The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2578-2583 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2578-2583.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

निराकारा धियः सर्वास्त्वत्पक्षेऽपि व्यवस्थिताः ।
आकारवान्पुनर्बाह्यः पदार्थोऽभ्युपगम्यते ॥ २५७८ ॥
जलाद्यन्तर्गतं चेदं प्रतिबिम्बं समीक्ष्यते ।
नभस्तलादिवर्त्ती च सूर्यादिर्न तथा स्थितः ॥ २५७९ ॥
तत्कस्माद्भात्यसावेवं भ्रान्त्या चेदत एव तत् ।
नतु स्पष्टमनालम्बं तद्रूपार्थवियोगतः ॥ २५८० ॥
तस्यैव प्रतिपत्तिश्चेदन्यथेदं सुभाषितम् ।
तच्चान्यथेति किंत्वेवं सर्वं स्यात्सर्ववेदकम् ॥ २५८१ ॥
तस्यैव प्रतिपत्तिः स्याद्यदीक्ष्येत तथास्थितम् ।
अन्याकारोपलब्धौ तु तस्य दृष्टिः कथं भवेत् ॥ २५८२ ॥
साकारेऽपि हि विज्ञाने न ज्ञातार्थाविलक्षणे ।
आकारे सति विज्ञानं ग्राहकं तस्य युज्यते ॥ २५८३ ॥

nirākārā dhiyaḥ sarvāstvatpakṣe'pi vyavasthitāḥ |
ākāravānpunarbāhyaḥ padārtho'bhyupagamyate || 2578 ||
jalādyantargataṃ cedaṃ pratibimbaṃ samīkṣyate |
nabhastalādivarttī ca sūryādirna tathā sthitaḥ || 2579 ||
tatkasmādbhātyasāvevaṃ bhrāntyā cedata eva tat |
natu spaṣṭamanālambaṃ tadrūpārthaviyogataḥ || 2580 ||
tasyaiva pratipattiścedanyathedaṃ subhāṣitam |
taccānyatheti kiṃtvevaṃ sarvaṃ syātsarvavedakam || 2581 ||
tasyaiva pratipattiḥ syādyadīkṣyeta tathāsthitam |
anyākāropalabdhau tu tasya dṛṣṭiḥ kathaṃ bhavet || 2582 ||
sākāre'pi hi vijñāne na jñātārthāvilakṣaṇe |
ākāre sati vijñānaṃ grāhakaṃ tasya yujyate || 2583 ||

Even under your view, all cognitions are formless, and it is only the external thing that is held to be with form. The reflected image that is seen is seen within the water; and yet the sun existing in the sky is not there in the water.—“How is it then that it appears as if in the water?”—It is through delusion, and hence it is that it is clearly devoid of an objective basis; because it has no connection with any object with that form.—If it is urged that “it is the same sun that is perceived otherwise”,—this would be another excellent assertion—the same and yet otherwise.—But in this way, every cognition would apprehend everything. It would be the cognition of the same sun only if it were seen exactly as it is; when however, it is actually perceived in another form, how could it be the perception of the same sun?—(2578-2582)

Even if the cognition be with form, it can be regarded as apprehending an object only if it has a form that is not different from the object that is cognised.—(2583)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verses 2578-2582]:

It has already been explained before that all wrong cognitions are, without exception, devoid of any objective basis; still it is explained again, in the following Text, in connection with the cognitions of the reflected images,—be they regarded as (a) with or (b) without form.—First the Author takes up the former view (that the Reflected Image has a form):—[see verses 2578-2582 above]:

For you, the Mīmāṃsaka, Cognitions are formless, and it is the external object that is with form. Hence what is seen in the water cannot be the form of the Cognition; because forms are held to belong to external things only.—Nor is the Reflected Image held to be an entirely different thing; as in that case, it would not be a case of the perception of the Sun at all,—Nor does the Sun itself enter the water, by virtue of which it could appear there (as the Reflected Image); because it remains in the regions of Ākāśa—If it be asserted that—“it is through illusion that it appears in the water”,—in that case, the Cognition would not have the Sun for its objective basis; because the form within the water does not belong to the Sun.—From all this it follows that the form that belongs to the object (Sun) does not figure in the

Cognition; and hence having no connection with that form, the said Cognition is clearly baseless (without an objective basis).

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When an Object has a form that does not figure in a Cognition, that Object cannot be the objective basis of that Cognition;—e.g. Colour cannot be the objective basis of Auditory Cognition;—the Sun does not have the form that figures in the Cognition of the Reflected Image;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character (which implies the absence of the less wide character).—The Reason here adduced cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’; because in reality the Sun does not have the form that is within the water.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’; as that would lead to incongruities; as in this way anything could be the objective basis of any Cognition.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’; as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is present.

It might be argued that—“It is the same Sun that is seen in the water, only it appears otherwise, on account of the difference in its position, and consequently, the Buddhist’s Reason is ‘Inadmissible’”.

Who, except an audacious logician like yourself, could make such an assertion as ‘it is the same—and otherwise’, Because the assertion ‘it is the same’ affirms that it is of the same form, and the assertion that ‘it is otherwise’ denies that it has the same form; how then could these two mutual contraries—Affirmation and Denial—appertain to the same thing (Sun)?

If, even when cognised as otherwise, the thing (Sun) were the same,—then the entire Universe might be regarded as the same; and as a consequence of this, the birth and death of things would come at the same time and all Cognitions would have one and the same object. From this it follows that if the thing were cognised as it actually exists in relation to particular time and place, etc. then, the same Sun would have been cognised. How then can our Reason be ‘Inadmissible’?—(2578-2582)

Under the second view also—that Cognitions are with form,—the Cognitions of the Reflected Images are devoid of objective basis;—this is what is pointed out in the following:—[see verse 2583 next]

[verse 2583]:

Even under the view that Cognitions are with form,—though the Cognition of the Reflected Image may be with form, yet, the external object can be said to be ‘cognised’ only when the form in which it is apprehended is not different from the external object itself,—and not when it is apprehended in a different form; if it were not so, there would be incongruities.

—In the case of the Cognitions of the Reflected Images, the apprehension is not of a form that is non-different from the form of the Sun; for if it were there, the Cognitions of the Reflected Images would be exactly the same as the true Cognition of the Sun itself.—(2583)

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