Verse 2554-2558

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यदा च संस्कृतिर्नैवं श्रोत्रे शब्दे च युज्यते ।
भेदाभेदविकल्पेन संस्कारानुपपत्तितः ॥ २५५४ ॥
व्यतिरेक हि संस्कारे श्रोत्रशब्दौ न संस्कृतौ ।
स्यातां ताभ्यां च सम्बन्धः संस्कारस्य न कश्चन ॥ २५५५ ॥
विभिन्नस्य हि सम्बन्धः कार्यकारणता भवेत् ।
तस्यां च सर्वदैवायं भवेद्धेतोः सदा स्थितेः ॥ २५५६ ॥
अनर्थान्तपक्षेऽपि तद्वन्नित्यो भवेदसौ ।
तन्न शक्यक्रियस्तस्मान्नित्यं ज्ञानं प्रसज्यते ॥ २५५७ ॥
तन्न सामर्थ्यनियमो वाय्वादेरुपपद्यते ।
कर्त्तव्यविषयायोगे सामर्थ्यस्याप्ययोगतः ॥ २५५८ ॥

yadā ca saṃskṛtirnaivaṃ śrotre śabde ca yujyate |
bhedābhedavikalpena saṃskārānupapattitaḥ || 2554 ||
vyatireka hi saṃskāre śrotraśabdau na saṃskṛtau |
syātāṃ tābhyāṃ ca sambandhaḥ saṃskārasya na kaścana || 2555 ||
vibhinnasya hi sambandhaḥ kāryakāraṇatā bhavet |
tasyāṃ ca sarvadaivāyaṃ bhaveddhetoḥ sadā sthiteḥ || 2556 ||
anarthāntapakṣe'pi tadvannityo bhavedasau |
tanna śakyakriyastasmānnityaṃ jñānaṃ prasajyate || 2557 ||
tanna sāmarthyaniyamo vāyvāderupapadyate |
karttavyaviṣayāyoge sāmarthyasyāpyayogataḥ || 2558 ||

Thus then, there is no ‘embellishment’ possible, either in the auditory organ or in the word-sound; because it is not possible for the embellishment to be either different or non-different (from them). For instance, if the embellishment is something different from the auditory organ and the sound, then these two cannot be regarded as ‘embellished’; as these would have no relationship with the embellishment; because between two different things, the only relationship possible is the causal one; and if this relationship were there, then the embellishment would be there at all times, as its cause would be there at all times.—Even under the view that the embellishment is not something different,—it would be eternal, like the auditory organ and the sound; and hence it could not be produced by anything; consequently the cognition (due to the embellishment) would be everlasting.—Because all this is so, therefore any regulation or restriction of the capacity of the air-currents, etc. cannot be possible; and when what is to be accomplished is not present, the capacity to accomplish it can be of no use.—(2554-2558)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2194, that—“The vibrating air-particles, which are the manifesters, etc. etc.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2554-2558 above]

‘Yadā’—Because—‘Evam’—‘Thus,—in the manner just described, this ‘because’ has to be construed with ‘tat’ ‘therefore, etc. etc.’ of Text 2558.

How this embellishment is not possible is explained in detaū, in the words—‘Because it is not possible for the embellishment, etc, etc.’—What is meant is as follows—When the embellishment comes, it could be either different or non-different (from the thing embellished); these are the only two possibilities, as the matter does not admit of a third alternative.

In the former case,—i.e. if it is different,—there could be no ‘embellishment’ of the auditory organ or of the Word-Sound; because what is brought about is different; and when the Jar is brought about, it is not the Cloth that is embellished. Nor can there be any relationship between the Embellishment and the said two (Auditory Organ and the Word-sound); by virtue of which by the bringing about of the Embellishment, which is their relative, those two could become embellished.—Because, as it has been held to be different, the relationship of the Embellishment with the Auditory Organ or the Word-Sound could not be of the nature of ‘identity’; in fact whenever there is a relationship between two different things, it can be only of the nature of Cause and Effect; as there could be no help in any other way. If there were this relation of Cause and Effect between the Embellishment and the other two (Auditory Organ and Word-Sound),—the Embellishment would be there for all time, as its cause, in the shape of the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound, would be there all the time (both of these being eternal, ex hypothesi).

Under the second alternative (that the Embellishment is not different from the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound), the difficulty is that—

‘Even under the view, etc. etc.’—‘Tadvat’—Like the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound.—‘Asau’—the Embellishment;—and hence, as it would be eternal, the Embellishment could not be produced or brought about by anything.

Thus, under the view that Cognitions are produced by the Embellishment, every cognition would be eternal. This is the difficulty in the Embellishment being eternal.

The whole argument is summed up in the words—‘Therefore any regulation or restriction, etc. etc.’—(2554-2558)