Verse 2523

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

दूरासन्नादिभेदेन स्पष्टास्पष्टं यथेक्ष्यते ।
रूपं तथैव शब्देऽपि तीव्रमन्दादिविद्भवेत् ॥ २५२३ ॥

dūrāsannādibhedena spaṣṭāspaṣṭaṃ yathekṣyate |
rūpaṃ tathaiva śabde'pi tīvramandādividbhavet || 2523 ||

Just as on account of the differences in the shape of remoteness and nearness, the colour of things is seen indistinctly and distinctly (respectively),—in the same manner there would also be the cognition of lesser and greater intensity of the sound.—(2523)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued under the same Text (2175) that—“the greater and lesser intensity of Sounds would not be possible”.

The answer to that is as follows:—[see verse 2523 above]

Colour also is perceived without contact with the Eye and is not all-pervading,—and its perception is distinct or indistinct; in the same manner in the ease of Sound also, which also is not all-pervading and not in contact with the Ear, there would be Cognitions of greater or less intensity.

Objection:—“The other party does not admit of the perception of Colour without contact; how then is it put forward as the Corroborative Instance?” Answer:—This does not affect our position. Though it is by mere words that the other party does not admit it, yet what is vouched for by proofs must be admitted by both parties.

“What is the proof that vouches for the idea in question (that there is perception without contact)?”

The proof is provided by the fact that there is simultaneous perception of near and remote things. A thing that has movement gets at the nearer object quickly, and at the remoter object with some delay; when for instance, one goes from one village to another. But in the case of the Branch of the tree and the Moon seen through it,—the perception of both is simultaneous, as soon as the Eyes are opened. From this it is deduced that the Eye is operative without actually getting into contact with the object perceived.

In connection with this subject, Uddyotakara argues as follows:—“Inasmuch as Cognitions are produced quickly, there can be no perception of the time taken; hence the idea, that ‘the several Cognitions appear in the manner of the piercing of the hundred petals of the Lotus’, is not true”, This is not right. In this way, in the case of the two words ‘sara’ and ‘rasa’ also, there should be no recognition of the order in which the letters are heard; the quick production of the perception being present here also; and if that is so, then there should be no difference between the Cognition of the word ‘sara’ and that of ‘rasa And as there is ‘quick production’ in the case of all Cognitions, there would be no perception of any order of sequence at all.—This has been already thrashed out in detail before.

Again says Uddyotakara:—“Even if the Eye were operative without contact, the wall would have no power to obstruct it; hence there would be no concealment of things. Nor would there be this phenomenon that what is remote is not seen while what is near is seen.—It might be argued that—‘That object alone is seen which comes within range of the Eye, and what does not do so is not seen—But that is not so; without some sort of connection, there can be no coming within range. Because what is this coming within range, apart from being connected? The only difference is that what I call ‘connection’ is called by you ‘coming within range’; there is no other difference”.

This is not right. What is called by us coming within range is becoming the Cause;—not Connection. Because when the Eye produces Cognitions, the Object—Colour, etc.—becomes its auxiliary, and hence called its ‘objective’; and it is not called so because it comes into contact with it.—The purpose served by the aid provided by auxiliaries is of two kinds—(1) mutual benefit, e.g. between the Light-rays and the thing within cover,—and (2) serving the same purpose; e.g. when the man sees Colour immediately on opening his Eyes.—In both ways, the Object of the Cognition is so called because it is its peculiar Cause, and not because it is connected with it.

“This same restriction or specification of the Cause would not be possible without some Connection.”

Not so; because the necessary restriction is secured by the capacity of the Cause itself. In fact when the Cause is produced out of its own Cause? it is produced exactly in the form in which only some of it becomes productive of the Cognition, not all; because the difference among all things is due to the difference in their Causes.—Just as under your view,—even though the Connection is equally present in both cases, why is it that the Eye apprehends the Colour only, not the Taste?—It might be argued that—“the Taste is not apprehended because it is not connected with the Eye”.—Why should not the same Connection be present in the case of Taste also?—as the locus of both (Taste and Colour) is the same; and there is nothing to restrict the Connection (to Colour only),—whereby, even though residing in the same locus, the Eye comes up to the Colour only and not to the Taste, though this also is present at the same place,—and also it does not come up to the Colour also if it is very remote.

It might be urged that—“the restriction would be due to its own Cause”.

This can be said also under the view that the Eye is operative without contact.—Enough of this discussion.—(2523)

The following Text anticipates and answers an objection from the other party:—[see verse 2524 next]