Verse 2843-2846

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

किञ्चाप्रामाण्यमप्येवं स्वत एव प्रसज्यते ।
नहि स्वतोऽसतस्तस्य कुतश्चिदपि सम्भवः ॥ २८४३ ॥
अनपेक्षत्वमेवैकमप्रामाण्यनिबन्धनम् ।
इत्याद्यं वाऽप्यनिःशेषमभिधातुं हि शक्यते ॥ २८४४ ॥
विसंवादनसामर्थ्यं निश्चयं तु यथाऽन्यतः ।
तथा संवादसामर्थ्यं सर्वथाऽतो द्वयं समम् ॥ २८४५ ॥
ततः कोऽतिशयो दृष्टः प्रामाण्यस्य विपर्ययात् ।
येन स्वतस्तदेवेष्टं परतस्त्वप्रमाणता ॥ २८४६ ॥

kiñcāprāmāṇyamapyevaṃ svata eva prasajyate |
nahi svato'satastasya kutaścidapi sambhavaḥ || 2843 ||
anapekṣatvamevaikamaprāmāṇyanibandhanam |
ityādyaṃ vā'pyaniḥśeṣamabhidhātuṃ hi śakyate || 2844 ||
visaṃvādanasāmarthyaṃ niścayaṃ tu yathā'nyataḥ |
tathā saṃvādasāmarthyaṃ sarvathā'to dvayaṃ samam || 2845 ||
tataḥ ko'tiśayo dṛṣṭaḥ prāmāṇyasya viparyayāt |
yena svatastadeveṣṭaṃ paratastvapramāṇatā || 2846 ||

Then again, in the way that you have argued, invalidity also would have to be regarded as ‘inherent’; because (1) if it did not exist there by itself, it could not be brought about by anything; (2) because ‘self-sufficiency’ is the only basis for invalidity, so on and so forth,—all this (that you have urged in support of inherent validity) could be urged (in support of inherent invalidity);—and just as (according to you) the capacity for non-conformity (with the real state of things) and ‘certain cognition’ would be due to other causes, so (according to your opponent) would be the capacity for conformity and certain cognition; so that in all this, both would be on the same footing.—Under the circumstances, what peculiar feature have you seen in ‘validity’ which is not present in its contrary (‘invalidity’)—on the basis of which, the former has been held to be ‘inherent’ and the latter ‘extraneous’?—(2843-2846)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts point out the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the Reason—“because it is restricted to its presence [the Validity must be self-sufficient]”:—[see verses 2843-2846 above]

‘So also the capacity for conformity’—‘and certain cognition’ is to be construed here also.

‘Both would be on the same footing i.e. both Validity and Invalidity.

‘In its contrary’—i.e. in Invalidity.

Some people argue as follows—“The inherent character of the Capacities is not due to their eternality; nor is it due to the fact of their coming about from the causes of the Cognition itself; and it does not appear later on-on account of its being not dependent upon other causes; as a matter of fact, it is the potencies of things that come about, with specific characters, from the nature of the things themselves; and herein lies their ‘naturalness’ (or Inherent character). For instance, that same form (and character) which belongs to the causes is infused by them in their effect; for example, when the Jar is produced out of the potsherds, the colour and other properties in the Jar are brought about by the potsherds through their own properties; and as for the capacity to contain water, that capacity is not present in the potsherds, and hence that is not brought about in the Jar in the said manner; this capacity in fact, appears in the Jar by itself;—similarly, in the case of Cognitions, the capacity to differentiate and apprehend things, which, is not present in the sense-organs and other causes of the Cognitions, is not brought about by these causes; it appears in the Cognitions by themselves.—Thus it is that the Capacity is ‘natural’ (inherent)”.

This also is mere senseless babbling. Because by the same process of reasoning, Invalidity also may be shown to be ‘inherent For instance, ‘invalidity’ consists in ‘the capacity to differentiate and apprehend things otherwise than this real form’; and such capacity is not present in the Eye and other causes of Cognition.

