The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2586-2587 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2586-2587.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नैवं तद्ग(प्राग्न?)तया वृत्त्या प्रत्यग्वृत्ति समर्पितम् ।
बुध्यमानो मुखं भ्रान्त्या प्रत्यगित्यवगच्छति ॥ २५८६ ॥
प्रतिबिम्बकविज्ञानं स्वास्याद्यालम्बनं न तत् ।
तद्विलक्षणनिर्भासाद्रसशब्दादिवित्तिवत् ॥ २५८७ ॥

naivaṃ tadga(prāgna?)tayā vṛttyā pratyagvṛtti samarpitam |
budhyamāno mukhaṃ bhrāntyā pratyagityavagacchati || 2586 ||
pratibimbakavijñānaṃ svāsyādyālambanaṃ na tat |
tadvilakṣaṇanirbhāsādrasaśabdādivittivat || 2587 ||

Similarly it is not true that (in the case of the man looking at the mirror)—“it is through illusion that the man cognises the face as facing the west, though in reality what he actually perceives is the face as presented by the visual rays proceeding eastward to the rays as proceeding westward.”—(2586)

As a matter of fact, the perception of the reflected image cannot have the man’s own real face as its objective basis; because what figures in the perception is something entirely different from the real face; just as in the case of the perceptions of taste and sound, etc.—(2587)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 2586]:

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2224, that—“In the case of the man looking at the mirror, it is through illusion that, etc. etc.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2586 above]:

The reason why this is not true is stated in the following:—[see verse 2587 above]:

[verse 2587]:

Tadvilakṣaṇa, etc.’—This word has to be construed as with the abstract ending ‘tva’; and as a Bahuvrīhi compound.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a Cognition envisages something entirely different from a certain thing, it cannot have this latter for its objective basis;—e.g. the Cognition of Taste cannot have Sound for its objective basis; or the Cognition of Sound cannot have Taste for its objective basis;—the Cognitions of the reflected image envisage something entirely different from the real face;—hence here we have the apprehension of something contrary to the wider factor.—(2587)

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