The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2917-2919 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2917-2919.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तत्राप्रमाणसाधर्म्यमात्रं यत्किंचिदाश्रिताः ।
सर्वं प्रमाणमिथ्यात्वं साधयन्त्यविपश्चितः ॥ २९१७ ॥
तेषामात्मवधायैव तादृक्साधनकल्पनम् ।
उत्पद्यते परस्यापि प्रतिबिम्बेन तादृशम् ॥ २९१८ ॥
तेन च प्रतिषिद्धत्वादयथाभूतसाधनम् ।
नौत्सर्गिकप्रमाणत्वाच्चोदना बाधितुं क्षमम् ॥ २९१९ ॥

tatrāpramāṇasādharmyamātraṃ yatkiṃcidāśritāḥ |
sarvaṃ pramāṇamithyātvaṃ sādhayantyavipaścitaḥ || 2917 ||
teṣāmātmavadhāyaiva tādṛksādhanakalpanam |
utpadyate parasyāpi pratibimbena tādṛśam || 2918 ||
tena ca pratiṣiddhatvādayathābhūtasādhanam |
nautsargikapramāṇatvāccodanā bādhituṃ kṣamam || 2919 ||

“The ignorant men who, on the basis of mere similarity to invalid cognitions, seek to prove the invalidity of all cognitions,—for them such an argument is conducive to their own ruin. Because for the other party also, there comes about an argument which is the reflection of the Buddhist argument; and thus being refuted by this, the argument (of the Buddhist) turns out to be the means of proving what is not true; and as such, it is not capable of setting aside the Vedic injunction which is inherently valid.”—(2917-2919)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If a Cognition were invalid simply because it is similar (to another Cognition which is invalid),—then all Cognitions would have to be regarded as invalid; because some sort of similarity—such as being an entity—can be asserted in all cases.—Such is the meaning of the Text in brief.

Question:—How is it conducive to their own ruin?

Answer:—‘For the other party also, etc. etc.’—‘Other party’—i.e. the

Mīmāṃsaka.—‘Reflection, etc.’—just as the reflection appears after the reflected object, so, after the argument of the Buddhist, there appears the counter-argument of the Mīmāṃsaka.

For instance, it is open to the Mīmāṃsaka to argue as follows:—The words of the Veda are not false,—because they are Words, etc. etc.;—like such human assertions as ‘Fire is hot, bright and so forth

Thus being refuted—negatived—by such counter-arguments,—the argument that had been adduced by the Buddhist and others to prove the idea of Vedic Injunction being false is quite incapable of rejecting the Vedic Injunction.—Why?—Because of the inherent validity of the Vedic

Injunction;—that is to say, the validity of the Vedic Injunction is such as belongs to it by its very nature.—(2917-2919)

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