Further, if it is true that the form that is not present in the Causes is not produced by them in the Effect,—then how is it that the Sense-organ and other causes of Cognition produce, in the Cognition, the form that was not present there before? Just as this form, though not present there, is produced there by the causes,—so, in the same manner, why could not they produce in it the capacity for apprehending things also? There can be nothing to prevent their producing such capacity.

Then again, if Potencies or Capacities are held to be non-different from the thing (to which they belong), then,—like the form of the Thing—the capacities also must have their existence concomitant with (and due to) their causes; whence then could they be ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’?—If’, on the other hand, the capacities are different from the thing,—then, as they would be existent by themselves, they would have no connection with their substratum (the Thing); as it would be rendering no help to them and what cannot render any help cannot be the substratum; otherwise, there would be incongruities. Further, as they would have no causes, they would be appearing by themselves without being dependent upon the exigencies of time and place. For instance, a thing, having come into existence, disappears only when it is dependent upon something else; that which is not so dependent, and operates by itself independently,—why should it cease to operate at any time or place? If that were so, then the capacities of things would not be restricted; anything could operate towards everything else.

Other people argue as follows:—“What has been said (by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2812)—as to the validity of the Pramāṇas being inherent in them, is on the basis of what is seen of their effects. Because it is only as positive existent entities that effects are produced by the Causes;—as is clear from the fact that the producing of effects is always restricted. What are mere non-entities,—such as the ‘sky-lotus’—cannot be produced anywhere; nor is oil produced out of Sands.—If the non-existent thing were produced, as all things would be equally non-existent, and there would be no difference among them on that score, their production should come about at all times and at all places

This cannot be right; as, in that case, the Cause would be entirely futile. According to you, nothing that is non-existent is produced; while as for the existent,—as it does not stand in need of anything,—what is there that could be produced for it; then what is there by producing which the Cause would be an active agent? So that under this view there would be an end to the -whole principle of Cause and Effect.

It might be argued that—“what is brought about by the Cause is the manifestation of what has been existent”.

That cannot be; because the bringing about of the Manifestation also would be incompatible with the view that it is existent or non-existent Because, in regard to the Manifestation also the same alternatives present themselves—before being brought about, has it been existent or non-existent?—In the former case, as nothing new is produced, the notion of its being ‘produced’ cannot be right. If it be held that there is manifestation of the existent Manifestation,—then there would be an infinite regress.—Nor is the second alternative acceptable; because the other party does not admit of the idea of anything non-existent being produced. Even if it be accepted, it would mean that in the case of a positive entity itself, what is produced is something non-existent.

Then again, when the Manifestation is produced, is it produced as something different from the entity manifested? Or as something riot-different from it?—If it is something different,—then such production of the Manifested entity would have no effect on the manifested entity itself; because the producing of one thing can have no effect on a thing different from it; if it did, there would be incongruities.

It might be said that—“the manifestation is produced in what is related to the manifested entity

That, however, cannot be so; because it cannot be related to it, as it is not benefited by it in any way.—If there is any benefit admitted,—if that is something different, etc. etc.—there is an Infinite regress. Hence there can be no relationship in the case.

If the Manifestation is not-different from the manifested entity,—then Causes become futile. If the Manifestation, in the form of some benefit, is produced out of the Entity in which it subsists,—then there should be such Manifestation at all times; as the cause of Manifestation, in the shape of the nature of the Entity, would be always there. It has been explained repeatedly that what cannot be benefited cannot depend upon anything else.

If then, the view is that what is produced is the Manifestation which is not-different from the entity,—that also cannot be right; as in that case there is nothing new produced. Because what the assertion, ‘The Manifestation, non-difîerent from the entity, is produced,’ means is that ‘the nature of the entity is produced’; and as this would be existent already, it could not need anything else; and hence the idea of its being produced would be most improper. Hence we are discussing this same view.

