Verse 2621

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

कार्यकारणभावश्च समयाद्येन निश्चितः ।
स विवक्षां प्रपद्येत शब्देभ्यो हस्तकम्पवत् ॥ २६२१ ॥

kāryakāraṇabhāvaśca samayādyena niścitaḥ |
sa vivakṣāṃ prapadyeta śabdebhyo hastakampavat || 2621 ||

It is only when the man has definitely recognised the said causal relationship through convention that he comprehends, from words, the desire to speak; as in the case of the gestures of the hand.—(2621)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Says the Opponent:—“If that is so, then Convention becomes useless; the said causal relation being determined by the said Perception and Nonapprehension”.

The answer to that is as follows:—[see verse 2621 above]:

The idea is as follows:—The causal relation that has been recognised is with mere ‘Desire to Speak’ in general; as for the said relation with a particular ‘Desire to Speak’, as this would naturally be present in the ‘subjective chain’ of another person (to whom the words are spoken), it could not be known except through Convention; hence it is for the due ascertainment of this that the Convention is made.

Says the Opponent:—“How can this be ascertained through Convention also? If, at the time of the making of the Convention, the particular desire of the other person to speak were the means of bringing about the Cognition, then it might be that the Convention thereupon would, at the time of usage, serve to bring about the Cognition of the particular desire to speak. As it is, however, the said means is not there yet. Because the Convention cannot be made without pronouncing the Word; so that if the particular ‘desire to speak’ were also comprehended from the same word, then there would be mutual interdependence. Because through Convention, the Word would indicate the particular Desire, and the Convention cannot be made without the Cognition of the particular and general desire to speak; hence there would be clear mutual interdependence”.

This does not affect our position. As a matter of fact, the whole verbal usage is admitted only on the basis of one’s own impressions; because it is radically wrong, illusory,—like the ideas of the man with the blurred vision having the idea of ‘two moons Where then does the point of the objection lie?

Nor indeed is the Word the only means of knowing the particular ‘Desire to Speak’, in all cases. Because there are other ways also in which the Convention can be made,—such as actually pointing to the thing, through Context, etc. by positing a special meaning and thereby indicating the particular ‘Desire to Speak’.

Thus there would be no mutual interdependence.

Then again, to you also, who uphold the affirmative view, the objection is equally applicable, that the Cognition of one man not bringing about the Cognition in another man, how can there be any certainty as to the speaker and the hearer having the Cognition of the same thing?—And without the common Cognition of such a thing; there can be no Convention.

The answer that you would make to this objection would be our answer also to your objection.

The following might be urged—“As the Word does not enter into the ‘Desire to Speak’, how can it have any connection with this desire ascertained through Convention? Any Convention that is made here cannot be indicative of any other me’aning; if it did, there would be incongruities”.

This does not affect our position. What is meant here by the term ‘Desire to Speak’ is that which, even when in confusion as to being in the form of the object or in its own form, does not vary with it. Because in reality it is only this that has the nature of the ‘Desire to Speak’.

And it is this particular form of the ‘Desire to Speak’ that is meant here. Convention also is made in relation to this Desire, not in regard to the Specific Individuality of things; and hence that same particular Desire is what is indicated by the word. Thus alone is it possible for it to be conceived of in that form. Mere desire in general cannot be expressed by the word; as has been explained above.—(2621)