Verse 2882-2885

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ऋणादिब्यवहारेऽपि द्वयोर्विवदमानयोः ।
एकं प्रत्यर्थिनो वाक्यं द्वे वाक्ये पूर्ववादिनः ॥ २८८२ ॥
अनवस्थाभयादेव न वाक्यं लिख्यतेऽधिकम् ।
ततस्तु निर्णयं ब्रूयुः स्वामिसाक्षिसभासदः ॥ २८८३ ॥
एवं ज्ञानत्रयस्यैव सर्वत्र विक्रियेष्यते ।
त्रिसत्यताऽपि देवानामत एवाभिधीयते ॥ २८८४ ॥
तेन स्वतःप्रमाणत्वे नानवस्थोभयोरपि ।
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे यथायोगमतः स्थिते ॥ २८८५ ॥

ṛṇādibyavahāre'pi dvayorvivadamānayoḥ |
ekaṃ pratyarthino vākyaṃ dve vākye pūrvavādinaḥ || 2882 ||
anavasthābhayādeva na vākyaṃ likhyate'dhikam |
tatastu nirṇayaṃ brūyuḥ svāmisākṣisabhāsadaḥ || 2883 ||
evaṃ jñānatrayasyaiva sarvatra vikriyeṣyate |
trisatyatā'pi devānāmata evābhidhīyate || 2884 ||
tena svataḥpramāṇatve nānavasthobhayorapi |
pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve yathāyogamataḥ sthite || 2885 ||

“In transactions relating to debt and other heads, when there is a dispute between two disputants, there is one statement by the dependant and two by the plaintiff; and it is for avoiding an infinite regress that no further statements are recorded;—and it is on the basis of the said three statements alone that the master (judge), the witnesses and the assessors should come to a decision.—Thus, in all cases, there is a following up of three cognitions only; and it is for this same reason that the deities are called ‘trisatya’ (three-truth).—Thus then, if the validity of cognitions is inherent in them, there is no infinite regress; and the validity and invalidity remain as they happen to be in reality.”—(2882-2885)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts proceed to show that even in ordinary business-transactions, the conclusions of the Enquirer (Judge) require only three statements:—[see verses 2882-2885 above]

“Then again, if it be proved that the validity of Sense-perception and other Pramāṇas is due to extraneous causes,—the same is not the case with Verbal Cognition,—even so our position becomes established. Because the whole of this effort of ours is meant for the purpose of establishing the reliability of the Vedic Injunction; so that when it is proved that the validity of the Verbal Cognition is inherent, self-sufficient,—the reliability of the Vedic Injunction becomes automatically established;—what need there is then for our trying to prove the self-sufficient validity of the other forms of Cognition?”

With the above idea in his mind, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to prove the self-sufficient validity of Verbal Cognition:—[see verses 2886-2888 next]