Then again, like the Manifestation, the entity also that would he produced, would have to be non-existent; as there is no difference between the two (ex hypothesi). Or, like the nature of the entity, the Manifestation also that would be produced would be existent. Nor is this right; as nothing new is produced in this case; as there would be an infinite regress, as already explained.

Further, if it be held that the Cause operates upon what is already existent, then there would be no cessation of the producing of effects by Causes; as in that case, on securing what, would the Causes cease to operate?—If it be urged that—“they would cease on securing the existence of the effect”—then that cannot be right; as, under your view, that existence would be already there. Hence that non-existent thing alone is produced of which there is a Cause,—and not such non-existent things as the ‘sky-lotus’; as there are no causes capable of producing these latter.

Thus it is that the causal relation is always restricted by the limitations of the efficiency of the Cause. Everything cannot be regarded as capable of producing everything else; as the efficiency of all things is restricted within limits through a beginningless ‘chain of causes’,

If the idea is that—“because validity, if not existent, could not be produced by anything else, therefore it is said to be inherent”,—then, for the same reason, Invalidity also should be regarded as inherent. Hence the explanation is not worthy of notice.

Some people argue as follows:—“The validity of the Cognition consists in its capacity to bring about the apprehension of the Object; and this Capacity resting in the Cognition, which is momentary, if not existent by itself, cannot be produced; and no producing of it can be possible at any of the three points of time. For instance, it cannot be produced before the appearance of the Cognition, as it is in the Cognition that it subsists; and what is subsistent cannot be produced in the absence of the substratum.; e.g. the painting cannot be produced in the absence of the wall;—as if it did, it would cease to be subsistent. It is for this same reason of the Capacity being subsistent in the Cognition, that both cannot be regarded as produced simultaneously; e.g. the wall and the painting, which are the substratum and the subsistent respectively, are not produced at one and the same time.—Nor, on the other hand, can the Capacity be produced in the Cognition after the latter has been in existence; because the Cognition is momentary, and cannot continue to exist so long.—It is on all these grounds that the validity of all Pramāṇas is held to be inherent in them”.

All this cannot be right. Because, as regards the assertion that—“The validity of cognitions consists in the Capacity productive of the apprehension of things”,—this is entirely irrelevant; because ‘the apprehension of things’ is synonymous with ‘cognition’; and the Capacity subsisting in a Cognition cannot be productive of the same cognition; as in that case the capacity would not be subsistent in the Cognition; as the relation of cause and effect can be there only when both are there at one and the same time.

Then, it has been argued that—“being subsistent, the Capacity cannot be produced at the same time as, or before, the Cognition—This also cannot be right. Because, the two being non-different (ex hypothesi), the one cannot be subsistent in the other.

The fact of the matter is that when the nature of the thing itself is found to be capable of a particular effective action,—and there arises the question as to its exact character,—the same nature of the thing is called ‘Capacity’ (Potency); and it is not anything different. If the Capacity were something different from the Thing, the latter would cease to be an active agent; and there would be no possibility of aṇy relationship between the two. This has been already discussed several times.—Thus then the capacity of the Cognition forms its very nature, and is subject to the same fate; and as such, before the appearance of the Cognition, it remains nonexistent, just like the nature of the Cognition itself,—and is then brought about. There is no incongruity in this view of the matter.

It is also quite right that the Capacity is produced along with the Cognition itself; because the property that forms the nature of a thing must always share the same fate as that thing itself.

