The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2539-2544 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2539-2544.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एकव्यापिनभःपक्षे विभागो न प्रकल्प्यते ।
संस्कृताश्रयमन्यच्चेत्येकमेव हि तन्नभः ॥ २५३९ ॥
एकव्योमात्मकं श्रोत्रं नास्त्यसंस्कृतशष्कुलि ।
अतोऽधिष्ठानभेदेन संस्कारनियमोऽस्थितः ॥ २५४० ॥
तेनैकस्मिन्नधिष्ठाने लब्धसंस्कारमिन्द्रियम् ।
बोधकं सर्वदेशेषु विज्ञानोत्पत्तिरिष्यताम् ॥२५४१॥
पुंसां देहप्रदेशेषु विज्ञानोत्पत्तिरिष्यताम् ।
किन्तु प्रधानवैदेश्यमेकत्वान्नभसो न ते ॥ २५४२ ॥
निष्प्रदेशोऽपि चात्मा नः कार्त्स्न्येन च विदन्नपि ।
शरीर एव गृह्णातीत्येवमुक्तेऽपि दुष्यति ॥ २५४३ ॥
बाधिर्याद्यव्यवस्थानमेतेनैव च हेतुना ।
तदेवाभोग्यमन्यस्य नाविशेषाद्धि युज्यते ॥ २५४४ ॥

ekavyāpinabhaḥpakṣe vibhāgo na prakalpyate |
saṃskṛtāśrayamanyaccetyekameva hi tannabhaḥ || 2539 ||
ekavyomātmakaṃ śrotraṃ nāstyasaṃskṛtaśaṣkuli |
ato'dhiṣṭhānabhedena saṃskāraniyamo'sthitaḥ || 2540 ||
tenaikasminnadhiṣṭhāne labdhasaṃskāramindriyam |
bodhakaṃ sarvadeśeṣu vijñānotpattiriṣyatām ||2541||
puṃsāṃ dehapradeśeṣu vijñānotpattiriṣyatām |
kintu pradhānavaideśyamekatvānnabhaso na te || 2542 ||
niṣpradeśo'pi cātmā naḥ kārtsnyena ca vidannapi |
śarīra eva gṛhṇātītyevamukte'pi duṣyati || 2543 ||
bādhiryādyavyavasthānametenaiva ca hetunā |
tadevābhogyamanyasya nāviśeṣāddhi yujyate || 2544 ||

Under the view that ākāśa is one and all-pervading, there can be no such division as that the one is the substratum of the embellished organ and the other is not so; because ākāśa is one (and indivisible).—If the auditory organ consists of the one ākāśa, then it cannot have its tympanum ‘unembellished’. Consequently, any restriction in the embellishment on the basis of the substratum cannot stand. Consequently, when the organ has secured the embellishment in one substratum, it should bring about the cognition in the bodies of all men;—according to those who declare the organ to be one only. You may hold that cognitions (sensations) appear in the various parts of the bodies of men; but according to you, there can be no diversity of place for the principal factor, in relation to ākāśa which is one only.—The other party might say—“according to us, the soul is without parts, indivisible, and it is in its entirety that it cognises things, and yet it actually apprehends if in the body only”;—but even with this, the view is open to objection: there would, in this case, be no such distinctions as that of the ‘deaf’ and the like, and for the same reason it would not be possible for one cognition not to be apprehended by another soul; as there is no difference between the two.—(2539-2544)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2185, that—“Even if the Auditory Organ were one and all-pervading, the Embellishment due to Articulation could affect only the material substratum of that organ, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2539-2544 above]

Anyat’—the substratum of the unembellished organ.

Such distinction is not possible in the case of what is without parts, indivisible. If there were, it would have to be regarded as with parts, divisible.—If the distinction were merely assumed (not real), then there would be an incompatibility regarding its being with and also without effective action; because effective actions never follow in the wake of mere assumptions; they are always related to real entities. Consequently, if the organ has become embellished in one substratum, it acquires thereby the capacity to bring about the cognition of things; so that in another substratum also, as the organ would really be the same, it would be embellished everywhere, and hence capable of bringing about the Cognition of things.

Thus what has been said (in Text 2542) regarding “the Cognitions, appearing in the several parts of the bodies of men”, becomes set aside; because there can be no real division in what is one only.—This is what is shown in the words ‘Puṃsām, etc. etc.’

Pradhānavaideśyam’.—‘Pradhāna’, ‘Principal Factor’, stands for the Body;—‘Vaideśya’—residence in different parts of Ākāśa.

Evamuktepi, etc.’—because there can be no division for what is one only.

Avyavasthānam’—impossibility of such distinctions.—(2539-2544)

The following Text shows how there is no difference between the two:—[see verse 2545 next]

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