes proved by Perception, exactly in the same manner as the absence of the Jar is established by the apprehension of the place devoid of the Jar.

Thus the Proposition that there is conviction regarding validity is annulled by a fact of Sense-perception.—(2928)

The following Text points out how there is incompatibility with Perception:—[see verse 2929 next]

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