Or, the Capacity may be something different from the thing to which it belongs. Even so, as there can be no subsistence between the existent and the non-existent,—the said subsistence cannot be admitted. Because the Capacity cannot subsist in the Cognition, in the manner that ‘Being’ does; because it is always completely established and does not depend upon anything else. Nor can there be any substratum for the existent thing; as such a substratum can serve no useful purpose; as for instance, in the case of the Vindhya and the Himalaya mountains.—It might be said that—“what it brings about is continued existence”.—But that cannot be right. Because the ‘continued existence’ cannot be anything different from the existent thing. In fact, it is the nature of the existent thing itself that is spoken of as ‘continued existence’, with a view to the denial of ail other diversities. But the essence of the existent thing is not brought about by such a substratum; hence it is futile.—If the continued existence and the existent thing be different from one another, then anything tending to bring about existence would be futile; as what it would bring about is only something else, in the shape of the continued existence; but the bringing about of one thing cannot produce any effect in another thing; so in either case there would be futility of what brings about the continued existence.—It might be argued that—it brings about an existence related to it”.—That cannot be so; because there can be no relationship between ‘continued existence’ and the ‘existent’, as there is between the permanence and what brings about the permanence; and this would also lead to an infinite regress. This has been so often discussed.

Then again, if the ‘continued existence’ that makes the thing ‘lasting’, be admitted to be something different from that thing,—then, there can be no Destruction of anything at all; as the continued existence conducive to permanence would be always there.—Nor can it be asserted that—“Even though the continued existence is there, there would be destruction by causes leading to that Destruction”. Because such cause also, being futile, could not bring about the Destruction. Because in this case also, the following alternatives present themselves: When the cause of Destruction brings about the Destruction, does it bring this about as something different from the Thing destroyed? Or is it the Thing itself?—It cannot bring about the Thing itself; as this is already there as an accomplished entity; and if it brings about something different, then it brings about nothing in the Thing itself, which continues to remain as before. Then again, as there can be no Destruction of anything, the cause of Destruction must be futile; all this has been discussed in detail in course of the examination of the ‘Permanence of Things

Further, by its very nature, the thing could be either impermanent or permanent.—If then, the thing appearing from its cause is impermanent by its nature, then, as soon as that impermanent thing has come about, it should cease to exist by itself,—so that there would be nothing to be done by the two causes—that of continued existence, and that of Destruction.—If, on the other hand, the Thing is permanent, by its nature,—even so, as its nature could not be altered, there would be nothing that could destroy it; and being permanent, by itself, there could be nothing that could make it lasting; so in both cases the causes of Continuance and of Destruction would be futile.

Nor can it be right to hold that the Capacity subsists in something nonexistent. Because what is non-existent is devoid of all character,—it cannot have anything introduced into it; nor can it be operative; hence it would be like the ‘Hare’s Horn’,

From all this it follows that the Capacity cannot be subsistent in anything.

If it were admitted that the Capacity is subsistent;—even so, the Reason would be ‘Inconclusive’; because even though Colour, etc. do not subsist in the Jar, they are produced along with it.

Then again, the same could be said regarding Invalidity also; for instance, Invalidity also consists in the capacity productive of the wrong apprehension of things;—and when this Capacity subsists in the Cognition, it cannot be produced at any of the three points of time; so that, as in the case of Validity so in that of Invalidity also, the Capacity consisting of this Invalidity should be inherent in the Cognition.

Further, if at any time, the Capacity of the cognition does not come into existence, then the Cognition becomes devoid of all Capacity. When a certain property is not produced in it at any time, how can that property belong to it? For instance, corporeality can never belong to Ākāśa. Where, too, have the Capacities learnt this wonderful magic whereby, even though never produced in the Cognition at any time, they enjoy association with it?—It might be said that—“They enjoy some wonderful substance by reason of their eternality”.—But that is not possible; because in that way everything would be endowed with such Capacities; as there would be nothing to restrict them. When a certain thing is not under the influence of another, we see no reason why it should be restricted in its association with certain particular things only; hence there can be nothing to show that such capacities belong to the Cognition alone, not to anything else. Consequently, there being no restrictive agency near at hand, the Capacities should belong to all things; as has been explained before.

Nor can there be any substratum for these capacities, as no useful purpose could be served by such a substratum; specially because, being eternal, they cannot have any additional character produced in them.—Enough of this discussion!—(2843-2846)