The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2642-2648 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2642-2648.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सम्बन्धाख्यानकाले तु गोशब्दादावुदीरिते ।
केचित्सम्बन्धबुद्ध्याऽर्थं बुध्यन्ते न परे तथा ॥ २६४२ ॥
यस्मात्सम्बन्धसद्भावाद्यादृशः स प्रकाशितः ।
तावकीने तु सम्बन्धे सर्वोऽर्थमवधारयेत् ॥ २६४३ ॥
शक्तिरेव हि सम्बन्धो नित्या युष्माभिरिष्यते ।
सा चार्थबोधजनने नियताऽनवधिर्न वा ॥ २६४४ ॥
नियतानवधौ सर्वः किमर्थं नावधारयेत् ।
सावधावपि को हेतुः प्रकृतिश्चेत्स्वतस्तथा ॥ २६४५ ॥
सङ्केतग्रहणात्पूर्वं तस्य चास्मरणे पुनः ।
एकस्यैव प्रवृत्तं किं विज्ञानं तत्र वृत्तिमत् ॥ २६४६ ॥
तज्ज्ञानजन्मनियता सा हि शक्तिरवस्थिता ।
अथ ज्ञातैव सा शक्तिर्नियता परिकल्प्यते ॥ २६४७ ॥
ज्ञाताऽज्ञाता च भिन्ना चेन्नित्यत्वमवहीयते ।
ऐक्ये तु किंनिमित्तोऽयं विभाग उपवर्ण्यते ॥ २६४८ ॥

sambandhākhyānakāle tu gośabdādāvudīrite |
kecitsambandhabuddhyā'rthaṃ budhyante na pare tathā || 2642 ||
yasmātsambandhasadbhāvādyādṛśaḥ sa prakāśitaḥ |
tāvakīne tu sambandhe sarvo'rthamavadhārayet || 2643 ||
śaktireva hi sambandho nityā yuṣmābhiriṣyate |
sā cārthabodhajanane niyatā'navadhirna vā || 2644 ||
niyatānavadhau sarvaḥ kimarthaṃ nāvadhārayet |
sāvadhāvapi ko hetuḥ prakṛtiścetsvatastathā || 2645 ||
saṅketagrahaṇātpūrvaṃ tasya cāsmaraṇe punaḥ |
ekasyaiva pravṛttaṃ kiṃ vijñānaṃ tatra vṛttimat || 2646 ||
tajjñānajanmaniyatā sā hi śaktiravasthitā |
atha jñātaiva sā śaktirniyatā parikalpyate || 2647 ||
jñātā'jñātā ca bhinnā cennityatvamavahīyate |
aikye tu kiṃnimitto'yaṃ vibhāga upavarṇyate || 2648 ||

At the time of the assertion of the connection, when the word ‘cow’ is uttered, some people, who are cognisant of the connection, comprehend its meaning,—while others do not;—and the reason for this lies in the presence of the connection in the form and manner in which it has been made known.—Under your view of the ‘connection’, however, all men should comprehend the meaning; because according to you, the connection consists of potency only, and potency is eternal; so that it should be able to bring about the cognition of the meaning at all times; or, otherwise, it should not be free from limitations.—If being eternal, it were free from limitations,—why should not all men comprehend the meaning of the word?—If, on the other hand, it has limitations,—what would be the reason for such limitation, when it is in the nature of the potency itself? A man who has no knowledge of the convention (bearing on the word), or when he has forgotten it,—does the cognition of the meaning appear in the same one man? Because the potency restricted to the production of that cognition is there all the time,—the idea is that the eternal potency is effective only when it is itself known,—so that, if the known potency be different from the unknown one,—then it loses its eternality;—while if it is the same, why is this distinction set forth?—(2642-2648)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2264, that—“At the time that the Connection is asserted, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2642-2648 above]:

The proper idea would be that some people comprehend the meaning of words through that relationship of cause and effect which might be there; because the fact always remains that such relationship is the means of such comprehension.

But as regards the Relationship that you posit, everything is wrong. This is what is pointed out by the words—‘Under your view of the Connection however, etc. etc.’ That is (in the case of words) the Connection is held to be a form of Potency,—and Potency is described as productive capacityand this capacity is held to be eternal and uniform;—and always restricted to the bringing about of the cognition of the meaning.

Now the question that arises is—Being thus restricted to the bringing about of the Cognition of the meaning,—is this Potency held to be without limitations,—not limited to a few persons only—or is it otherwise? These are the only possible alternatives.

Under the first alternative (that it is without limitations), all men would have the Cognition of the meaning at one and the same time.—Under the second alternative also, the cause that serves to restrict the said productiveness of the Potency to certain persons has got to be pointed out; because in the case of all evanescent effects, there are always certain causal factors that go to regulate and restrict their productivity; not so in the case of eternal things.

The following might be urged—“In the case of eternal things also, their very nature is such that they bring about only certain effects, not all. And certainly no one can object to the nature of things”.

In that case, if such is its nature by itself, independently of other things, then, prior to the knowledge of the Convention, or on forgetting the Convention,—under such conditions also, the man who has comprehended that restricted meaning would continue to do so for all time; because the capacity of the Potency to produce that particular cognition would remain there permanently.

The following might be urged:—“As the Potency brings about the Cognition, the Potency in the shape of the Relationship can bring about Cognition only after it has itself been recognised,—not while it itself remains uncognised; hence the incongruity pointed out does not arise”.

This is not right. If it is held that the Potency as known differs from the Potency as unknown,—then it loses its eternality.—If there is no difference between them, there is no justification for making any such distinction as the ‘Potency known’ and ‘Potency unknown’. Because for the same person, one and the same thing cannot have the two mutually contradictory characters of being known and unknown.—(2642-2648)

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