Verse 2819-2822

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सा चानित्येदृशी शक्तिः स्वहेतुबलभाविनी ।
स्वाभाविकी प्रमाणानां युष्माभिः कथमिष्यते ॥ २८१९ ॥
स्वाभाविक्यां हि शक्तौ स्यान्नित्यता हेतुताऽथवा ।
प्रमाणानां च तादात्म्यान्नित्यताहेतुते ध्रुवम् ॥ २८२० ॥
सदाभावोऽथवाऽभावोऽहेतुत्वेऽप्यनपेक्षणात् ।
अतः कार्यं तदायत्तं कादाचित्कं न युज्यते ॥ २८२१ ॥
दृश्यते च प्रमाणानां स्वरूपं कार्यमेव च ।
कादाचित्कमतः शक्तिर्व्यक्ता स्वाभाविकी न वः ॥ २८२२ ॥

sā cānityedṛśī śaktiḥ svahetubalabhāvinī |
svābhāvikī pramāṇānāṃ yuṣmābhiḥ kathamiṣyate || 2819 ||
svābhāvikyāṃ hi śaktau syānnityatā hetutā'thavā |
pramāṇānāṃ ca tādātmyānnityatāhetute dhruvam || 2820 ||
sadābhāvo'thavā'bhāvo'hetutve'pyanapekṣaṇāt |
ataḥ kāryaṃ tadāyattaṃ kādācitkaṃ na yujyate || 2821 ||
dṛśyate ca pramāṇānāṃ svarūpaṃ kāryameva ca |
kādācitkamataḥ śaktirvyaktā svābhāvikī na vaḥ || 2822 ||

How can such a ‘capacity’ of pramāṇas—which is non-eternal, as coming into existence through the efficiency of its cause,—be held by you to be ‘natural’ ‘inherent’?—(2819)

If the ‘capacity’ (of pramāṇas) were ‘natural’ (inherent), the pramāṇas themselves would have to be regarded as eternal and without cause. because pramāṇas would be of the same nature, they would surely be eternal and without cause.—(2820)

In the event of the pramāṇas being without cause, they would be either permanently existent or permanently non-existent; because they would not be dependent upon anything; under the circumstances, the effect contingent upon those pramāṇas could not be occasional;—as a matter of fact, however, the form as well as the effect of pramāṇas is found to be occasional;—hence it is clear that for you, the ‘capacity’ in question cannot be ‘natural’ (inherent).—(2821 -2822)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 2819]:

If it is meant that the Capacity is not-different (from the thing, the Pramāṇa),—then, it could not be ‘natural’, ‘inherent Because things, as coming into existence through the efficiency of their causes, must be non-eternal; so that the Capacity also, if non-different from the thing, would have to be regarded as non-eternal, on account of its coming into existence through the efficiency of its cause. Otherwise, not sharing the same fate, the two could not be non-different

This is what is pointed out in the following:—[see verse 2819 above]

Further, if the Pramāṇas are non-different from the said ‘Capacity’, they would themselves, like the Capacity, be eternal and without cause.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—[see verse 2820 above]

[verse 2820]:

Question:—“What is the harm if that is so?”

Answer:—[see verses 2821-2822 above]

[verses 2821-2822]:

If they are without cause, they must either exist for ever, or never exist at all. That in the event of their eternality, they must exist for ever—is well known: hence it has not been mentioned separately.

Another incongruity is pointed out—‘Under the circumstances, etc. etc.’

‘Tadāyattam’—contingent upon the Pramāṇas.

This shows that the Proposition of the other party is contrary to Perception and Inference. For instance, that the form of the Cognitions and their Means is occasional, is known by direct Perception,—and is also inferred from the fact of its effects appearing successively, one after the other. Thus these two Means of Cognition clearly set aside the idea of the said Eternality of Cognitions.—(2821-2822)

In the following Text, the other party makes an attempt at avoiding the two incongruities just urged:—[see verse 2823 next]