Verse 2490-2493

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अन्यथा च तमेवार्थं वेत्तीति व्याहतं वचः ।
अन्याकारस्य संवित्तौ स ह्यर्थो विदितः कथम् ॥ २४९० ॥
निराकारे हि विज्ञाने बाह्याकारः स ते ध्रुवम् ।
बाह्यश्च न तदात्मेति किमसौ विद्यते तथा ॥ २४९१ ॥
साकारज्ञानपक्षेऽपि बाह्याकारानुरूपतः ।
ज्ञाने नर्भाससंभूतावर्थो विदित उच्यते ॥ २४९२ ॥
इह बाह्यानुरूपेण न तु ज्ञानं प्रवर्त्तते ।
तस्मान्निर्विषयं सर्वं भ्रान्तं चित्तमिति स्थितम् ॥ २४९३ ॥

anyathā ca tamevārthaṃ vettīti vyāhataṃ vacaḥ |
anyākārasya saṃvittau sa hyartho viditaḥ katham || 2490 ||
nirākāre hi vijñāne bāhyākāraḥ sa te dhruvam |
bāhyaśca na tadātmeti kimasau vidyate tathā || 2491 ||
sākārajñānapakṣe'pi bāhyākārānurūpataḥ |
jñāne narbhāsasaṃbhūtāvartho vidita ucyate || 2492 ||
iha bāhyānurūpeṇa na tu jñānaṃ pravarttate |
tasmānnirviṣayaṃ sarvaṃ bhrāntaṃ cittamiti sthitam || 2493 ||

The assertion that ‘one cognises the one thing as otherwise’ involves self-contradiction; i.e. what is cognised is another form, then how can the same object be said to be cognised? under the view that cognition is formless, it would exist only in the external form; consequently, if what is cognised is external and yet not of the nature of the external thing,—then how is it that it exists? Even under the view that cognitions have forms, the cognition always appears in accordance with the external form; and then alone is the object said to be ‘cognised’.—in the case in question, however, the cognition does not appear in accordance with the external form.—Hence it follows that all this cognition, which is wrong, is entirely objectless—(2490-2493)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—“The same Word-Sound, appearing in the ‘fast’ and other forms, would form the objective basis of the Cognition; as has been declared that ‘in every case the objective basis consists in the external thing varying with the variations of Time and Place The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2490-2493 above]

‘Self-contradiction’—‘The same’ and ‘Otherwise’ are mutually exclusive, the presence and absence of the one involving the absence and presence (respectively) of the other; and as such, these cannot co-exist in the same object.

Then again, under the view that forms do not belong to Cognitions, all Cognitions are false; while under the view that forms belong to Cognitions, all Cognitions are objectless. This is what is shown by the words—‘Under the view, etc., etc.’—For those who regard the Cognitions as formless, what is perceived is the Blue form as subsisting in the Object. The Conch-shell does not really exist in the yellow form in which it figures in the wrong Cognition; hence this is all the more clearly objectless.

Says the Opponent—“If the yellow form is not in the Object, then it must be in the Cognition; otherwise, if it were in neither, how could there be cognition of it? Thus if it resides in the Cognition, it behoves you to explain how Cognition can be formless?”

This is true; but when we assert that Cognition is objectless, we do so, on accepting the view that Cognition is formless. One who holds Cognitions to be formless has got to provide an answer to the question that has been raised.

Even under the view that the form resides in the Cognition, the apprehension of the Object is explained on the basis of the idea that what is actually apprehended is that form of the Cognition which bears the imprint of the form of the Object. In the case of wrong Cognition there is no apprehension of the form of Cognition bearing the imprint of the Object; hence the Cognition is clearly objectless. Apart from being with form and being without form, there is no other alternative possible, in regard to the apprehension of things. Hence it follows that all Cognition, which is wrong, is objectless.—(2490-2493).