Verse 2636-2639

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

घटादावपि सामान्यं प्रागेव विनिवारितम् ।
नहि भूतगुणप्रख्या काचिदाकृतिरिष्यते ॥ २६३६ ॥
नचास्याकृतितः सिद्धा शक्तिरब्धारणादिषु ।
तेषामपि हि नित्यत्वमाकृतेर्यद्यभेदिनः ॥ २६३७ ॥
भेदे सम्बन्धदोषस्तु तदुत्पत्तौ त्वनित्यता ।
अतो नाकृतितो युक्ता शक्तिरब्धारणादिषु ॥ २६३८ ॥
घटादेर्व्यतिरेकेऽपि शक्तेर्दोषा इमे ध्रुवम् ।
अब्धारणादि तत्कार्यं नित्यमेवं प्रसज्यते ॥ २६३९ ॥

ghaṭādāvapi sāmānyaṃ prāgeva vinivāritam |
nahi bhūtaguṇaprakhyā kācidākṛtiriṣyate || 2636 ||
nacāsyākṛtitaḥ siddhā śaktirabdhāraṇādiṣu |
teṣāmapi hi nityatvamākṛteryadyabhedinaḥ || 2637 ||
bhede sambandhadoṣastu tadutpattau tvanityatā |
ato nākṛtito yuktā śaktirabdhāraṇādiṣu || 2638 ||
ghaṭādervyatireke'pi śakterdoṣā ime dhruvam |
abdhāraṇādi tatkāryaṃ nityamevaṃ prasajyate || 2639 ||

As regards the jar and other things also, the ‘universal’ has been already discarded.—The ‘configuration’ (‘universal’) is not held to be a quality of material substances.—Nor is the capacity of the jar, to contain water for instance, known from its ‘universal’,—if the jar, etc. are non-different from the ‘universal’, then, like it, they also should be eternal. If then, they are different from the ‘universal’, then it becomes open to objections relating to the relation between the two.—If the relationship were something produced, then the universal would be non-eternal.—Hence the capacity (of the jar) to contain the water cannot be due to the ‘universal’,—even if the jar etc. were different,—there would surely be all these objections regarding the ‘capacity’; and the effects of this ‘capacity’, in the shape of the containing of water, etc. would thus have to be regarded as eternal.—(2636-2639)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2258, that—“If it be argued that the same arguments apply to the Jar, etc. also, then the answer is that it is not so, because what is recognised in the case of these is the Universal, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2636-2639 above]:

‘Already discarded’—in course of the examination of the ‘Universal’.

The refutation of the ‘Universal’ is briefly set forth here also: ‘The Universal is not, etc, etc,’—You, Mīmāṃsaka, do not hold the ‘universal’ to be a quality of the material substances,—earth, water, etc.—like their dark colour, etc.,—as something distinct from those substances.—Though it is held to be visible, it is never seen.

Nor can it be right to regard it as non-different from these; as in that case the particular material thing also—like the Jar—would have to be regarded as eternal, just like its Universal.

Even when it is regarded as different from these things,—it becomes open to the objection that there can be no relationship between them. Between two different things, the only relation possible is the causal one—that the one should be produced by the other; so that if the Universal were regarded as produced by the Individual things,—then the Universal would become non-eternal, on account of its liability to being produced, like the Jar.

In some places, the reading is ‘nityatā’, ‘eternality’, for ‘anityatā’, ‘non-eternality’; the meaning in that case is as follows:—If it is held that the Jar, etc. are produced from the Universal, then the Jar, etc. would have to regarded as eternal; that is, this cause being always there, the Jar, etc. would be there at all times.

If the Universal (or the Jar) be regarded as being of the nature of both, then it becomes open to the objections that relate to both;—and it also leads to its being deprived of its one-ness; because one and the same thing cannot be of the nature of two things. So that the two would be two distinct entities,—and not one, of the nature of both. If the thing be held to be neither the one nor the other, then it ceases to be an entity. It has also to be pointed out that one and the same thing cannot be both positive and negative.

‘All these objections’—in the shape of (1) absence of relationship, (2) the contingency of being eternal and so forth.—There is the additional objection that the work of containing water, etc, also would have to be regarded as eternal,—(2636-2639)