The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2591-2593 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2591-2593.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

विलक्षणावभासेनाप्यर्थसंवेदने सति ।
रूपशब्दादिचित्तं स्यात्सर्वं सर्वार्थगोचरम् ॥ २५९१ ॥
ईषत्संमीलितेऽङ्गुल्या यच्च चक्षुषि दृश्यते ।
पृथगेकोऽपि साऽप्येवं भ्रान्तिर्निर्विषया मता ॥ २५९२ ॥
प्रतिबिम्बोदयस्त्वत्र प्रागेव विनिवारितः ।
सहैकत्र द्वयायोगान्मूर्त्तानां प्रतिघाततः ॥ २५९३ ॥

vilakṣaṇāvabhāsenāpyarthasaṃvedane sati |
rūpaśabdādicittaṃ syātsarvaṃ sarvārthagocaram || 2591 ||
īṣatsaṃmīlite'ṅgulyā yacca cakṣuṣi dṛśyate |
pṛthageko'pi sā'pyevaṃ bhrāntirnirviṣayā matā || 2592 ||
pratibimbodayastvatra prāgeva vinivāritaḥ |
sahaikatra dvayāyogānmūrttānāṃ pratighātataḥ || 2593 ||

If, even when what appears in the cognition is something quite different from the object, it be regarded as the cognition of that object,—then all cognitions of colour, sound and other things, would envisage all things.—(2591)

When the eye is slightly pressed by the finger, if a single object is perceived as diverse,—that also is pure illusion, entirely baseless.—(2592)

The reality of the appearance of the reflected image has already been discarded before; because two corporeal material objects cannot exist together, because they are mutually obstructive.—(2593)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 2591]:

In the following Text, the author refutes the charge of ‘Inconclusiveness against his Reason:—[see verse 2591 above]:

That all cognitions would have all things for their object is the Reason that serves to annul the conclusion of the other party.—(2591)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka in Text 2218 that—“When the eye is slightly pressed by the finger, even a single object is perceived as diverse, because of the diversity in the functioning of the eye,—the same thing happens in the case in question also”.

This also is discarded by what has been said above.

[verse 2592]:

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under the Text 2225, that—“Even granting that the Reflected Image really exists in the different places,—there can be no plurality, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2593 above]:

[verse 2593]:

The idea of the Reflected Image being an entity has been rejected before; where it has been shown that one corporeal object cannot occupy the same place as another and so forth.—(2593)

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