The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2699-2704 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2699-2704.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नित्यतायां तु सर्वेषामर्थापत्तिरपाकृता ।
अर्थप्रतीतिरूपत्वमनित्येषु हि साधितम् ॥ २६९९ ॥
यो यद्विवक्षासम्भूतविवक्षान्तरतस्थि(स्त ?)तः ।
वर्ण उत्पद्यते तस्य श्रुतिस्तत्समनन्तरम् ॥ २७०० ॥
पूर्ववर्णविदुद्भूतसंविन्नातिद्रुतश्रुतिः ।
सोऽपेक्ष्य तत्स्मृतिं पश्चात्कुरुते स्मृतिमात्मनि ॥ २७०१ ॥
तत्समुत्थापकग्राहिज्ञानानि प्रति जन्यता ।
हेतुता वाऽनुपूर्वीयं वर्णेषु पुरुषाश्रया ॥ २७०२ ॥
अतः प्रतिपदं भिन्ना वर्णा इति परिस्फुटम् ।
दमो मदो लता ताल इत्यादिक्रमभेदतः ॥ २७०३ ॥
ईदृशेन क्रमेणैते त्वर्थभेदोपपादकाः ।
अतएव निरर्थेह स्फोटस्यापि प्रकल्पना ॥ २७०४ ॥

nityatāyāṃ tu sarveṣāmarthāpattirapākṛtā |
arthapratītirūpatvamanityeṣu hi sādhitam || 2699 ||
yo yadvivakṣāsambhūtavivakṣāntaratasthi(sta ?)taḥ |
varṇa utpadyate tasya śrutistatsamanantaram || 2700 ||
pūrvavarṇavidudbhūtasaṃvinnātidrutaśrutiḥ |
so'pekṣya tatsmṛtiṃ paścātkurute smṛtimātmani || 2701 ||
tatsamutthāpakagrāhijñānāni prati janyatā |
hetutā vā'nupūrvīyaṃ varṇeṣu puruṣāśrayā || 2702 ||
ataḥ pratipadaṃ bhinnā varṇā iti parisphuṭam |
damo mado latā tāla ityādikramabhedataḥ || 2703 ||
īdṛśena krameṇaite tvarthabhedopapādakāḥ |
ataeva nirartheha sphoṭasyāpi prakalpanā || 2704 ||

The presumption put forward in support of the eternality of all things has been already discarded. It has also been proved that the comprehension of the meanings of words is possible only when words are not eternal.—When one letter-sound is produced by the ‘desire to utter,’ following from the desire to utter another letter-sound,—the former is heard immediately after the latter;—the cognition proceeding from the cognition of the preceding letter is not heard very quickly; in fact, with the aid of the remembrances of the previous letters, the latter brings about its own remembrance later on. Thus it has the character of an effect, in relation to the cognitions leading up to, and apprehending, it.—Or, the order of the letters may be dependent upon men. From all this it follows that the letters clearly vary with each word; as is found in the case of such words as ‘dama’-‘mada’, ‘latā’-‘tāla’ etc., where the letters are the same but their order different in the two words. It is under this order of sequence that these words become expressive of different meanings.—Consequently, the assumption of the ‘sphoṭa’ also is absolutely futile in this connection.—(2699-2704)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Presumption has been discarded.’—Under Text 2617, it has been shown that the Presumption is wrong and also annulled by other means of Cognition.

[The text is corrupt.]

The upshot of the whole of this argument is as follows;—In the ‘chain’ of the Speaker, from his desire to speak, there arises a series of Cognitions, each member of which is produced by its predecessor;—and these ideas arouse each Letter-sound; thus the several Letter-sounds come about; and these directly produce, in the ‘chain’ of the Hearer, successive Cognitions,—each member of which is helped by its predecessor; later on, these Cognitions bring about successive remembrances relating to themselves, indirectly in due order.

Consequently, these Remembrances come to be regarded as ‘effects’ in relation to the cognitions appearing in the Speaker’s ‘chain’, which have given rise to the Remembrances; while in relation to the cognitions appearing in the Hearer’s ‘chain’, they come to be regarded as the ‘Cause Herein lies their ‘order of sequence’;—nowhere else. Thus, as the character of the Letters in every word, is variable,—sometimes appearing as causes and sometimes as effects,—it is only right that in the case of such similar words as ‘sara’ and ‘rasa’, the resultant cognitions should be different. But this cannot be right if the Letters and words are eternal; as eternal things retain the same form at all times. Nor in their case can any order of sequence be regarded as something different from themselves. Even if it were something different, there would be no relationship between them; this is what is really meant.

The meaning of the words of the Text is now explained:—‘When one Letter-sound is produced’—such is the construction.—In the case of such words as ‘sadā’ and ‘samaya’, there is the vowel ‘a’ after ‘s’,—there is desire to utter this arising from the desire to utter ‘s’; hence this is ‘another desire—What is meant is as follows:—In the Speaker’s ‘Chain’, there is one ‘desire to utter’ following from another, and so on; this desire is followed by the Letter-Sound produced,—this Sound brings about the Remembrance; such is the connection with what follows in the text later on.

Having thus described the fact of the Letters being ‘effects’ of the series of ‘desires to speak’ in the Speaker’s ‘Chain’,—the author proceeds to point out the fact of its being the ‘cause’ of the cognitions appearing in the Hearer’s ‘Chain’—‘The former is heard, etc. etc.’—‘Tasya’ refers to ‘yaḥ’ in the previous line;—its hearing is produced, it is heard—‘immediately’—without anything intervening.

Having thus shown that it is the cause of the Hearer’s Cognition, the author now proceeds to show that it is the cause of Remembrance.—‘Not heard very quickly’—quick hearing being incapable of being produced by Remembrance.—‘The latter’—i.e. the later ‘Letter—‘Remembrances’—of the previous Letters in the chain.—‘With the aid’—with the help of it, it arouses the Remembrance with regard to itself;—‘the cognitions leading up to, and apprehending, it’,—‘it’ stands for the Letter;—this is to be treated as a Copulative Compound; or even as a Tatpuruṣa or Karmadhāraya and in relation to these cognitions, these are ‘effects’; but they are ‘causes’ in relation to the subsequent cognitions and remembrances.

Having thus discarded the idea of the ‘order’ being something different (from the Letters or Words), the Author proceeds next to discard the view of the Grammarians that the ‘word’ that is expressive is of the nature of a ‘8phoṭa’, which is something entirely different from the Letter-sounds,—by the sentence beginning with ‘Consequently’.—(2699-2704)

[It has to be noted that the commentary is very incomplete in the printed text; and much of the translation there is based upon mere surmise.]

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