Verse 2600

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

क्रमेण तु प्रयोगेऽस्य प्रत्यक्षेण न केवलम् ।
भेदोऽवगम्यते किन्तु लिङ्गादपि धियां क्रमात् ॥ २६०० ॥

krameṇa tu prayoge'sya pratyakṣeṇa na kevalam |
bhedo'vagamyate kintu liṅgādapi dhiyāṃ kramāt || 2600 ||

When the letter is pronounced in succession, one after the other, the diversity is not only directly perceived, but also inferred through the inferential indicative in the shape of the fact of the cognitions appearing in succession.—(2600)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Text shows that there is diversity also when the letter is pronounced in succession:—[see verse 2600 above]:

‘Not only directly perceived’;—because even so it is clearly apprehended, to be diverse, on account of the diversity in the notes, ‘Ṣaḍja’ and the rest.

This cannot be a ease of diversity among the manifesters; as that idea has been already discarded.

‘Through the Inferential Indicative’;—i.e. through Inference also; the argument being formulated as follows:—At the time that a thing does not come into existence, its cause is not present in an efficient form,—e.g. visual cognition does not appear when the set of its causes is devoid of the Eye, even though the other factors are there in the form of the Colour, the Light, the mental condition, and so forth;—at the time that the several cognitions of the single letter ‘ga’ appear, there do not appear those subsequent cognitions which are held to follow from the said cognitions;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider term; the presence of the efficient cause being invariably concomitant with coming into existence, and the said ‘presence’ being not- there,

Says the Opponent:—“If what you seek to prove is the negation of the presence of the efficient cause in general,—then your argument is superfluous; because even though the eternal Word-sound is a cause, there may be a deficiency due to the absence of its auxiliaries, which renders the appearance of the subsequent cognitions impossible; and this fact is admitted by your opponent.—If, on the other hand, what you are negativing is the causal efficiency of the Word-Sound in particular,—then your Reason is ‘Inconclusive’, and the Corroborative Instance is ‘devoid of the Probandum Because when the Visual Perception does not appear, its non-appearance is not due to the deficiency of the cause of the Word-Sound; it is due to the deficiency (absence) of the eye”.

This is not right. What we seek to prove is the fact in its general aspect. Nor is our argument ‘superfluous’ in that case. Because if the eternal thing had need of another cause, then alone could our argument be ‘superfluous’. As a matter of fact, however, the eternal thing does not depend upon another cause; because such a cause could not render any help to the eternal thing; and it is only what helps that is needed; otherwise there would be incongruities. Consequently, if the Word-Sound, independently, were held to be the cause, all the cognitions proceeding therefrom would always have the efficient cause present; and hence they would all appear at alt times. If they did not, then the non-appearance of the cognitions proceeding therefrom would indicate the inefficiency of the Word-Sound itself. How then can our argument be ‘superfluous’?

Even if what is meant to be proved were the deficiency of a particular Cause, our argument could not be ‘inconclusive’; nor would our Corroborative Instance be ‘devoid of the Probandum’; what is meant is as follows:—even when one thing is present, if the other thing does not come into existence, the former cannot be the cause of the latter,—according to you; e.g. Visual organ does not appear when Sound is present;—even when the particular forms of the letter ‘Ga’ are there, the Cognitions held to proceed from them do not come into existence; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.

Here also the fact of the Eternal Thing not needing another Cause supplies the reason for the annulment of the contrary conclusion.. The case of the Seed in the granary cannot be cited to the contrary; because the seed cannot be the primary cause of the Sprout. We desist from labouring this point further.—(2600)