The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2827-2829 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2827-2829.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अथ शक्तिः स्वहेतुभ्यः प्रमाणानां प्रजायते ।
जातानां तु स्वहेतुभ्यो नान्यैराधीयते पुनः ॥ २८२७ ॥
तदत्र न विवादो नः को ह्यनंशस्य वस्तुनः ।
स्वहेतोरुपजातस्य शक्तिं पश्चात्प्रकल्पयेत् ॥ २८२८ ॥
यन्नामोत्तरकालं हि रूपमाधीयते परैः ।
तद्भावान्तरमेवेति न तस्यात्मोपदिश्यते ॥ २८२९ ॥

atha śaktiḥ svahetubhyaḥ pramāṇānāṃ prajāyate |
jātānāṃ tu svahetubhyo nānyairādhīyate punaḥ || 2827 ||
tadatra na vivādo naḥ ko hyanaṃśasya vastunaḥ |
svahetorupajātasya śaktiṃ paścātprakalpayet || 2828 ||
yannāmottarakālaṃ hi rūpamādhīyate paraiḥ |
tadbhāvāntarameveti na tasyātmopadiśyate || 2829 ||

If the view taken is that—“the capacity is produced by the causes of the pramāṇas themselves, and is not something imposed upon them by other causes, after they have come out of their causes”,—[then the answer is as follows in the following text].—(2827)
Then, there is no dispute between us. Who is there who could make the assumption that the capacity of an indivisible thing is infused into it after that thing has been produced by its causes? Because the form that is subsequently infused into a thing by other causes is an entirely different entity; and it is not the character of this other entity that is being taught in the present context.—(2828-2829)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 2827]:

The Author now refers to the second alternative view [mentioned in the Commentary on 2817-2818; viz.: that “the Capacity is inherent, in the sense that though it is non-eternal, it appears at the same time that the Pramāṇas have their essence brought about by their causes”]:—[see verse 2827 above]

The following Text provides the answer to this view;—that it is open to the charge of ‘futility’:—[see verses 2828-2829 above]

[verses 2828-2829]:

Both kinds of things, permanent and impermanent,—which are indivisible—come about in their complete form always, as one indivisible whole; and no causal factor can, later on, infuse into them any capacity; if any such capacity were infused, it would mean the production of an entirely new thing, and not the infusion of the Capacity as a new feature of the same thing. If the Capacity is not regarded as part of the nature of the thing, it would cease to be an active agent; as has been explained before.—(2828-2829)

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