Tattvasangraha [with commentary]
by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 2705-2706 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2705-2706.
Verse 2705-2706
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
स ह्यर्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं शाब्दिकैः परिकल्पितः ।
वर्णा एव च तच्छक्ता इत्यनर्थाऽस्य कल्पना ॥ २७०५ ॥
दृश्यस्यादृष्टितश्चास्य नास्तिताऽध्यवसीयते ।
अदृश्यत्वे तु नैवायं लिङ्गवज्ज्ञापको भवेत् ॥ २७०६ ॥sa hyarthapratipattyarthaṃ śābdikaiḥ parikalpitaḥ |
varṇā eva ca tacchaktā ityanarthā'sya kalpanā || 2705 ||
dṛśyasyādṛṣṭitaścāsya nāstitā'dhyavasīyate |
adṛśyatve tu naivāyaṃ liṅgavajjñāpako bhavet || 2706 ||The ‘sphoṭa’ has been assumed by the grammarians for the purpose of explaining the cognition of the meanings of words.—But the letters themselves being competent to express the meaning of words, the assuming of the said sphoṭa is futile. As it would be perceptible (if it existed), but is not perceived, it is concluded that it does not exist.—If it is imperceptible, then it cannot be indicative, like the inferential indicative (which is effective only when perceived).—(2705-2706)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
[There is a lacuna in the text of the Commentary].
‘As it would be perceptible, etc. etc.’—Nothing apart from the Letters,—in the form of Word, eternal and indivisible,—is ever perceived by auditory perception. On the contrary, what is clearly proved is the fact that no such ‘Sphoṭa’ exists at all.
If the second view is accepted.......[the reference is clearly to the lacuna]—the cause could be either positive or negative or both positive and negative,—these are the only alternatives possible.—According to the first view (?).... the Cause could be either the property of what is called ‘Sphoṭa’, or that of something else. It cannot be the former, as the Sphoṭa itself has been shown to be non-existent. Nor could it be the property of something else; because it could not subsist in the ‘subject’; just like the ‘arms and feet’ in the proving of the non-eternality of the Jar (?).—Nor could the cause be the property of something negative; as that could prove only the contrary of what is desired.—Nor could it be both positive and negative; as that is always ‘inconclusive’.
Then again, is the ‘Sphoṭa’ proved by a Reason based upon the nature of the thing? Or by one based upon the Causal Relationship?—The former view cannot be right; because as it is beyond the senses, its nature cannot be known; if it were known, there would be no point in seeking for the proof of its existence; as its nature would be already known; and the whole attempt is to prove its existence and nature.—Nor is the second view acceptable, because no causal relation can be known in relation to what is beyond the senses.
It might be argued as follows:—“In the case of the Auditory and other perceptions, when it is found that they appear only occasionally, it is concluded that they are dependent upon other causes also; and from that, by implication, it is concluded that there is the Auditory organ; in the same manner, in the case in question, the comprehension of meaning being the ‘subject’, it is found that even when the Letters are the same,—as in the case of the words ‘sara’ and ‘rasa’—the meanings comprehended are different; from which we shall infer the presence of another Cause, in the shape of the ‘Sphoṭa’”.
This also cannot be right; because nothing apart from the Letters is known. As it has just been established that it is the Letters themselves which, varying in each Word, become capable of bringing about the comprehension of the meaning, through the variations in the relation of Cause and Effect. So that the assumption in question is entirely futile.
It is also implied that the same objections apply also to the view that the existence of the ‘Sphoṭa’ can be inferred.
It might be argued that—“it is not to be inferred, but it is absolutely imperceptible”.
The answer to that is—‘If it is imperceptible, etc. etc.’—Just as the inferential Indicative, while it is itself unknown, does not bring about any cognition,—so this Sphoṭa also, while itself unknown, cannot bring about the comprehension of the meaning.—(2705-2706)