Tattvasangraha [with commentary]
by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 2460-2461 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2460-2461.
Verse 2460-2461
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
गादेरप्येकतापत्तौ जात्येष्टं सिद्धसाधनम् ।
अतद्रूपपरावृत्तिरभिन्ना कल्पितैव हि ॥ २४६० ॥
व्यक्तीना(मेकतापत्तावनैकान्तिकता भवेत् ) ।
(प्रति) प्रयोगमाक्षाद्यैर्वर्णभेदविनिश्चयात् ॥ २४६१ ॥gāderapyekatāpattau jātyeṣṭaṃ siddhasādhanam |
atadrūpaparāvṛttirabhinnā kalpitaiva hi || 2460 ||
vyaktīnā(mekatāpattāvanaikāntikatā bhavet ) |
(prati) prayogamākṣādyairvarṇabhedaviniścayāt || 2461 ||If the one-ness of the letters ga, etc. that is urged as an; undesirable contingency, is in reference to the ‘universal aspect’, then the argument is superfluous; because the aspect of ‘exclusion of the unlike’ is already postulated by us as one and the same in all individuals.—If the individuals themselves were, urged to be one and the same, then the reason would be ‘inconclusive’; because the multiplicity of the individual letter has been definitely recognised, in every use of them, by means of sense-perception, etc.—(2460-2461)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
Five arguments have been set forth (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under Texts 2121 et seq.;—if what is meant to be proved by these is the one-ness of the ‘Universal’ in the shape of the ‘exclusion of others’, then they are superfluous, as proving what is already admitted by the other party; as a matter of fact, on the basis of the single uniform notion that people have in regard to all Individuals, the one ‘Universal’, in the shape of the ‘exclusion of others’, is admitted (by us).
If, on the other hand, what is meant to be proved is the one-ness of the Individuals themselves, in the form of their Specific Individualities; then the Premiss would be one that is contrary to and annulled by Perception and. Inference; and this would make all the Reasons ‘Inconclusive’,
‘By means of Sense-perception, etc. etc:—‘Ākṣa’ is pertaining to ‘akṣa’, sense-organ. ‘Etc.’ includes Inference. The Plural number is in view of the large number of individual Perceptions and Inferences.—(2460-2461)